Gun-toting Angels and Other Stories from the Spanish Empire

by

Carla Rahn Phillips

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GUN-TOTING ANGELS AND OTHER STORIES FROM THE SPANISH EMPIRE: A BRIEF OVERVIEW

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The collection of territories ruled by the Spanish Habsburg dynasty from 1500 to 1700 has sometimes been called the first global empire. It was certainly global, and it is usually called an empire. Nonetheless, although empires are often associated with strong centralized power, the Spanish Habsburg Empire functioned as a composite monarchy. Each territory had its own traditions and historic relationship with the central government, and the Habsburg kings realized that they lacked the resources to rule their diverse territories from the top down. Instead, although administrative structures were similar in all the territories under Spanish rule, bureaucrats could not govern by force. They needed the cooperation of the local population at all levels of society to maintain order and carry out the agenda of the monarchy. Most vassals of the crown seemed to accept the idea that cooperation made better sense than resistance, because many aspects of their lives, including their paths to increased status and wealth, were tied to the monarchy and its bureaucratic structures. The Bourbon dynasty that came to power in 1700 would attempt to impose more centralized control than the Habsburgs had exercised. However, although some chapters will include events during the first century of Bourbon rule, that will not be the primary focus of the book.

Chapter 1, SPANIARDS IN A LAND OF CONTRASTS, provides an overview of the geography, topography, and climate that shaped where human beings settled and adapted to the Spanish landscape. The chapter also describes the social structures and the ups and downs of the economy in three broad regions during the period when the Habsburg dynasty dominated European politics and reigned over the territories and vassals that the Spanish crown claimed around the world.

Chapter 2, WOMEN, FAMILIES, AND COMMUNITIES. Family relations and marriage alliances held the potential for tension and conflict at every level of Spanish society, from the humblest families to individuals and lineages at the highest levels of church and state. Though women's roles are often taken for granted or ignored in this broad history, women who married played a crucial role as household managers and important shaping forces for their children. Moreover, women who entered the

religious life often played important roles in politics and culture. Whether women married or did not, their actions had repercussions for their families and lineages and often for the broader society as well.

Chapter 3, SPAIN IN THE WORLD. Spanish monarchs authorized adventurers to explore across the oceans to establish trade and to claim and conquer lands and peoples wherever possible. Other European states followed similar patterns, and the breathtaking arrogance that drove such claims has attracted the disapproval of present-day scholars for good reason. Nonetheless, explorers, mariners, settlers, missionaries, and bureaucrats acting in the name of the Spanish crown are important to study, because together they created and maintained Spain's overseas empire.

Chapter 4 – AMBITION AND SERVICE. Ambitious men and women saw the expanded Spanish world as an unprecedented opportunity to increase their wealth and status, but they needed extraordinary personal qualities and skills to take advantage of that opportunity. Luck played a role as well. Service to the crown was the most obvious path to better one's prospects, and the careers of a handful of prominent individuals illustrate both the hazards and the rewards of serving the crown at home and abroad. Some succeeded far beyond the dreams of their ancestors. Others overreached themselves even when they succeeded, and still others failed so completely that it cost them their lives. The individuals discussed in this chapter include explorers, bureaucrats, military commanders on land and sea, and one extraordinary nun.

Chapter 5 – TRADE, CONTRABAND, AND GUN-TOTING ANGELS. For two centuries, the Habsburg dynasty reigned over Spain and its composite global monarchy, which included Portugal and its empire for sixty of those years. As rival states in Europe challenged the Iberian powers by land and sea, warfare disrupted the regular merchant fleets to New Spain (Mexico) and Tierra Firme (South America). As a result, petty smuggling and open contraband posed a persistent challenge to the government and reduced the taxes on trade that funded protection for the merchant fleets. Contraband was particularly bold and worrisome at the end of the seventeenth century, when the fleets to Tierra Firme ceased because of continual warfare. In that critical period, the artistic representations known as á*ngeles arcabuceros*—gun-toting angels—first appeared in the Viceroyalty of Peru.

Chapter 6 - FROM HABSBURG TO BOURBON: A GLOBAL UPHEAVAL. The end of the seventeenth century also marked the end of the Habsburg dynasty in

Spain. When King Carlos II died without an heir, his will named a grandson of France's Bourbon king, Louis XIV, to succeed him. Most other rulers in Europe opposed that choice and went to war to prevent it. During the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–14), two viceroys of Peru—the Count of La Monclova and the Marquess of Castelldosrius—faced difficult choices in governing and protecting the viceroyalty. When the long war finally ended, Spain's first Bourbon king remained on the throne, presiding over territories around the globe, though many of Spain's European lands had passed into other hands.

Chapter 7 – SHIPS AND SAILORS. Hundreds of ships and tens of thousands of sailors linked Spanish territories around the world. Those ships and sailors made exploration, trade, colonization, and defense possible. An earlier chapter discussed a few extraordinary commanders who served the Spanish crown at sea. This chapter focuses on ordinary sailors who formed the crews. Unlike the forced recruitment and shipboard brutality that characterized many European navies, Spanish naval recruitment was largely voluntary, and ordinary sailors knew how to exercise their legal rights if they were mistreated.

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Each chapter in this book examines individuals and social groups defined by a particular context. Some of the individuals are well known, and they appear in more than one context. Others are known only to serious researchers, and others are anonymous, even though they represented the lives and experiences of countless men and women. The fantastic gun-toting angels of Peru were imaginary beings rather than flesh and blood individuals, and the context in which their portraits were painted suggests new ways of looking at the complex reality of imperial Spain in the early modern centuries. Because the chapters are defined thematically, there is some repetition between chapters, but only enough to clarify the context of each theme.

The book includes excerpts from some of my prior publications, each cited in a footnote, with permission from the copyright holder to use the excerpts. I hold the copyright to my other cited publications, including their maps and tables. The only other footnotes cite the sources of direct quotations. Because this book is searchable digitally, there is no need for an index. All images are in the public domain, with their sources cited in the list of figures. Readers interested in learning more about various topics can refer to suggestions for additional reading in English at the end of each chapter, all of which cite numerous publications in many languages.

Chapter 1
SPANIARDS IN A LAND OF CONTRASTS

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A DIVERSE LANDSCAPE

The Spanish landscape is extraordinarily diverse in climate and topography, which posed extraordinary challenges for the human population in the Habsburg centuries.[1] With regard to climate, what is often called 'dry' Spain includes some sixty-eight percent of the land, receiving less than 500 millimeters of rain a year on average and far less in many areas. The remainder of the land is known as 'wet' Spain, including the north and northwest coasts and mountainous areas in the northeast and south. For the most part, the rivers are not navigable, descending precipitously from their headwaters to the sea, with enormous variations in seasonal flow. Steep banks and a propensity to deposit silts from flooding severely limited the use of most rivers for irrigation as well during the period covered by this book. Although many good natural ports exist on the coasts, inland transport faced many difficulties in the early modern centuries.

Regarding topography, formidable mountain ranges divide and isolate regions from one another, connecting them only through a handful of passes and natural defiles. As a result, each geographical region of Spain developed as a separate enclave with its own mixture of ecological, social, and economic variables that influenced the ways that its inhabitants could make a living. The characteristics described in hundreds of local studies suggest the existence of three distinct regions within the Spanish landscape: 1) most of the Crown of Castile, comprising Old and New Castile, León, Extremadura, Andalusia and the southwest coast; 2) the north from Galicia in the northwest to the Basque provinces and Navarre in the northeast; and 3) the east and southeast coasts and their hinterlands, including Murcia and the Kingdom of Aragón (Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia).

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[1] This chapter includes modified excerpts from my article, "Time and Duration: A Model for the Economy of Early Modern Spain," *American Historical Review* 92 (June 1987): 531–62, which contains extensive source citations.

Figure 1.1 – Spain's Ecological Regions

The ecological features of each region defined the matrix and resources available for the human population. Although narrowly focused areas in the same region could differ significantly from one another, they still fit within the same broad matrix. Differing patterns of growth and recession defined each of the three broad regions during the early modern centuries, which we will return to later in this chapter.

PEOPLE ON THE LAND: THE MAJORITY[2]

The waves of human migration that flowed over the Iberian Peninsula since ancient times added diverse cultural and legal traditions to the varied and complex landscape. The ancient Romans used variations of the Latin word Hispania to designate the peninsula that the Greeks had called Iberia. Islamic forces conquered most of the peninsula in the early eighth century as part of their rapid expansion over

[2] Many of the topics regarding Spain's population and history in the late medieval and early modern centuries are summarized in William D. Phillips, Jr., and Carla Rahn Phillips, "Spain in the Fifteenth Century," pp. 11–39, in *Transatlantic Encounters. Europeans and Andeans in the Sixteenth Century,* ed. Kenneth J. Andrien and Rolena Adorno (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991).

the Middle East and the Mediterranean basin. They built a brilliant civilization in Spain, which became an integral part of the wider Islamic world. Nonetheless, the Christian remnant of Iberia in the far north began a reconquest of the peninsula that lasted from the early eighth century to the late fifteenth century. During that long period, open hostility and warfare between the Christian and Muslim civilizations alternated with what is called *convivencia* in Spanish—literally, living together. If it was not exactly peace, neither was it war. Over time, the Christian areas grew in population and extended slowly and inexorably southward, often under the leadership of strong monarchs who took advantage of weakness and disunity among the Muslim leaders. The Christian reconquest of the Iberian Peninsula established and reinforced the notions that there was wealth to be gained from the armed conquest of alien peoples and that the security and survival of Christian society depended upon a militant defense of the faith.

Toward the end of the Christian reconquest in the fifteenth-century, four separate Christian kingdoms—Aragón, Navarre, Castile, and Portugal—shared the peninsula with Granada, the last Muslim-held territory in Europe. The Kingdom of Aragón included a Mediterranean empire comprising the Balearic Islands, Sicily, Sardinia, and the Kingdom of Naples in southern Italy. The small Kingdom of Navarre lay northwest of Aragón and northeast of Old Castile on the border with France. The huge Kingdom of Castile included territories patched together during the eight centuries of reconquest, and the Kingdom of Portugal had emerged from its own reconquest of Muslim territory.

In 1469, Princess Isabel of Castile married her cousin, Prince Fernando of Aragón. After they inherited their respective kingdoms, they ruled their territories jointly and conquered Muslim Granada in 1492 after a ten-year war, adding it to the Kingdom of Castile. Isabel and Fernando, known as the Catholic Monarchs (Reyes Católicos), also sponsored Spanish expeditions to explore into the western ocean and beyond, where Christopher Columbus and dozens of other explorers discovered and claimed lands and peoples in the Americas for Castile. The legal separation of Castile's overseas empire and Aragón's Mediterranean empire demonstrates that there was nothing inevitable about the creation of modern Spain through the amalgamation of Aragón and Castile. Medieval Castilian rulers had secured marriages with Portugal as well as Aragón for their children, and that practice continued under Isabel and Fernando. They arranged marriages for their five surviving children not only with Portugal but also with France, England, and the Habsburgs of the Holy Roman Empire. Those marriages were all designed to establish and strengthen alliances but not to accumulate territories and concentrate power. Unexpectedly, however, that is what happened.

When Queen Isabel died in 1504, her four-year-old grandson—Karl Habsburg—had already become heir to a vast collection of territories in Europe and the lands that explorers were claiming across the western ocean for Castile. His inheritance was the result of a series of untimely deaths, and there was no guarantee that the Kingdom of Aragón and its Mediterranean empire would add to his inheritance as well. Eight years after Queen Isabel died, Fernando of Aragón married Germaine de Foix of Navarre, and the part of Navarre south of the Pyrenees became part of the Kingdom of Castile. A child from Fernando's second marriage would have inherited the Kingdom of Aragón and its Mediterranean empire, but the marriage did not produce an heir. Instead, at Fernando's death in 1516 the territories that Karl Habsburg inherited in the Iberian Peninsula corresponded very closely to a modern map of Spain, not by design but by the unpredictable lottery of births and deaths that decided the fate of kings as well as ordinary mortals.

The first region defined above—the Kingdom of Castile—accounted for most of the surface area of Spain and most of its population. People tended to live in concentrated settlements for defense and to be near sources of fresh water. In wet Spain, individual farmsteads were more common. Because nearly all of Castile is part of dry Spain, some of the best land for growing crops is in areas of unpredictable rainfall. As a result, the harvest volume from year to year depends heavily on the weather. The region can produce very well under the right circumstances, however, and it is mistaken to equate dry Spain with poor agricultural production. In addition to grains, some areas regularly produce grapes, olives, and orchard crops in the present day, as they did during the Habsburg period.

Some of the land unsuitable for crops was used to pasture local animals or migratory flocks of sheep. Herding was especially important in New Castile and Extremadura, where several hundred thousand sheep spent the winter. Shepherds then moved the flocks north to avoid the summer heat in the south. The annual movement of grazing animals between winter and summer pastures is known as transhumance. Because the moving flocks could damage growing crops if they strayed from their designated paths (*cañadas*), traditional historiography has often stressed the conflict between farmers and herders in the early modern centuries. Nonetheless, the relationship between farming and transhumant herding in Castile is better understood as a mutually profitable partnership, despite the tensions and conflicts that frequently arose.

In many areas, a broad range of individuals owned land in the early modern period, although the number of landless day-laborers predominated in many farming communities. Most English-language studies would call them all peasants, a word whose origin refers simply to people linked to the land or the countryside. However, the word in English has come to suggest poor, oppressed rural people. Even without

the negative connotations, rural occupations did not fully define early modern Spaniards who worked on the land. People who farmed or kept livestock in dry Spain rarely lived in isolated farmsteads on the land they worked. Instead, they lived in hamlets (*aldeas*), villages *(lugares*), and towns (*villas*), traveling back and forth to work the land and tend to their flocks and herds. They might call themselves farmers *(labradores*) or livestock owners (*ganaderos*), but those terms described their occupations. For their dwelling places, they typically identified themselves as legal citizens (*vecinos*) of their hamlet, village, or town. Citizenship *(vecindad*) gave them a wide range of privileges and made them eligible for allotments of things held in common for the use of all the *vecinos,* such as arable and grazing land, forest products, and water rights. Their lives were obviously quite different from the lives of *vecinos* in large cities. Nonetheless, they shared the legal distinction of being part of an urban commune and tended to define themselves in those terms. The strong identification of Spaniards with civic life and its legal and social structures would define their colonization in the Americas almost from the moment they arrived.

Serfdom, which bound people to the land and forced them to make payments to an overlord in medieval times, had never been widespread in Castile, and its last vestiges were abolished by the end of the fifteenth century. Serfdom was much more prevalent in medieval Catalonia, but the worst abuses were ended there by the late fifteenth century as well. Nonetheless, regardless of their legal position, individuals who made a living from the land were hardly equal in wealth or status. Some owned or leased large farms and employed others to work for them. They often lived very comfortable lives and could aspire to higher social status or even to the lower nobility. Others might own enough land to support one family or might own part of the land they farmed and lease the rest from large landowners for terms ranging from a year or two to virtual perpetuity. Someone who owned a plow team or other livestock, with or without also owning land, was a cut above others who had no animals, because livestock required a considerable investment. Rural workers who owned neither land nor animals usually made a living by working for others, with no security in difficult times. Day laborers (*jornaleros*), as the name implies, were paid for each day's work (*jornal*). Other workers could arrange labor contracts for a season or more.

At the top of the social pyramid of landowners were the nobles, although they did not form a closed caste, because movement in and out of their ranks was common in the fifteenth century and thereafter. Overall, individuals with noble status were much more numerous in the north than in the south, thanks to grants of nobility from grateful monarchs during the early centuries of the reconquest from the Muslims. Nobles in the south were less numerous but much wealthier, thanks to grants of nobility and territory as the reconquest moved southward. Overall, individuals in the lowest and most numerous noble category were known as *hidalgos*—loosely meaning

the children of some distinction—whose only advantages were a certain amount of local prestige and exemption from personal taxation. Above them were lords *(señores*) with small territorial possessions (*señoríos*). Higher still were the *títulos* or titled nobles—counts, marquesses, and dukes—an exclusive group defined by wealth and power, both of which increased in the fifteenth century. The highest level of the Spanish nobility comprised those known as grandees (*grandes*) of Spain, a status (*grandeza*) generally but not always granted with a noble title by the reigning monarch. In the early modern centuries, *grandes* generally held the most important landed titles. Their holdings were often scattered, and the greatest among them owned or controlled lands and municipalities in several provinces.

While each titled noble typically had a favored stronghold and various other fortresses, he or she did not usually reside on landed estates pertaining to the title. Instead, the Spanish nobility tended to be urban, with their power residing in the major towns and cities of the realm, where they dominated municipal governments and judicial positions by gaining supporters among lesser noble families through intermarriage and patronage. The greatest nobles followed the royal court and sought to establish hereditary control over important royal offices. By inserting themselves into the highest levels of local and royal government, they could also secure and enhance their economic position and social status. By the mid-fifteenth century, a few dozen families occupied the highest positions in the social hierarchy, enjoying a concentration of wealth, land, titles, and political positions far beyond those of lesser nobles.

The wealth of the high nobility rested on a common economic base: the land and its bounty. Whether they raised wheat, wine grapes, or olives, or derived their wealth from wool, meat, and hides from livestock, their primary aim was to secure the greatest possible return from their agricultural and pastoral pursuits. Nobles who lived along the coasts pursued analogous profits from the fishing industry or from the export trade by controlling ports and shipping. Spanish nobles routinely engaged in these money-making activities without losing either their social status or their titles. One good example of a nobleman-capitalist in the mid-to-late sixteenth century was the Duke of Medina Sidonia in coastal Andalusia. As a shipowner in his own right, he negotiated directly with the Commune of Genoa to sell and transport the grain produced on his estates. He also controlled the profitable tuna fisheries on the Atlantic coast near Cádiz, which earned him the popular nickname of "The Tuna King."

Additional wealth and status for the nobility came from the crown, both in return for service and for promises of loyalty to one faction or another in times of political strife. The monarchs had at their disposal a vast array of rewards to grant as *mercedes* (mercies or gifts), in addition to the power to bestow noble titles. Among

the rewards were appointments to official positions, which carried salaries and the ability to collect fees from those appointed to subordinate offices; grants of income based on royal taxes and customs revenues; outright monetary gifts and grants of vassals, towns and villages; and the right to establish *mayorazgos* or entailed estates. Although very few of the high Spanish nobility migrated to America, they served as powerful role models for those who emigrated in search of increased wealth and status. Noble military skills and attitudes, the way they dressed and spent their money, and their willingness to serve the crown in anticipation of substantial rewards all inspired Spanish conquerors in the New World of the Americas.

Related both to the nobility and the clergy were the important religious-military orders (Órdenes Militares) founded in the late Middle Ages to aid in the reconquest from the Muslims: Calatrava, Alcántara, and Santiago in Castile and Montesa in the Crown of Aragón. In recognition of their crucial contributions to the reconquest, the military orders received grants of land as the Christian frontier moved southward. In the Kingdom of Castile, those grants included rich pastures eminently suitable for winter grazing, so that the masters of the military orders had close ties to the association of owners of transhumant flocks, known as the Mesta. Altogether, the grand masters of the military orders had jurisdiction over about one million people during the late Middle Ages. They could also grant nobility to some fifteen hundred individuals as knights (*caballeros*) of the orders, who were roughly equivalent to the *señores* or middle ranks of the nobility. The title of knight often included jurisdiction over lands known as *encomiendas* (from the verb *encomendar)* because they were commended to the care and protection of the knight or *encomendero*. The grand masterships of the military orders were absorbed into the crowns of Castile and Aragón during the reign of the Catholic Monarchs to forestall challenges to royal authority, and membership in a military order thereafter provided a position of status and potential wealth for individuals in minor noble families and for the younger sons in great noble families. During the Habsburg centuries, monarchs also appointed distinguished military commanders to one of the military orders as a reward for their service to the crown.

The members of the clergy, some two to five percent of the population, formed a legal category of their own with collective rights and privileges, but they represented all of society, with internal divisions and a well-defined hierarchy of wealth and status. The secular clergy, who ministered to the spiritual concerns of the laity, ranged from rich and worldly archbishops to bishops in smaller cities, canons of cathedrals and churches, and priests in local parishes. The regular clergy lived in communities apart from secular society, dedicated to serving God through spiritual or charitable works and governed by rules (*regula)* established by the founders of each religious order. In Spain, the most important of such orders included the long-

established Benedictines and Cistercians and the order of St. Jerome, founded in the late fourteenth century. The Jeronymites had their headquarters at Guadalupe in the hills of Extremadura, an area that sent many early adventurers and explorers to America. Consequently, the Jeronymites and the Virgin of Guadalupe attained significant importance in Spanish America. The late medieval orders of Franciscans and Dominicans flourished in the Spanish kingdoms as well, and the Society of Jesus (with members known as Jesuits) was founded in the sixteenth century by a former Basque soldier, Ignatius of Loyola.

The Roman Catholic Church in Europe experienced major upheavals in the late medieval period. In the process of reestablishing its authority, the Church moved toward doctrinal uniformity and away from the relative toleration for unorthodox Christians and non-Christians that had characterized earlier times. In the early thirteenth century, the Fourth Lateran Council established restrictive measures for the Jews in Europe, requiring them to live in segregated residential quarters and to wear distinctive clothing that set them apart from the Christian majority. In the late thirteenth century, Edward I of England expelled the Jews from his kingdom, and France expelled its Jewish population early in the fourteenth century.

Spain also had a large Jewish population and the only sizable Muslim population in western Europe. During the fifteenth century it became increasingly clear that relations among the several religions were worsening. At the end of the fifteenth century, Fernando and Isabel followed the path laid out by English and French monarchs two centuries earlier and ordered the Jews in Spain to convert to Christianity or leave their kingdoms. The Muslims faced the same choice in 1500. All had to embrace Christianity or leave Spain, except for those in the Kingdom of Valencia, who were given several decades of respite. Most of Spain's Jews and Muslims chose to convert and remain, so that by the early sixteenth century there were two large minority groups in the Spanish kingdoms: the Conversos, new Christians of Jewish origin (known pejoratively as *marranos*), and the Moriscos, new Christians of Muslim origin. Many so-called Old Christians resented and feared these New Christians, seeing them as bad Christians who could tempt God's wrath and pose a threat to society as a whole. The crown had established a religious inquisition in 1478 to enforce Christian orthodoxy, and it gained substantial power as the ranks of New Christians swelled.

The strength of the Catholic Church in Spain helps to explain why religion was a powerful motivator for the Spanish conquerors in the Americas and the clerics who accompanied them. The attitudes of evangelical orders toward indigenous religions in America were shaped by the growing militancy of Spanish Catholicism in the late fifteenth century. After a period in which persuasive methods of conversion often failed, many evangelical clerics in the Americas forcibly converted people to

Christianity rather than see them outside the fold, where they were believed to endanger their own souls and the souls of their fellow citizens.

PEOPLE ON THE LAND: THE MINORITY

Spaniards of all ages and both sexes who did not fall into the categories of workers on the land, nobles, or members of the religious establishment surely did not exceed five percent of the total population. Almost exclusively urban, they ranged from wealthy merchants and town councilors to full-time artisans, domestic servants and slaves. The individuals involved in trade formed a small but essential part of the population. Although mountain ranges and the lack of navigable rivers isolated many inland areas from direct long-distance trade, small-scale merchants moved goods between producers and consumers within regional networks. In important cities such as Burgos, Segovia, Toledo, Córdoba, and Seville, large-scale merchants and the organizations they founded controlled the most important commerce. They also dominated manufacturing, securing raw materials from wide hinterlands and maintaining links to port towns. The old notion that Spain did not have a native merchant population is simply not true. In Burgos, the merchants were nearly all Spaniards, though in Seville there was a large admixture of Italians and other foreigners, many of whom established permanent residence and acquired Spanish citizenship. When Madrid became the capital in the mid-sixteenth century and grew to upwards of 100,000 people in the century that followed, the trading networks that supplied the capital would expand to include much of the country.

Trade connected Spain with the outside world, even before the discovery of the Americas. Catalonia's medieval empire in the Mediterranean oriented Catalonian trade eastward. Merchants from Barcelona, Majorca, and Valencia maintained a strong presence throughout Mediterranean and Atlantic Europe, their commerce ranging from the coast of southern France to northern Italy; from the islands of Corsica and Sardinia to Sicily; and into the Islamic Mediterranean with enclaves in Alexandria, Damascus, and North African enclaves such as Tunis, Bougie, and Tlemcen. The North African connections gave Catalonian merchants access to tropical products and the gold of West Africa. Merchants in cities in the Crown of Aragón, especially Barcelona, were also present in considerable numbers in Seville and Lisbon and maintained a presence in Bruges and later in Antwerp.

The foreign trade of Castile had developed along with the religious pilgrimage to the shrine of St. James at Santiago de Compostela during the Middle Ages, during which commercial opportunities connected to pilgrimage stimulated both internal and external trade. Merchants from all over Europe met to exchange money and goods at Medina del Campo's fair in central Castile, which lasted for a total of one

hundred days during two periods between May and October. For Castilian merchants, one major trading circuit stretched from the Cantabrian ports to France, Flanders, the British Isles, and the North Sea. The driving force behind this trade was the inland city of Burgos, whose merchant Consulado (founded 1494) worked to keep trade flowing smoothly and gain concessions from the crown for doing so. Burgalese merchants enjoyed a near monopoly on Castilian exports, especially wool and iron. They negotiated with mariners and shipowners on the north coast, who had a well-deserved reputation for competence in the carrying trade, to ensure regular transport facilities for their exports. The other great area of Castilian trade was the Mediterranean, where merchants were active from the mid-fourteenth century onward from bases in Seville and Cádiz in the southwest and Cartagena in the southeast. Both Aragonese and Castilian merchants also adapted Italian norms of maritime insurance, banking, and commercial accounting for their needs.

Every village and hamlet, however small, included at least a few individuals known as artisans who made and sold things to their fellow *vecinos*. Typical artisans were blacksmiths, shoemakers, and others producing items that individual households could not make for themselves. Larger towns had more specialized artisans, and the most important cities had the greatest variety, with entire streets or districts devoted to a particular type of production.

If wealthy merchants and municipal officials occupied the top positions the social hierarchy of Spain's largest cities, enslaved individuals occupied the bottom. In late fifteenth-century Spain, slaves were all non-Christian in origin. Some were Muslims captured in Mediterranean warfare, others were Muslims born in Spain, others were Black Africans from south of the Sahara Desert, brought to Spain by the Portuguese, and a few were Canarians. Almost all were domestic servants concentrated in large urban centers, especially Seville and Valencia, but slaves were also sent to work in nearby fields at planting and harvest times, and in various mining operations.

Each of the three regions defined at the beginning of this chapter had different patterns of growth and recession during the Habsburg period. Though all three regions experienced population growth in the sixteenth century, that growth was affected by their differing locations and environments.

Figure 1.2

Population Totals in the Late Sixteenth Century, Rearranged by Broad Regions

	Inhabitants	Percent
Old Castile, New Castile, Extremadura, and Andalusia	5,469,910	68.3
North and Northwest	1,266,294	15.8
Crown of Aragón and Murcia	1,276,630	15.9
TOTAL INHABITANTS	8,012,834	

SOURCE: Molinié-Bertrand, *Siècle d'or*, 308–09.

SIXTEENTH-CENTURY GROWTH: CASTILE

The discovery, conquest, and colonization of lands across the Atlantic Ocean provided a powerful lure for Spaniards in the Kingdom of Castile. Despite the number of departures for the New World of the Americas, however, abundant evidence from household counts and parish registers testifies to continued population growth for much of the sixteenth century. The population rise had begun as early as 1450 and marked the recovery from the depression of the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, which had been worsened but not caused by the Black Death. The strongest increases seem to have occurred during the middle third of the sixteenth century, with growth strongest in New Castile, weaker in Andalusia, and weakest in Old Castile and Leon. The causes of this growth in population and its timing are debatable, although they were arguably related to decades of favorable weather, generally good harvests, and a lack of serious epidemics.

Figure 1.3

Population Growth in the Sixteenth-Century Kingdom of Castile

	Taxpaying Householders in 1528	Taxpaying Householders in 1591	Percent Increase	Total No. of Households in 1591	Percent of Castile in 1528	Percent of Castile in 1591
Northwest (7 areas)	67,039	124,908	86.3	183,771	7.8	13.9
Old Castile (13 areas)	300,446	368,200	22.6	443,817	35.0	33.6
New Castile and Extremadura (14 areas)	208,633	360,314	72.7	394,706	24.3	29.8
South and Southeast (5 areas)	154,366	230,650	49.4	249,550	18.0	18.9
Granada*	126,469 (280,835)			50,448 (299,998)	14.8 (32.8)	3.8 (22.7)
TOTAL	856,953			1,322,292		
TOTAL PERSONS (households × 5)				6,611,460		

* Granada was a special case. After a rebellion in 1570–71, about 15,000 households were relocated in Castile.

SOURCE: Annie Molinié-Bertrand, *Au siècle d'or: L'Espagne et ses hommes: La Population du Royaume de Castille au XVI^e siècle* (Paris, 1985), 308–09, which lists thirty-nine administrative areas, without grouping them by region.

In Castile and Andalusia, as the population rose and internal and external demand for food increased, much land was plowed up and planted that had not been farmed in recent memory. With low population density, considerable availability of land, and minimal technology, an extension of cultivation using traditional techniques was the logical response to population growth. There is also evidence of market stimulation in the increasing amount of land devoted to grapes and olives, especially near growing cities and southern ports leading to the Americas. Some agricultural expansion came at the expense of common grazing land and the traditional rights-of-way and grazing privileges for transhumant animals. Numerous legal cases document the growing tension between herders and farmers as the

sixteenth century progressed, with herding literally losing ground as crop lands expanded. Despite the pressure from farming and rising costs for seasonal pasture, wool production also seems to have increased, at least until the middle years of the century. This increase reinforces the idea that favorable weather underlay expansion in the Castilian countryside.

Market stimulation internally and from the New World also led to a substantial growth in Castilian industry, particularly textile manufacturing but also metallurgy, paper production, soapmaking, and fish salting, all of which required considerable investment. Some of the capital came from profits made in local and international trade. The merchants of Seville presided over the explosive growth in New World trade, just as their counterparts in Burgos controlled the northern wool trade. Many noble families as well as merchants were attracted to the commerce in wool and the manufacture of cloth, consolidating their fortunes and their social status at the same time. With part of their fortunes, many merchants endowed charities and pious foundations, making the sixteenth century one of the great periods for charitable endowments in Castile.

SIXTEENTH-CENTURY GROWTH: THE NORTHERN REGION

Elsewhere in Spain, the population also rose during the sixteenth century but not as dramatically. In general, the northern and northwestern region of Spain had been more densely settled than Castile in the Middle Ages. During the sixteenth century, the north showed patterns of growth ranging from moderate (50–70 percent) to high (70–90 percent), though the region accounted for less than 16 percent of the population of Spain. In Galicia in the far northwest, pirate raids and internal political instability had restricted development in the Middle Ages, but the average population density rose from 12.8 persons per square kilometer in about 1530 to 21.8 in 1591. Figures for Navarre and the Basque provinces of Guipúzcoa, Álava, and Vizcaya are less reliable or nonexistent, though population seems to have risen there as well.

The north and northwest were poor agricultural regions, despite ample rainfall or more likely because of it, a point that simplistic comparisons between wet and dry Spain often overlook. It was particularly difficult to grow wheat, the staple bread grain, and the region was frequently short of food. Land-holdings tended to be small and fragmented, and noble and ecclesiastical landowners controlled a much higher proportion of the land than in Castile, which limited the possibilities for agricultural expansion. On the positive side, iron deposits offered opportunities for industrial employment, and the presence of several large seaports and numerous smaller ones meant that some coastal inhabitants could make a living through fishing, seafaring, shipbuilding, trade, transport, or a combination of several of those occupations.

The combination of pressures and opportunities in various parts of the north determined the ways in which inhabitants responded to rising population in the sixteenth century. With limited opportunities to expand food production, preventive checks on population growth assumed greater importance than they did in Castile. Women married at a later age in the northern region than elsewhere in Spain, not consciously to reduce fertility but to delay marriage until the new couple could afford to establish a separate household and begin a family. Nonetheless, later ages at marriage reduced fertility and restricted population growth.

The percentage of individuals who never married, known as permanent celibacy, was also higher in the north than in Castile. Related to this behavior was a tradition of male emigration, both permanent and temporary, as a conscious adaptation to chronically scarce resources. Galicians developed a pattern of delayed marriage, male emigration, and a high rate of permanent celibacy. The situation was similar in the Basque provinces for the same reasons. In addition, the government drew off experienced mariners and soldiers from the Cantabrian coast, adding to the traditional pattern of out-migration. Eventually, this loss of labor became a hindrance to economic life on the coast, but in the sixteenth century it helped forestall a crisis as the population rose. The pattern varied slightly depending on the state of the economy, but it was determined by economic realities that transcended temporary fluctuations.

Even limiting population growth, the people of the northern region faced difficulties providing themselves with a regular supply of food. Formidable mountains separated the Cantabrian coast from the Castilian plains, making overland transport both difficult and expensive. Port cities accepting wool and other goods from Castile for ocean transport often compelled arriving exporters to bring grain with them as well. As Castilian grain became scarcer and more expensive in the late sixteenth century, a cheaper and more reliable supply was procured from abroad. The north coast was habitually exempted from the ceiling price on wheat and from prohibitions on the export of coinage when it paid for grain. Grain imports were also exempt from wartime embargoes on trade with enemy powers such as France. Some of the grain entering Cantabrian ports undoubtedly went on to Castile, but the interior of the country could not afford to import grain on a regular basis. Habitual imports were possible only for coastal areas and then only if the inhabitants had something to exchange or could obtain money by trading with Castile. Because people on the north coast had access to foreign supplies of grain and purchased them regularly with governmental approval, they had a further buffer against crises.

SIXTEENTH-CENTURY GROWTH: THE EASTERN REGION

In the eastern region that included Aragón, Catalonia, Valencia, and Murcia, similar positive and negative incentives combined to avoid a population crisis in the sixteenth century. Contrary to the traditional view that Catalonia endured economic decay from the fourteenth to the early sixteenth century, more recent evidence shows a substantial economic recovery during the fifteenth century, like that of Castile. Catalonia also experienced the same population growth in the sixteenth century that was evident elsewhere, although it was slower than in central Castile. Even before that rise, there were great variations in population density among residents of the mountains, the plains, and the coasts. Historians of the eastern region have often emphasized its differences from the rest of Spain, particularly from inland Castile, but trade linked the eastern and inland regions. In other words, the difference in their experiences did not result from a lack of contact but from differences in their geography, resources, and traditions. Above all, the eastern region could easily be supplied by sea, and the international market could moderate both the price and the availability of grain in times of scarcity.

Perhaps surprisingly, the port of Barcelona did not grow as much as many Castilian cities in the sixteenth century. The population rose from under 30,000 around the year 1500 to 46,000 by 1552; it may have risen somewhat higher before falling to below 40,000 by the end of the century. Historians have often blamed overcrowding and epidemics for the late sixteenth-century decline in Barcelona's population, which would agree with what we know about the disease patterns of major Mediterranean ports. Another reason was the shift in trade away from the Mediterranean and toward the Atlantic. Although individual Catalonian merchants tried to expand their business in Castile and the Andalusian gateway to the New World, their efforts did not compensate for losses in Barcelona's Mediterranean trade. When the Burgos-Bilbao-Flanders route weakened from the late 1560s onward, the Barcelona-Genoa trade route revived, but Genoese merchants dominated that route, and Barcelona itself became part of the trading orbit of Marseilles.

CASTILE IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

The impressive growth in sixteenth-century Castile was accompanied by spiraling inflation, stimulated at first by the internal rise in population and demand, then by the continuing arrival of treasure from the New World. Despite external wars, emigration, privation, disease, and permanent celibacy, the population continued to rise. By the late sixteenth century, population growth and rising prices

had upset the balance of the Castilian economy. A government survey in 1575–78 provided evidence of overpopulation in New Castile, noting the scarcity of firewood, the plowing of former common lands, and the insufficiency of pasture. It seems clear that Castile was already approaching a crisis during the 1570s before a series of harvest disasters struck. Parish registers throughout Castile show a weakening of the population rise by 1580 at the latest and earlier in largely rural areas that had already reached the limits of their resources, which forced some residents simply to move away. In other areas, absolute population declines did not appear until the end of the century. Nonetheless, the best estimate is that beginning in about 1580 a crisis in the rural economy brought the sixteenth-century population rise to an end in Castile.

Regarding trade, the commercial and financial fairs of Castile, centered on Medina del Campo, enjoyed their heyday in 1550–60 and thereafter faced increasing difficulties that coincided with and related to the agricultural crisis. Taxes in the late sixteenth century, already much higher than elsewhere in Europe, undoubtedly added to the strains on the internal economy, but taxes alone cannot be blamed for halting sixteenth-century growth. The crisis in the Castilian countryside was already apparent before tax increases surpassed inflation. Transatlantic trade linking Spain with the Americas had grown rapidly along with the economic growth of Castile and Europe as a whole during most of the sixteenth century. A decade or so after the crisis began in the Castilian countryside, however, transatlantic trade also turned downward. A later chapter will examine that trade in detail. Here, it is sufficient to note that international trade was connected to every other aspect of the economy on both sides of the Atlantic.

Scholars have sometimes called the seventeenth century a time of crisis, but that term is misleading and subject to heated debate. In Castile, it seems that the seventeenth-century economy experienced a long, slow, and painful adjustment to the crisis of population and resources that began in the late sixteenth century. That adjustment was made worse by epidemics that struck in 1597–1602, 1647–52, and intermittently between 1677 and 1685. Overall, the Castilian population declined by nearly 20 percent, in part from epidemics but also from emigration, military recruitment, and the expulsion of the Moriscos in 1609–14 as a presumed security threat. Famines and diseases related to chronic malnutrition may have accounted for some additional losses, but famines were rare in Castile, and municipal governments often purchased outside supplies of grain to combat harvest shortages, even at exorbitant cost.

Along with the population losses of the seventeenth century came hints of a fundamental readjustment of people and resources in Castile. In areas where agricultural production fell, commercial networks unraveled and the residents in

areas that had once relied on a broad region of supply found themselves thrown back on local resources. In years of bad harvests, municipal officials found it difficult to locate and transport food supplies from elsewhere, and towns and cities that were too large to be sustained from local resources alone suffered. A range of middle-sized cities lost out to Madrid, whose rapid growth created a new network of trade that drew on virtually all of Castile and beyond. The rise of Madrid as both the royal court and the capital city was one of the most dramatic and long-lasting effects of the restructuring of Castile's urban networks and internal trade in the seventeenth century.

The policies of the royal government in the seventeenth century did little to aid the internal economy of Castile. The generally peaceful reign of Felipe III (1598–1621) provided some respite from the nearly continual warfare of the previous century, but any far-reaching plans to reform government finances were abandoned as impractical. Renewed warfare led the government of Felipe IV (1621–65) to institute new taxes and manipulate the currency, which caused additional harm to the beleaguered economy and slowed its recovery. It was not until the reign of the sickly last Habsburg, Carlos II (1665–1700), that a definite economic upturn took place.

Even though the start of economic revival predated any effects that historians can attribute to government, the decrees and reform programs of the 1670s and 1680s at least aided the process. They included, ironically, a drastic 1680 devaluation of copper coinage (*vellón*) amid harvest failures and epidemics. In the short term the devaluation caused distress and dislocation in the internal economy and hurt exports by essentially doubling the price of Spanish goods. In the longer term, however, coupled with a devaluation of silver coinage in 1686, the government stabilized the currency, which led to a mildly inflationary and stimulating effect on the economy. Other reforms of the bureaucracy and the tax structure also aided economic recovery, even though Spain was involved in frequent warfare in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.

Despite the suffering caused by population losses in the seventeenth century, the remaining population may have benefited from increased economic opportunities that led to earlier ages at marriage. In the absence of widespread birth control, an earlier age at marriage for women would have generated higher birth rates and population growth. That growth in turn would have led to increased agricultural production and perhaps to higher productivity. Local timetables varied, but there is increasing evidence for a general demographic recovery in Castile by the 1680s, and that growth would continue into the eighteenth century.

THE NORTHERN REGION IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

The north and northwest seem to have escaped the large losses of population that afflicted inland Castile in the seventeenth century, largely because the inhabitants had developed strategies to balance their numbers with available resources. Nonetheless, many areas in the north entered a depression in the 1580s. Given the weakness of agriculture and herding, other occupations had a prominent place in local economies, but they were subject to outside forces that the local population could not control. For example, Galicia, Guipúzcoa, and Vizcaya depended heavily upon fishing. Following a period of expansion, the fishing industry suffered a crisis in the last third of the sixteenth century, probably caused by changes in the weather and perhaps by overfishing during the period of expansion. The crown's demands for sailors and ships also hurt the fishing industry, which seems to have begun a decline by 1600 that lasted for about a century.

Iron production in Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa experienced tough times as well, related to trends in Castile and the broader European economy. High grain prices in Castile and the collapse of the northern wool trade at the end of the sixteenth century made contacts with Castile less profitable for the north coast and contacts with England and France more attractive. As a result, Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya pressed the crown for a relaxation of restrictions on foreign shipping, eventually winning the more-or-less free entry of foodstuffs in 1625. But food had to be paid for, and the rising costs of iron production, combined with a failure to make improvements in technology, made Basque iron less competitive in the international marketplace. The first thirty years of the seventeenth century saw serious declines in iron production in both Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa, related in part to a European credit and industrial crisis from around 1620. To confront the crisis, the Basque iron industry had to be restructured. Large foundries, most of which were in Vizcaya, introduced new techniques and survived. Even so, only the production of forged iron, preferred for weapons and ship fittings, was truly competitive on the European market. The iron industry in Guipúzcoa was less able to change, because iron foundries there tended to be smaller and undercapitalized.

As the iron industry shrank, exports of crude iron ore increased, especially from Guipúzcoa. By 1640, however, iron founders in Vizcaya had persuaded the crown to tax the exports of iron ore heavily to preserve more ore for their industry. The short-term effect of the export taxes was to plunge Guipúzcoa into ruin. Through most of the seventeenth century, the two provinces feuded with one another, each trying to gain governmental support and exclusive privileges. It was not until the end of the century, under the pressure of a French blockade, that they considered a consortium to trade their iron jointly for Castilian grain.

A similar pattern of dependence on the European market and governmental support typified the shipbuilding industry in the north. Although Basque shipbuilders could obtain wood, iron, and labor locally, they had to rely on the European market for naval stores, sails, and cables. Shipbuilding flourished from the fifteenth to the late sixteenth century, stimulated by the needs of trade, empire, and warfare. By 1575, however, signs of decline appeared that may have been related to the increasing cost of imported supplies and grain purchased from Castile. In other words, the crisis in northern shipbuilding stemmed from the terms of trade, much like the crisis faced by manufacturing areas in Castile as the price of food and raw materials rose. The situation worsened with the recession in transatlantic trade in the 1620s, which diminished investment and the need for ships. Relying on foreign naval stores also made the shipbuilding industry vulnerable to war in the Baltic and to the Dutch naval blockade during the Thirty Years' War (1618–48).

Other problems for northern shipbuilding included a shortage of skilled artisans such as carpenters and caulkers and the difficulties of reducing construction costs. While the English and Dutch were producing lighter, cheaper ships that were ideal for commerce in peaceful waters, shipbuilders in northern Spain had to build the heavy ships required for Spanish trade and imperial defense in hostile waters. Because of its military importance, the shipbuilding industry received considerable attention from the crown, including subsidies and continued contracts for new shipping. In the early seventeenth century, the crown commissioned the construction of ships more often, rather than relying mostly on traditional embargoes of private merchant vessels in wartime. Government commissions kept the shipbuilding industry on the north coast afloat, but that did not compensate for the declines in private ship construction related to the transatlantic trade.

The carrying trade from the Cantabrian coast was the lifeline of port towns and the region, as it had been for centuries. At the height of the wool trade in the mid-sixteenth century, a great volume of wool flowed out of the northern ports and a great volume of foreign goods flowed in. As mentioned earlier, the trade was largely in the hands of merchants from Old Castile, especially the members of the merchant Consulado of Burgos. The Consulado had legal rights over the functioning of many Cantabrian ports, which in some ways were outposts of inland Castile rather than independent towns. With the decline of the wool trade from the 1570s on, the ports that handled Castilian wool—primarily Bilbao, Laredo, and Santander—entered a steep decline. San Sebastián, which usually handled the coarser wools of Navarre, saw its fortunes rise in the first third of the seventeenth century, as coarser wools found an improved market in the textile industries of Northern Europe. With the profits from that trade, San Sebastián could purchase much-needed foreign grain, and the privilege of being able to export money to pay for it made San Sebastián a

conduit through which Northern Europe could tap into the wealth coming into Spain from America. However, those advantages only lasted until the northern trade shifted to Bayonne in southwestern France after 1659. Overall, the seventeenth century saw the definitive shift of Spanish commerce to the ports of Andalusia, especially Seville and Cádiz, with their access to the New World.

Economic recovery arrived on the north coast in the late seventeenth century, based on a restructuring of commerce and industry. After about 1650, the wool trade to Northern Europe enjoyed a modest revival, from which the port towns could benefit without the interference of Burgos. Native merchants in Bilbao became active participants in the trade, serving as intermediaries between foreign buyers and internal merchants and flock owners. Although north-coast merchants cannot be said to have replaced the Burgalese in power and function, they carved out a comfortable niche for themselves in the decentralized wool trade of the late seventeenth century. In agriculture, new crops and methods fundamentally altered the economic base of the northern region. In the long term, the dense population and scarce resources of northern Spain encouraged innovations, whereas the low population density and available land of Castile did not. The use of lime as a soil amendment was perhaps the greatest improvement, leading to better drainage of clay soils and allowing for the more rapid assimilation of nitrates and other nutrients. The cultivation of maize, mostly for animal fodder, led to better aeration of the soil, and the introduction of the colewort plant produced both fodder and rapeseed oil. With new sources of fodder, farmers could own more livestock, leading to the production of more manure, as well as other animal products. The result was a more efficient use of the land and higher agrarian incomes in many parts of the north coast in the late seventeenth century. In Guipúzcoa, for example, the expansion from about 1650 to 1700 took place on land already used for agriculture, so that it posed no threat to pasture or forest. Population grew and commerce and industry revived along with more efficient agriculture, despite periodic setbacks. Renewed population pressure would develop in the mid-eighteenth century, but by then the resource base had greatly expanded compared to earlier times.

THE EASTERN REGION IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

In the eastern region, the sixteenth-century population growth may have continued until about 1610–20. Immigration from France was an important feature of that growth, and it was especially strong in Catalonia from 1580 to 1600, just when the population rise in Castile faltered. By the late sixteenth century, French immigrants may have accounted for 20 percent of the population of Catalonia and 20 to 25 percent of the population of Aragón, though a much smaller percentage of the

population of Valencia. By 1626, an estimated 200,000 French people lived in Spain, most of them in the eastern region. Nonetheless, despite moderate population growth and impressive immigration, the eastern region still comprised only about 16 percent of the total Spanish population at the end of the sixteenth century.

French immigration and continued population growth into the seventeenth century might suggest that Spain's eastern region was better off than either Castile or the southern provinces of France. However, Spain's eastern region may have been approaching the same crisis of population and available resources that afflicted Castile, masked and delayed by the flow of immigrants. For example, although the city of Murcia was well supplied with food from local market gardens and imported wheat, the countryside was approaching a crisis by the late sixteenth century, and the situation was similar in adjacent Alicante and in Valencia from the mid-1570s. Murcia was legally within the Kingdom of Castile, but it was part of the eastern region for the purposes of this discussion.

Aragón, though poor overall, normally produced a surplus of grain that was sold to Catalonia and Valencia, and sometimes even to Castile, Navarre, and France. Western Catalonia also normally produced a surplus, but high transport costs and a poor distribution network made the surplus difficult to export. Barcelona's grain supplies usually came from coastal cities such as Tarragona and from Aragón, but grain from as far away as Sicily was sometimes cheaper and easier to procure. A free market in grain from 1580 to 1600 brought abundant supplies to the city, which could explain why Barcelona continued to attract foreign immigrants after 1600. A ceiling price set in 1599 drove some local grain out in search of higher prices, and scarcity and bread riots in 1604–06 led to imports coming from as far away as England. For the most part, however, a free market in grain characterized Catalonia, except during serious crises.

Similarly in Valencia, a habitual importer of grain, the population supplemented local harvests with free market supplies, most of them from foreign sources, because Castilian exports were often restricted. The people of Valencia paid for the grain with money earned selling silk. The production of Valencian raw silk peaked around 1580, and the silk cloth industry likewise grew until the 1570s, benefiting from the economic boom in Castile, the major client for Valencian silk cloth. By the late sixteenth century, Valencia was buying grain from Northern Europe, and it continued to do so. The timing and volume of grain imports may suggest periodic harvest crises, but, alternatively, they may suggest Valencia's economic diversity and wealth, which paid for imports of grain on a regular basis.

Overall, the eastern region was buffered against a crisis in population versus resources at the end of the sixteenth century by limits on population growth that included epidemic diseases arriving from the Mediterranean and southern France.

Nonetheless, the population in the eastern region ceased to grow by the first third of the seventeenth century, stagnating in some places and declining in others. The expulsion of the Moriscos in 1609 had serious short-term consequences in Aragón and especially in Valencia, which lost more than 30,000 families, roughly one-third of the population. Thereafter, waves of epidemic disease hindered efforts to resettle the Valencian countryside, and agriculture was further harmed by unfavorable weather and poor harvests in the early and middle years of the seventeenth century.

More than in Castile, however, the economic downturn in the eastern region was linked to broader European commercial trends. By 1620–30, Catalonian trade with Italy was only about one-third of what it had been as recently as 1600, partly because of declining exports of cloth and iron, as well as imports of cheap and attractive foreign cloth, especially from France. In steelmaking, Catalonia lost out definitively to Northern Europe by the 1620s, and, in the Peace of the Pyrenees between Spain and France (1659), Catalonia lost the best local sources of iron to France. The underlying difficulty in the iron industry seems to have been an inability to keep up with technical advances, just as in Guipúzcoa, although the Basques continued to control their raw materials. The manufacture of silk cloth in Valencia entered a decline after about 1580 that lasted until after the mid-seventeenth century. The period following the expulsion of the Moriscos was especially difficult, as the loss of workers in the countryside reduced harvests and rents, depressing the demand for manufactured goods even further.

The Catalonian rebellion against the crown in 1640–52 brought an economic slump and pervasive French influence in the local economy, monetary disruptions, and a devastating plague that hastened the collapse of the rebellion. After the coinage was stabilized in 1654, the economy began to recover along with the population. By the end of the century, the level of port traffic was double what it had been in 1664–74. The textile industry began to recover in about 1680, often in places outside guild control and featuring foreign styles and methods. The recovery was supported by generally favorable economic conditions, monetary stability, and the interest of the central government in reviving and protecting industry. Even Catalonian shipbuilding, which had been in decay since the fifteenth century, enjoyed a modest revival beginning in 1675–80, mostly in the smaller shipyards that built vessels for private owners rather than military vessels for the crown. For those who could benefit from the revival, the reign of Carlos II was a prosperous time, leading the local author of the *Anales de Catalunya* (1709) to call him "the best king that Spain has ever had," without, it seems, even a hint of irony.

In Valencia, adequate harvests in 1660–80 marked the start of agricultural recovery, and the silk industry began to revive in the 1670s, with an expansion of mulberry production and an improved market in Castile. The evidence suggests that

a considerable restructuring of the industry took place in the seventeenth century that was marked by an increased use of rural workers. Valencia was tied more closely to Castile than other areas in the eastern region, and its overall economic timetable was strikingly like Castile's, with an expansion that ended about 1580, followed by stagnation, decline for much of the seventeenth century, and unmistakable signs of revival by 1680.

INTELLECTUAL AND BUREAUCRATIC TRADITIONS

Spaniards of the middling and upper classes benefited from a rich intellectual tradition that produced the educated bureaucrats who would administer Spain's overseas territories. The first university in the Iberian Peninsula was established in Palencia in the early thirteenth century. The University of Salamanca, founded shortly thereafter, became the most prestigious in the peninsula, receiving royal support and attaining an international reputation quite early. Other universities appeared in Valladolid, Lérida, and Huesca, and a substantial proportion of young men of good family in sixteenth-century Spain attended university.

Regardless of their social class, all Spaniards benefited from an established tradition of the rule of law. Reigning monarchs, like their counterparts elsewhere in western Europe, had extended the sway of royal law over the centuries. Two legal developments proceeded on parallel courses in Castile and Aragón: the gradual adoption of Roman law as the basis for the legal system and the gradual imposition of royal law throughout the kingdom. In the eleventh century the Italian legal scholar Irnerius had begun the academic study of the Roman legal code, and in the next two centuries knowledge and application of Roman law spread widely in western Europe, in part because it tended to bolster central authority. In the mid-thirteenth century, Alfonso X of Castile compiled a new code for his kingdom, known as the *Siete Partidas*, which relied heavily on Roman law. Although it was never fully implemented, the *Siete Partidas* had a major influence on subsequent legislation in Spain and its overseas territories. As the legal authority of the monarchy strengthened, so did the bureaucratic apparatus of councils and royal officials, with Aragón's governmental structure more developed than that of Castile. After the marriage of Isabel and Fernando, although their two kingdoms remained legally separate, Castile undoubtedly benefited from the close association with Aragón and began to refine the bureaucracy that would later be introduced in the Americas. A well-defined hierarchy of authority enabled Castile to establish royal control of its fledgling American empire soon after the conquests of Mexico and Peru, so that the Spaniards who migrated from Spain to the Americas would settle into a context that

was at least somewhat familiar to them. In subsequent chapters, we will meet some of those individuals.

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Chapter 2
WOMEN, FAMILIES, AND COMMUNITIES[3]

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INDIVIDUALS AND THEIR COMMUNITIES

Individual and communal identity feature in much scholarly work on the religious and political upheavals that marked sixteenth-century Europe, although Benedict Anderson, for one, argued that the "imagined communities" we know as modern nations only began to be conceptualized in the late eighteenth century and developed thereafter. According to Anderson, in earlier times, dynastic and religious identity provided the foundation for loyalties and a sense of community, but that foundation had to crumble before the "imagined communities" that developed into modern nations could rise in their place.

Anderson's argument leaves the impression that pre-eighteenth-century concepts of community, nation, and loyalty were somehow inferior or less worthy of attention than their later counterparts. That is less Anderson's fault than it is the product of assumptions that changes necessarily mean progress, and that individual identities are more modern than collective identities. A more serious failing is that Anderson barely mentions familial or geographical identities as bases for communal and national identities and loyalties in the early modern period. I would argue instead that only by understanding the tight networks created by familial and local ties can we understand the strength and tenacity of the dynastic and religious identities that Anderson discusses. In many parts of Europe, political and doctrinal upheavals undermined the unifying forces of dynasty and religion that had prevailed before the Protestant Reformation. In Spain and its empire, however, loyalty to the ruling dynasty and the Roman Catholic Church continued to serve as unifying forces through the early modern period. The strength of those loyalties emerged from the network of local ties created by familial and communal identity.

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[3] A full discussion of these issues first appeared in two of my articles: "Family and Community in the Spanish World," pp. 71–90 in *From the Middle Ages to Modernity: Individual and Community in the Early Modern World,* eds. Charles H. Parker and Jerry H. Bentley (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), copyright by Roman and Littlefield Publishing Group., Inc., 2007; excerpted with permission of the Licensor though PLSclear; and "Twenty Million People United by an Ocean: Spain and the Atlantic World Beyond the Renaissance," *Renaissance Quarterly* (Spring 2009), Vol. 62, No. 1: pp. 27–40.

Many distinguished scholars have documented the importance of family and community in early modern Europe. Starting in the 1980s, pioneers such as Peter Laslett in historical demography, Tamara Hareven in social history, and Andreas Plakhans in anthropology helped to shape the field. In a pioneering book, Plakans proposed general principles to better understand the social role of kinship. He argued that kinship roles imply mutual responsibilities between and among individuals who are related to one another and that those responsibilities last for a lifetime. Moreover, individuals can have many kinship roles, and their family lives are best understood within the context of their kinship networks. With Plakhans's principles in mind, once we know the family relationships linking a group of individuals together, we can reasonably assume some of the social roles they played over the course of their lives, whether we have documentary proof of those roles or not.

None of those assumptions eliminate the need to carefully interrogate each document we find and to ascertain–if possible–when, where, why, and by whom it was written, with due attention to the vocabulary used to describe kinship links. Nor do Plakhans's general principles permit us to overrule contradictory evidence when we find it in the historical record. Instead, his notions provide us with a logical framework for thinking about the social roles of kinship in Europe, particularly when we have only sparse and limited documentary evidence at hand.

The potential for documentary gaps increases when we broaden our sphere of inquiry to study Europeans and their communities outside Europe. One of the great benefits of studying Spain and its empire is that the Habsburg monarchy generated an enormous quantity of documents recording virtually every aspect of public and private life. Spain included about eight million people at the end of the seventeenth century and the whole empire about twenty million. The bureaucracy kept track of their numbers, the taxes they paid, their religious orthodoxy, and their military service, among other characteristics. At the local level, municipal, religious, occupational, and social institutions in Spain recorded the mundane activities of daily life, capturing individuals with ink and paper who might otherwise have escaped the historical record altogether. Scribes and bureaucrats in Spanish territories elsewhere in Europe and across the oceans created the same types of documents in virtually identical form wherever they were written. Private citizens also wrote or dictated letters to stay connected to family, friends, and associates near and far. Archives in Spain and throughout the Spanish Empire were created to organize and house official documents, and countless municipal, episcopal, institutional, occupational, and private archives and libraries also served as depositories for the documentary legacy of recorded lives.

Virtually every document in those depositories includes information that can be used to study family and kinship roles, whether the document was created with

that purpose in mind or not. In the last half century, historians have mined the archives to ask new questions about family, kinship, and community in the Spanish world. The results of their research has helped us to better understand the lives of Spaniards during the early modern centuries.

WOMEN AND FAMILIES

The history of women has been a noteworthy topic for many decades, and the studies on Spain and Spanish America are particularly rich. Some authors focus on the well-documented lives of women in convents and their economic and cultural activities. Other authors focus on women in secular society, including their roles in the family and the workforce, as well as their relationship to the political power structure dominated by men. Just as in the scholarship about society in general, recent work about women documents their ability to make choices and take independent action, not only in the absence of men, but also as daughters, wives, workers, spinsters, mothers, prostitutes, widows, and nuns. Children and child welfare have also attracted scholarly interest. As historians delve deeper into empirical documentation, they are questioning generalizations and theoretical models, and the result is a richer, much more nuanced picture of the roles of women, family, and lineage in Spain and its overseas territories.

Family connections were particularly important among the elite, in large part for political and economic reasons, but some of the same concerns motivated families at all levels of society, especially regarding marriage. Marriage alliances were the principal way that families tried to improve their social and economic status, making women into crucial players within the families and lineages of their birth and in the families and lineages that they entered through marriage. Even in the present day, a Spanish female typically retains the family names (*apellidos*) of her father and mother throughout her life, regardless of whether she marries or how many times she marries, which reinforces her continuing ties to her birth family. Although women are sometimes seen as no more than pawns in the marriage strategies of their birth families, that is misleading. Women were necessary participants in those strategies as liaisons with the families into which they married and as child-bearers, and their roles as wives and mothers could have far-reaching implications for the status and well-being of both their birth families and their marriage families. For example, the failure of a wife to produce viable heirs affected the subsequent history of her family by marriage and presumably affected the reputation of her birth family as well.

MARRIAGE IN THE SPANISH WORLD

Marriage between a man and a woman formed the hub of family and social relations in Spain as in other parts of Europe, so it is not surprising that scholars have focused on marriage as a key to understanding society. In the early modern centuries, the choice of marriage partners depended on the appropriateness of the match as well as the real or potential affection between the contracting parties. Ruling elites typically sought marriage partners for themselves and their children at the same social level or higher. Bureaucrats and other professionals typically sought marriages to advance their careers. Merchants and artisans sought marriages that could enhance or consolidate a family business. And landowners at all levels of society often sought marriages to gain more land or to connect disparate family properties.

The Roman Catholic Church prohibited marriage between individuals who were closely related by blood, though dispensations could be granted by the ecclesiastical authorities for marriages within the prohibited degrees of kinship. Beyond moral considerations, modern genetics shows that such rules lessened the transmission of recessive genes that carried undesirable physical or mental traits. Yet marriages to blood relatives could consolidate family properties and ensure the continuity and strength of a lineage. The Habsburg dynasty repeatedly arranged marriages between close relatives in Spain and central Europe to maintain the strength and solidarity of the dynasty. The strategy worked well for nearly two centuries, but recessive genetic traits eventually finished off the Spanish Habsburgs. At all social levels as well, marriages between close relatives might be arranged to enhance the fortunes or aspirations of the family or lineage.

On the other hand, families and communities in early modern Spain were aware of the benefits of variety in choosing marriage partners. Although marriages between close relatives consolidated family property, they also restricted the possibilities for expanding a kinship network. In other words, there were logical reasons for the heads of families to seek a balance between marriages inside and outside their kinship network. Similar impulses may have driven community norms as well. In rural Catalonia, for example, marriages between third cousins as well as multiple marriages between the same families were discouraged by villagers, even though such marriages were permitted by the church. Community norms had the effect of pushing families to look outside their village for marriage partners, bringing in new blood, literally and figuratively, and linking the village to the outside world. We know that families in villages and small towns elsewhere also sought outside marriages by choice as well as necessity.

Overall, marriage can be understood as a business contract with sentimental overtones. The best marriages from the point of view of families and their

communities combined economic and affective ties in a harmonious blend, because that was the best way to ensure that the marriage would fulfill its assigned roles in the family and the community. Spanish ecclesiastical authorities took quite seriously the requirement that the free will of both partners was necessary for the marriage to be valid, regardless of family strategies. Clergymen in Spain and Spanish America frequently intervened when parents tried to prevent a child from contracting what they considered an inappropriate marriage, or, conversely, when they tried to force an unwilling child into a socially or financially desirable marriage. In other words, the principle of free will overruled the principle of parental authority when the validity of the sacrament of marriage was at stake.

Once the marriage bond had been forged, Roman Catholic ideals prescribed that it could be broken only by death. Given Spain's religious orthodoxy, many scholars assume that Spaniards adhered closely to religious ideals regarding marriage. In practice, however, Spaniards who found themselves in an unhappy union often found ways to escape, with or without ecclesiastical permission. During the early modern centuries, Spain fought nearly continuous wars in defense of the Habsburg dynasty and the Catholic religion, so that the crown had a chronic need for soldiers and sailors. Military service provided one escape route for men who wanted to distance themselves from an unhappy marriage, just as it provided income for poor married men who were devoted to their wives. The same can be said of migratory occupations such as muleteers, seasonal agricultural workers, itinerant peddlers, herders, and several other occupations that separated men from their wives for at least part of the year.

Women had fewer occupational outlets than men for escaping an unhappy marriage, but both men and women could petition the ecclesiastical authorities for a legal separation or divorce (*separación de matrimonio*). The grounds varied, and it is not always clear how cases were decided. Under canon law, refined at the Council of Trent in the late sixteenth century, heresy, abandonment, or adultery alone were not valid grounds for separation or divorce; there had to be some other factor or factors that would make the marriage invalid in the eyes of the church—for example, if one of the parties claimed to have been forced into the marriage.

Scholars find petitions for the dissolution of marriages in a variety of archives, especially among diocesan or judicial papers and in notarial records, because notaries drew up the petitions. Women filed most of the petitions found to date, often claiming mistreatment (*maltratos*), the impossibility of maintaining the marriage, or adultery by their husbands (often linked to mistreatment). Most of the petitions for separation or divorce filed by men claimed adultery by their wives and the resulting damage to their honor and good name. The economic stakes were high. If a marriage was

dissolved, under Spanish law the woman regained her dowry, plus any interest accrued to it during the marriage.

Faced with the expense and bother of using legal action to end an unhappy marriage, many Spaniards simply behaved as if their marriage vows no longer bound them. They took lovers while continuing to live with their spouses or openly lived with someone else. If they continued to live in the same community, however, such behavior would bring disapproval from their neighbors, as well as sanctions from church authorities that could include excommunication. To avoid such complications, some unhappily married Spaniards abandoned their hometowns and went somewhere else. They might live with a new partner, or even contract a new marriage, presumably hoping that no one ever found out they were already married. In fact, instances of bigamy came to official notice with some frequency. Because bigamy was an offense against the sacrament of marriage, the officials who most often dealt with it were attached to the Spanish Inquisition. In a monumental study of 44,000 inquisitorial cases in Spain from 1540 to 1700, Jaime Contreras and Gustav Henningsen found 2,645 cases of bigamy, or about six percent of the cases overall.

We should not assume that all the instances of bigamy were intentional, however. Many bigamists married a second time in the sincere belief that their spouses had died. Emigration to America made such honest mistakes more likely. If a man left his wife behind in Spain and traveled to the Indies, as Spaniards called the lands across the ocean, she might reasonably assume that he had died if he did not return after a period of years; she might even hear indirect reports of his death. At that point, she might petition to have her marriage declared ended and then remarry, only to learn later that her first husband was still alive. Similarly, a man who emigrated might hear that his wife in Spain had died. He might then marry in America, only to find that the reports of his first wife's death had been mistaken, or perhaps invented. Not surprisingly, individuals accused of bigamy often claimed 'truthful ignorance' to escape the charge of bigamy, leaving the ecclesiastical authorities to sort things out. As in many other aspects of Spaniards' lives, there was much more flexibility than we might assume regarding the application of rules.

Spaniards who migrated to America or Asia carried legal and customary norms governing marriage and family relations with them, but it is fair to say that those norms underwent a sea change. Although many early Spanish migrants to America were unmarried males (including clergymen), whole families and marriageable women were always part of the migratory stream. The government encouraged royal officials to take their families with them, not only on moral grounds but also to prevent them from identifying too closely with the societies they were supposed to govern. Women accounted for nearly thirty percent of Spanish migrants to America in the late sixteenth century, and about sixty percent of those women were

unmarried. Most of the latter quickly found husbands among the male population, often men born in Spain or Spaniards born in the Indies (known as *Criollos* or Creoles).

There were never enough Spanish women to fully supply the marriage market in the Americas, however. From the earliest days of the empire, Spanish men married or established informal sexual unions with Indigenous or mixed-race women. At the highest political level, the leading Spanish conquerors (*conquistadores*) paired with Aztec and Inca royalty, both formally and informally, in effect creating a merger between the pre-conquest and post-conquest elites. It is fair to say that the hoped-for outcome of such marriages and those farther down the social scale was similar to expectations for marriages in Spain: to enhance the economic, political, and social status of the contracting parties. A Spaniard who married a local Indigenous woman in New Spain (Mexico), for example, would acquire access to his wife's property, or to her family's connections in manufacturing, trade, or other occupations. The children of such a marriage, usually designated as *mestizos* (mixed race), had access to positions in the emerging colonial society that were more difficult for their Indigenous counterparts to obtain. In colonial Peru, the male children of similar marriages often enjoyed tax benefits because of their partial Spanish heritage. The female children, especially if they were carefully raised and educated in convent schools, became valuable assets in the colonial marriage market.

SOCIAL NORMS OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR

The pre-conquest norms of sexual behavior in the Americas seem to have been rather different from those in Spain, especially regarding temporary liaisons and multiple marriages. Medieval Christian warriors had sometimes adopted the Muslim custom of polygamy to seal political alliances during the Spanish reconquest of the peninsula, but the Catholic Church had always condemned the custom. In the Americas prior to contact with Europeans, temporary sexual liaisons served as a form of diplomatic courtesy or hospitality, and many Spanish men easily adapted to such local customs when they arrived. Moreover, although sexual promiscuity was common enough in Spanish society, it is probably fair to say that it was not considered acceptable behavior to the extent that it was in the Americas, both before and after the European invasion.

The importance of emulation in Spanish society, in which the middling and lower classes adopted the manners and values of the elite along with their fashions and amusements, had unexpected echoes in Spanish America. Foreign travelers often commented on what they judged to be inappropriate behavior by common people in Spanish America, especially wearing fancy clothing that the travelers considered

inappropriate to their station in life. In Mexico City, that attire included silver and gold lace and fancy imported cloth adorned with pearls and gems. By adopting the trappings of wealth and status, as well as flouting moral strictures against vulgar ostentation, diverse individuals in Spanish America behaved as if they enjoyed a higher status than their birth accorded them. In the process, they redefined the standards of proper behavior.

Just as domestic servants and nursemaids in Spain transmitted a certain amount of popular culture to the well-born children in their care, household servants in Spanish America did the same. In Spain, the close relationship between nursemaids and children bridged the gap between disparate levels of society. In the Americas it also bridged the gap between distinct cultural traditions, which may have contributed to more relaxed standards for public sexual behavior in Spanish America than in Spain. During the colonial period, foreign travelers routinely commented on the lascivious behavior of well-born Spanish and Creole residents of Mexico City, Lima, and elsewhere, both male and female.

At the highest levels of both Spanish and Spanish colonial society, however, traditional Mediterranean notions of honor and shame continued in force, and may even have grown stronger over time, perhaps to separate the most distinguished families from the rest of society. Honor belonged only to families that maintained an unblemished record of ecclesiastically sanctioned marriages and legitimate births, plus at least the appearance of upright moral behavior. Reality often fell short of appearances, but a family's honor could be protected from shame or restored to honor by keeping private indiscretions away from public view, or behaving honorably after all, such as marrying the mother of one's illegitimate child, or legitimizing the child legally.

We might assume that moral strictures would hinder the ability of family strategists to manage the sexual fortunes of their families. However, scholars who have studied notarial records and other reflections of daily life have long been aware that moral strictures, though undoubtedly important, were not absolute. If a woman claimed that she had been seduced by promises of a future marriage (*estupro por palabras de futuro*), and her seducer was unwilling to honor his promise, she and her family could resort to law. If she could prove her claim by presenting love letters, for example, the authorities could legally restore her lost virginity and honor by assessing monetary damages for the offense. The young woman could then contract an honorable marriage (with the dowry supplied by her ex-lover), and the young man was free to marry someone else, all with the approval of the legal and ecclesiastical authorities.

In addition, informal unions and illegitimacy were more common than we might suppose. A minority of women at all social levels bore children without being

married to the father or fathers of those children, and that behavior seems to have been more common at lower levels of society in Spanish America and some parts of Spain. Presumably, one or both partners saw no need to be married, because it brought them no particular economic benefits. If the communities in which they lived did not disapprove of such behavior, religious disapproval was not strong enough to prevail.

KINSHIP

If we broaden the focus from marriage and family outward, we can see how kinship ties functioned both in Spain and in Spanish America. The most important relationship was between parents and children. Uncles and aunts formed the next line of protection and defense for the younger generation, and God-parentage (*compadrazgo*) extended the ranks of protectors more broadly. Those relationships remained in force, even when family members emigrated overseas and closely related individuals became separated by vast oceans.

One example concerns two young noble brothers who wished to enter one of Spain's prestigious Military Orders in the late seventeenth century. Their uncle sponsored their application and wrote to them affectionately over the course of several years as he assembled the necessary paperwork. His task was complicated, because he lived in Spain and his nephews lived in Mexico City. Several reciprocal links featured in that story. The young men were children of the senior member of the family, and their sponsor was their father's younger brother. In fulfilling his duties as an uncle, he earned his older brother's gratitude, or he might have been paying back an earlier favor. Ironically, because of their father's seniority in the family, the young men outranked their uncle in the Spanish noble hierarchy. They stood higher still after they entered the Order of Santiago, because their uncle belonged to the less prestigious Order of Alcántara. For their entry into the Order of Santiago, their uncle functioned as their patron. However, as their social inferior he might have hoped to benefit as a client from their higher status sometime in the future. Every act of reciprocity would reinforce the ties of kinship and affection that bound them all together.

Marriage alliances reinforced the links of kinship when they led to similar acts of reciprocity. In Spain, as in many other parts of Europe, marriage alliances served as a standard tactic for family advancement at all levels of society, as noted above. When Spaniards traveled abroad, either elsewhere in Europe or to the Americas, kinship networks served the same function, helping individuals to adapt and flourish in an unfamiliar environment. Although early emigration streams to America flowed in large part from the western and southern parts of Castile, eventually every region

in Spain played a role in colonizing the Americas. Correspondence back and forth across the Atlantic helped to maintain the migrants' ties to their kinship network back home.

A few emigrants returned to their hometowns wealthy, providing a living example of the prosperity that lay across the ocean. Others lived modestly in Spanish America and remained there for the rest of their lives. Still others died young or poor or both. When they died, emigrants habitually left bequests to relatives and to charitable and religious foundations in Spain. Even poor sailors who died on board ship or in the Indies would leave their few articles of clothing and personal effects, or the proceeds from their sale, to relatives back home. In other words, as their last living act, individuals in the Spanish world continued to reinforce their kinship ties, wherever they happened to live and die. Scholars continue to study the activities of Spaniards and their extended families at home and abroad, and their findings provide overwhelming evidence for the strength and resiliency of kinship ties, even when those ties were stretched for thousands of miles.

INDIVIDUALS AND COMMUNITY

Just as marriage and family provided the foundation for kinship networks, affinity groups of various sorts provided the foundation for community in the Spanish world. In Spain, the place of residence was one important focus for individual and group identity, and most often that place of residence was a municipality of some sort. Town life and town citizenship are perhaps the most common denominators among Spaniards. In Castile, in particular, there is almost no land that does not fall under the jurisdiction of a municipality of some sort. Ancient notions of urban life as the source of culture and the rule of law took root in Spain along with the towns founded by Phoenicians, Greeks, Carthaginians, and Romans. By extension, the separation between the relatively dense population within the towns and the unpopulated hinterland also marked the separation between the safety of communal life and the dangers of the open countryside. Christian ideals of spiritual brotherhood and religious establishments based in towns reinforced the idea that an orderly town, based on Christian principles, provided an orderly life for its citizens and encouraged them to behave well.

During the centuries of medieval warfare between Christians and Muslims, new towns were founded along the frontier as the Christian area expanded to the south. The dichotomies of town versus countryside, communal life versus isolation, safety versus danger, and Christianity versus Islam persisted long after the final conquest of Muslim Spain in 1492, strengthening the importance of towns in Spanish life.

Law and custom defined three sorts of urban inhabitants: legal citizens or householders (*vecinos*), resident sojourners (*residentes*), and outsiders (*forasteros*). Individuals passing through a town for various reasons might appear in documents simply as being present (*estantes*) at the time the document was written. Citizens alone enjoyed the full range of benefits and responsibilities, however. The norms of citizenship were very similar in large cities and tiny villages alike, so that Spaniards grew up with the experience of living in structured municipalities. In a village or small town, all adult male citizens would take turns holding the various municipal offices; in larger towns the citizens elected municipal officials and had the right to hold office. In addition, they shared communal benefits such as the right to graze livestock on the municipality's common land or to share in profits from the sale of communal assets such as timber. The citizens were collectively responsible for paying taxes assessed on the town and for fulfilling the town's quota in military levies as well. Resident sojourners typically paid certain taxes but enjoyed no political or financial benefits. Outsiders, even if they resided in the town, were legally outside the life of the commune.

Throughout the year, a regular round of civic festivals brought the citizens together, and additional gatherings might be arranged as well, for example to celebrate the birth of a royal heir, or to participate in a religious procession to pray for rain during a drought. Many civic occasions had a religious dimension, because the rituals and ceremonies of the Roman Catholic Church punctuated and defined the daily lives of Spaniards, and religious life and civic life were virtually inseparable. Countless disputes between ecclesiastical and municipal officials, often occasioned by community gatherings, prove that closeness. Whenever the citizens came together, they re-enacted their collective identity, defined by their attachment to the municipality and its communal life.

In the unknown vastness of the Americas, towns continued to signify order, safety, and collective identity in a dangerous world, but the definitions of all those concepts had to be adapted to the new reality. In the Americas, the outside dangers included hostile Indigenous groups, pirates, runaway slaves, and others who did not live in an urban setting. Spanish colonial authorities, like their counterparts at home, believed that urban structure would naturally inspire citizens to live orderly, peaceable, and hardworking lives. That was the driving idea behind settling Indigenous groups into their own towns, whether a particular group had a tradition of settled urban life or not. In indigenous towns, the population tended to be homogeneous, though that did not mean the residents adopted Spanish norms of town life more easily; the reverse was probably closer to reality. Nonetheless, officials believed that the Indigenous populations would become civilized, prosperous, happy

Christians and loyal subjects of the crown if they could be shaped by the structures of orderly urban life under their own leaders.

In other municipalities in America, the community was anything but homogeneous. Visitors to large colonial cities such as Havana, Mexico City, Cartagena de Indias, and Lima were impressed by the variety of people they saw, including Spaniards, Creoles, others of European ancestry, Indigenous people, Africans, and a growing population of mixed ancestry of various sorts. It is fair to say, however, that the administrative, social, and cultural norms of urban life were closer to Spanish models than any others. When they migrated, Spaniards carried with them a sense of how to shape and run a town.

Spaniards who settled elsewhere in Europe often maintained a sense of their separateness in the first several generations after their arrival, but eventually they assimilated into the local population in Bruges, Rouen, Rome, and many other places. In America, where Spaniards formed themselves into new municipalities almost immediately, they replicated the structures and rituals that defined town life in Spain, rather than adjusting to local customs. In doing so, they consciously reproduced the familiar forms, rituals, and customs of urban life. Lavish celebrations for the birth of a royal heir that took place in Madrid or Seville would be replicated in Mexico City and Lima with only minor variations. Over time, the customs and rituals of Spaniards abroad inevitably incorporated elements of local culture as well, while preserving the importance of Spanish identity that their customs and rituals represented.

Defining citizenship was important on both sides of the Atlantic, as Tamar Herzog discussed in an important book that is listed at the end of this chapter. During the early modern period in Castile, official citizenship was restricted to Catholic male householders over the age of twenty-five, and women held citizenship through their male relatives. Sixteenth-century decrees that restricted public office-holding, ecclesiastical benefices, and direct relations with Spanish America to natives of Spain led to debates about what constituted native status (*naturaleza*). Although one might assume that native status could be acquired only by birth, it could also be acquired by voluntary integration, which generally meant becoming a resident sojourner or citizen in a Spanish municipality. Towns readily welcomed outsiders and even foreigners as citizens, if they established permanent residence and displayed the will to become part of the community and share in its communal life. Thus, in practice, local communities had control over certifying foreigners as integrated natives of Spain.

Individuals had to obtain permission from the Spanish crown to travel to America, which is how the authorities hoped to control religious orthodoxy and social stability in the colonies. Once there, however, they might establish residence virtually

anywhere that accepted them as citizens. In Spanish America as in frontier Spain during the Middle Ages, many towns were founded on paper, traced out, and populated with citizens before any physical town existed. Early on, there were distinctions among citizens, sojourners, and outsiders, as there were in Spain, but as time went on, all the residents of many towns might be considered citizens, paying taxes and enjoying the benefits of citizenship.

That was not universally true, however. In seventeenth-century Caracas, for example, the definition of legal citizens became much more exclusive over time. Indigenous people and *mestizos* were considered ineligible for citizenship because they were supposed to reside in their own towns. Africans might be ineligible because they had been forced to immigrate. Mulattoes and other individuals of mixed ancestry were ineligible because they were not thought to behave or to live like proper citizens should. In Buenos Aires, the legacy of border wars with the Portuguese led to citizenship being restricted to natives of the kingdom of Spain alone, with all the complexity that native status meant. Nonetheless, many Spanish American municipalities welcomed virtually anyone who had the money to purchase the privilege of permanent residence, if they were willing to share in the communal life of the town.

Over time, and especially during the early eighteenth century, communities in Spain also became more restrictive in granting citizenship, frequently demanding continuous residence, regardless of an individual's claims of loyalty to the municipality. In other words, citizenship became more a matter of legal requirements than of loyalty and emotional attachment to the commune. As the century wore on, the Bourbon monarchy asserted its right to grant native status to foreigners, rather than continuing to leave such questions to local authorities. Instead of requiring would-be citizens to demonstrate their good faith by settling into a municipality before granting them legal status, the crown allowed them to establish the privileges of native status simply by declaring their intention to settle. Many Spanish municipalities resented having to accept foreigners as citizens who arrived with letters of naturalization but no other proofs of their good faith and trustworthiness. Nonetheless, if the newcomers settled down and behaved like good citizens, they were eventually accepted as such in fact as well as in law. Overall, although the norms for accepting new citizens in Spanish and Spanish American towns varied and changed over time, the duties and expectations of communal citizenship remained remarkably stable. Municipalities thus continued to be an important source of social identity and presumably of social stability on both sides of the Atlantic.

GROUP IDENTITIES AND LOYALTIES

In addition to their familial and communal identity, residents at all levels of Spanish society joined voluntary affinity groups, often based in the parish where they lived. In each parish, confraternities devoted to a saint or a particular representation of the Virgin Mary or Jesus Christ each had special days of prayer and celebration during the year, bringing the members of the confraternity together. Members would also participate as a group in civic and religious activities that involved the municipality. Such ritual activities reinforced the links among members of a given confraternity and bound them collectively to the broader community and ultimately to the crown.

Rivalries among the various confraternities in each parish and among the various parishes in a town had the potential for dividing the citizenry. Nonetheless, those rivalries played out within carefully defined norms of behavior and were subordinated to collective goals. This tended to tame their divisive potential and to provide an intermediate focus of loyalty between the family and the commune. Something similar seems to have occurred regarding differences in wealth and status. In some parishes, each confraternity had members with a similar level of wealth and status, but they were all part of the same parish and could be expected to work together and to help one another. However, some confraternities cut across lines of wealth and status, so that they functioned much like an extended kinship network, binding together a diversity of male and female members (*cofrades*). To a certain extent, therefore, confraternities like kinship networks could foster patron-client relationships and ameliorate social tensions and rivalries. When Spaniards crossed the ocean to America, they often established branches of the same confraternities that they belonged to in Spain. It was common for confraternities in Spanish parishes to list hundreds of members living in America, many of whom had been away for years, if not decades. This suggests that the members retained a sense of common identity with the confraternity, despite their separation in distance and time.

Emigrants from the same region in Spain often clustered together in Spanish American towns, which made it easier for their traditional networks to continue functioning in the unfamiliar environment. In an important study, Ida Altman traced emigrants from the small Spanish town of Brihuega who settled in the Mexican town of Puebla. Even as Puebla grew into the second most important municipality in New Spain, residents linked to Brihuega continued to be a recognizable affinity group in the city, preserving their identity through marriage alliances, business partnerships, and place of residence, among other means. They also continued to help one another in countless demonstrations of reciprocity.

Affinity groups based on occupations–craft or merchant guilds, for example–functioned much like confraternities, both in Spain and overseas. Typically, guilds would have their own patron saints and sponsors, and the members would reinforce their collective identity with an annual round of ritual observances and acts of mutual assistance. One well-known function of craft guilds involved providing aid to their members in case of illness, injury, and death, as well as participating in the funeral rituals of departed members of the guild.

Although family, citizenship, and voluntary associations shaped collective identities, they did not thwart personal ambition. A desire to move up the social ladder in status and wealth marked society in both Spain and Spanish America. Advantageous marriages, military service, or a career in the church provided some of the avenues for upward mobility in both venues. In addition, we know of individuals who moved to Madrid, Seville, and other large cities and simply pretended to be of higher social status, hoping that no one from their hometowns exposed their real origins. The likelihood of turning pretense into reality became easier the farther one traveled. Countless tales of immigrants claiming a higher status in America than they had enjoyed in Spain suggest that individual identities were highly malleable once their owners traveled overseas. Such behavior seems to have been typical of frontier societies in many periods. Late medieval Spain and colonial Spanish America were both frontier societies in which new avenues for advancement could penetrate traditional social boundaries.

Overall, the collective identities defined by family, kinship, geographical origins, and group affiliations provided social cohesion for communities as well as support for individual ambition. The various layers of collective identity did not weaken loyalty to the monarchy, however, because the monarch served as the ultimate source of patronage and sponsorship for individuals and society.

FAMILIES AND CHILDREN

One of the primary purposes of family formation was to produce children and raise them to be self-sufficient adults. Some historians used to argue that the high rates of infant and child mortality in early modern Europe blunted the attachment of parents to their children and the grief caused by a child's death. Anyone familiar with the written and visual evidence from those centuries knows that is not true. Parents, even in the most privileged families, suffered emotionally when a child died.

In the case of a ruling dynasty, grim demographic statistics often determined international politics. In the late fifteenth century, the political strategy of Isabel of Castile and her husband, Fernando of Aragon—both from the Trastámara dynasty—aimed to form useful marriage alliances with other ruling dynasties in Europe, as

mentioned earlier. Instead, the deaths of children from those alliances left one small boy, born in 1500, as the sole heir of a vast collection of territories. He would become the first Habsburg King of Spain as Carlos I (1516–1556) and the ruler of numerous lands elsewhere in Europe, as well as being elected Holy Roman Emperor as Karl V when he was only nineteen. During his long reign, Spain would also establish its empire in the Americas. For the next two centuries, the ability of the Spanish Habsburgs to produce viable heirs was a crucial element in the country's strength and stability—while the Valois in France, the Aviz in Portugal, and the Tudors in England died out.

Mothers played a significant role in their children's lives during their infancy and continued to do so in the case of daughters. Once sons survived the perils of their first few years, fathers assumed a larger role in their upbringing. In the literature and advice manuals of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the role of mothers is rarely mentioned. Nonetheless, in addition to bearing children, women bore primary responsibility for hearth and home, especially if their husbands were often absent. Moreover, if the father of the family died leaving minor children, his widow was often appointed as their guardian, codifying in legal terms the role that they already played within the family as a wife and mother. This was true at all levels of society, but especially among the elite.

Ironically, the birth of illegitimate children saved the fortunes of many of Spain's most distinguished lineages when legitimate marriages failed to produce viable heirs. Grace E. Coolidge's work provides numerous examples of noblemen who not only produced offspring outside their official marriages but legitimized them and made sure they were raised and educated in their households. A wife who had to accept her husband's bastards into her home presumably had ambiguous feelings about the situation, but the succession of the lineage into which she had married was judged to be more important than her self-respect, and raising those children well redeemed her status as a mother.

The mothers of illegitimate children may have entered an informal sexual liaison willingly, but they had little or no legal leverage over the fathers of their children. Nonetheless, many prominent men besides nobles anxious for an heir legitimized their bastards or natural offspring and provided financial support for the mothers. For example, among early global explorers the lengthy list of fathers who acknowledged their illegitimate children includes Christopher Columbus, Juan Sebastián Elcano, and Hernán Cortés. In Cortés's case, the Indigenous woman named Malintzin—known also as Doña Marina or (pejoratively) as 'la Malinche'—was his consort as well as a guide and interpreter who played a crucial role in the conquest of the Aztec Empire. Cortes legitimized their son, Fernando, who was raised in part at the royal court in Spain and became Cortés's universal heir.

Despite their legally subordinate roles, women and their children were central to the continuity of lineages. Pere Molas has studied many cases in which a young woman who could not legally inherit her father's noble title married a much older man, who would acquire the title when her father died. Assuming they had a son, and the young wife survived her husband, the marriage preserved not only the noble title but the bloodline of the lineage. When various strategies did not work as planned and a lineage died out, noble titles and properties passed to related lineages. The lineages that produced viable heirs generation after generation could accumulate impressive properties and titles. A cursory reading of the present-day roster of the Spanish nobility, called the *Elenco de la nobleza,* reveals many such winners and losers in the demographic lottery over the centuries.

A related source of tension and challenge for Spanish noble families was the system of entail (*mayorazgo*), which was designed to preserve family property from disintegration through partible inheritance. However, an entail that restricted inheritance to a male heir meant that family property carefully managed over the centuries could pass to a collateral branch if a generation produced only female offspring. The same could happen if the entail restricted inheritance to the legitimate male heir of a marriage, excluding legitimized bastards. Pere Molas found numerous examples of such occurrences in the early modern period. Legal challenges based on competing claims to properties and titles were quite common, reflecting bitter quarrels among members of the same or related lineages. Because of the restrictive language of many *mayorazgos*, women rarely won such legal battles, losing virtually everything but pride in their ancestors. In part to avoid legal challenges to inheritance, noble families might arrange marriages for their daughters with cousins or uncles from the same lineage.

At all levels of society, the education of children aimed to shape them into moral and productive adults. Obviously, reality could easily fall short of the ideal, but that did not discourage writers and moralists from laying out the principles that should govern a child's education. One of the most detailed descriptions of those principles was written by Juan Pérez de Vargas in the late sixteenth century. A native of Medina del Campo, Pérez was a senior retainer (*lugarteniente*) of the Count of Buendía, a gentleman in the royal households of Carlos I and then of Felipe II. Pérez dedicated his work to Don Fernando Cortés, the son and legitimized heir of Hernán Cortés, whom Carlos I had given the title of the Marqués del Valle—that is, Marquess of the Valley of Mexico. Pérez's manual, written in 1577, covers more than three hundred folios in manuscript, dealing with virtually every aspect of the infancy, education, and formation of a son of the Spanish upper classes, though much of his advice could be applied more generally as well. His modest introduction makes no claim to the erudition common among authors of many other such manuals. Instead

of alluding to the heroes in Scripture, or in the histories of ancient Greece and Rome as models, he simply offers practical advice, based on his observations and his experience as a tutor (*ayo*) of Don Fernando as a child. Throughout his manual, Pérez urges parents to be actively involved in the upbringing of their children. Although he is mostly concerned with noble fathers and their sons, he recognizes the significant role of mothers as well, especially in the early years.

THE LIVES OF ELITE WOMEN

The lives of aristocratic Spanish women in their roles as wives, mothers, and daughters provide examples of many of the general points made thus far. When women fulfilled the roles that custom, class, religion, and legal norms assigned them, they enhanced the reputation and prestige of their birth families and the families into which they married. When they challenged or rejected the roles and norms expected of them, they paid a price—sometimes the ultimate price of their lives.

The first woman considered here is best known from a 1545 portrait by Agnolo Bronzino, titled in English, "Eleanor of Toledo and Her Son." Doña Leonor Álvarez de Toledo y Osorio was born in January 1522 into one of the most distinguished noble lineages in Spain, the Alba clan, who were cousins to the king-emperor himself. Leonor's father, Pedro Álvarez de Toledo y Zúñiga, was appointed viceroy of the Spanish Kingdom of Naples in 1532, and his wife and family joined him there two years later. With vast wealth and considerable political skills, the viceroy organized Naples into a well-functioning component of Spain's composite monarchy, and his tenure as viceroy would last twenty years. Leonor and her siblings were raised in a strict and pious atmosphere at the vice-regal court.

In 1535, when Leonor was thirteen, Cosimo de' Medici visited Naples as a page in the entourage of his cousin Alessandro, the first hereditary Duke of Florence. The Medici family's fortunes, both monetarily and politically, had experienced a series of crises since the death of Lorenzo 'the Magnificent' in 1492, and the family was only restored to effective rule in Florence in 1512 with the help of Spanish troops. In 1537 Alessandro was assassinated in yet another crisis in the chaotic history of the Medicis. Florentine power brokers chose the seventeen-year-old Cosimo from a collateral branch of the Medici family tree to become the second duke, expecting to control him. They were wrong.

Cosimo would prove to be a strong and sometimes ruthless leader, but when he first became duke, he needed both the money and the prestige that an advantageous Spanish marriage would provide. He first hoped to marry Emperor Karl V's illegitimate daughter, Margaret of Austria, but she rejected the idea. The emperor then suggested one of the daughters of the Viceroy of Naples, and Cosimo

chose Leonor, whom he remembered from his visit to Naples in 1535, rather than her older sister, who might have brought him a larger dowry. Despite the political dimension of the betrothal, by all accounts theirs was a love match. They were married by proxy in March of 1539, when Leonor had just turned seventeen and Cosimo was not yet twenty. They corresponded frequently from then until she and her brother, García Álvarez de Toledo, arrived in Florence for her official church wedding to Cosimo at the end of June.

Their first child, a daughter, was born just over nine months later. Leonor would bear Cosimo eleven children before her death from malaria in December 1562 at the age of forty, in the presence of her grief-stricken husband. Contrary to the behavior of many aristocratic males, Cosimo was faithful to Leonor throughout their married life, even as frequent childbearing sapped her vitality and beauty. Her personal motto, *cum pudore laeta fecunditas* ("happy fruitfulness with chastity") captured both her own characteristics and the characteristics of the ideal noble wife.

Both Cosimo and Leonor took an active and affectionate interest in the health and education of their children, though they could not prevent the early deaths of more than half of them. Three died in infancy and another four before the age of twenty–a quite common rate of attrition, even at the highest levels of society. Giovanni, the winsome child in the Bronzino portrait, died at nineteen, along with a younger brother, both from malaria, two weeks before the death of their mother. It is hardly surprising that Duke Cosimo reportedly never recovered from the deaths of two sons, two daughters, and his beloved wife, all in six years.

Leonor clearly fulfilled her primary functions of producing heirs for the recently established ducal house of Medici and bringing much-needed funds to support the political, military, and cultural program that would enhance the family's prestige. Pious as well as fertile and chaste, Leonor supported a wide range of charities and often visited Florence's most notable convents, as well as establishing a new convent in her will, complete with provisions for its lavish decoration. She also became a supporter of the newly founded Society of Jesus, known as the Jesuits, despite initial misgivings. Ironically, Leonor's piety, along with her Spanish ancestry, did not endear her to the Florentine citizenry during her lifetime and affected her reputation in Florentine historiography for centuries thereafter. While recognizing the value of her charitable and cultural contributions, the Florentines considered her aloof, formal, austere, too pious, and altogether more Spanish than Florentine.

Because of her unpopularity among Florentine historians, Leonor's important activities in public life have often been overlooked. Her husband shared her passion for cultural patronage, and his political and military projects benefited from her financial support. Moreover, he trusted her to govern Florence as regent during his frequent absences and one extended illness, and he valued her political instincts and

advice. Leonor's political skills were not surprising, given her father's many years as Viceroy of Naples, and her brother García's tenure as Viceroy of Catalonia and then of Sicily, among other appointments. Elite Spanish women often substituted for their absent husbands and brothers in important positions. For example, the widowed sister of King Felipe II of Spain, Juana, Princess of Portugal, took on the regency of Spain and its empire in 1554 at the age of nineteen, leaving her infant son in the care of his Spanish grandmother in Lisbon. Juana served as regent for four years, effectively governing Spain and its overseas empire while her brother was in northern Europe.

In the hinterland of Florence, Duchess Leonor was known as an astute manager of the Medici family's agricultural estates and mining interests, which generated regular profits. In the city proper, in addition to her administrative duties, Leonor spent considerable sums in support of artistic and cultural pursuits, regularly employing such artists as Agnolo Bronzino, Giorgio Vasari, and Niccolò Tribolo. She purchased the Pitti Palace in 1547 and began an extensive program with Cosimo to enlarge the building to house paintings, sculptures, and other artifacts she commissioned, as well as beginning the development of the famed Boboli Gardens, a project that was still not complete at her death. In 1559, perhaps to broaden and toughen her image beyond being a pious and chaste mother figure, she commissioned Vasari to paint a stunning fresco in her private chapel in the Palazzo Vecchio. Its theme, which occupied Vasari for five years, focused on the character and deeds of some of the most heroic women in Biblical legends and Florentine history. Duchess Leonor clearly saw herself in the character and deeds of those heroic women.

In contrast to Leonor's character and accomplishments as the duchess of Florence, the shocking story of her niece provides a stark reminder of what could happen to women who did not fulfill the expectations of their assigned roles. As the daughter of Duchess Leonor's brother, she is often known in Florentine history as Eleonora di Garzia di Toledo. She was born in Florence in March 1553, at a time when her father administered several castles in the region. Her mother, Vittoria d'Ascanio Colonna, died a few months later, and the infant Eleanora was left in the loving care of Cosimo I and Leonor, who raised her as if she were one of their own large family. While Duchess Leonor was alive, she presumably tried to set high moral standards for the children and the ducal court in general, though it is likely that her standards were not emulated by the court as a whole, or even by all of her children.

Duchess Leonor died in December 1562, and Cosimo did not marry again until 1570, so their only surviving daughter, Isabella de' Medici, assumed the responsibilities of running the ducal household. To secure the southern borders of Florentine territory, Isabella had been betrothed at the age of eleven to Paolo Giordano I Orsini, who was a year older than Isabella. Their marriage took place in

1558 when Isabella was sixteen, but there seems to have been little affection between husband and wife from the beginning. Isabella remained in Florence, where Paolo visited from time to time, but he lived mostly in Rome when he was not fighting in the numerous major and minor wars of the time. Isabella was twenty years old when Duchess Leonor died and had not yet produced a viable heir, but she was intelligent, lively, and politically astute, supporting charity and the arts like her parents. Among her household responsibilities was the continued upbringing of her ten-year-old cousin Eleanora, nicknamed Dianora.

The ducal household had a quite different moral tone after Duchess Leonor's death. Cosimo took a mistress and acquiesced when the unhappily married Isabella took lovers of her own, as long as she was reasonably discreet. Her young cousin Dianora had always been one of Duke Cosimo's favorites, and her presence in Florence continued the ties between the new ducal house of Medici and the much older and more distinguished Alba lineage of Spain. Dianora grew into a lovely young woman at the Medici court, and Isabella served as her role model and confidante. To make the connection between the Medici clan and the house of Alba even stronger, Eleanora was betrothed to her first cousin, Pietro, the youngest child of Cosimo and Leonor. Dianora and Pietro had grown up together, and the match made sense in many ways. For their marriage in 1571, Dianora brought a handsome dowry of 40,000 gold ducats from her father, Garcia Álvarez de Toledo, whose troops had broken the Turkish siege of Malta in 1565. If Dianora's marriage to Pietro had been as loving and successful as that of Cosimo and Leonor, her subsequent life would have been far different. Unfortunately, Pietro was emotionally unstable, even as a child, and reportedly had to be forced to consummate the marriage. Although Dianora produced a son two years later, her husband avoided anything resembling a loving relationship with her, for reasons that remain unclear.

Isabella de' Medici finally produced two children in the early 1570s, but both she and her young cousin Dianora remained trapped in politically advantageous but loveless marriages. Had they been willing to accept their situation as dutiful, chaste wives, they could have lived out their lives pleasantly enough at the Florentine court. Instead, Isabella continued to amuse herself with lovers, and Dianora followed her example. Although Cosimo I continued as Duke of Florence and was appointed by Pope Pius V as the first hereditary Grand Duke of Tuscany in 1569, he delegated most of his responsibilities to his oldest son Francesco and spent much of his time in a villa outside the city proper. Francesco was much less tolerant than Cosimo of the extramarital affairs of his sister Isabella and his sister-in-law Dianora, especially when stories reached him that Dianora often took her current lover with her on carriage rides through the city for all to see. Her behavior tarnished the image of a ducal house that was barely a generation old and still struggling to acquire legitimacy

in the eyes of Europe. Cosimo's appointment as Grand Duke in 1569 had not even been acknowledged by the other Italian city-states or the Habsburg emperor, Ferdinand I. Cosimo married his mistress in 1570, not only to please the pope but to remove at least one source of damaging gossip about the Medici family. Ironically, his new wife, despite her previous position as Cosimo's mistress, complained that Dianora's behavior was damaging the family's reputation.

After Cosimo died in 1574 and Francesco succeeded him, the moral tone of the Florentine court shifted again, this time toward more austerity, but neither Isabella nor Dianora seemed to recognize the shift. Duke Francesco, married to an Austrian Habsburg, was something of a recluse—more interested in solitary scientific pursuits than in the visible cultural projects of his father and mother. Even so, he could not avoid the rumors that swirled around the behavior of Isabella and Dianora, as well as the repeated complaints by their respective husbands—presumably not from jealousy or moral outrage but from wounded pride.

Matters deteriorated and reached a climax in the summer of 1576. Pietro arrested Dianora's lover, Bernardino Antinori, and sent him to the island of Elba. Presumably based on incriminating love letters to Dianora, Antinori was strangled in his cell in early July. Dianora was sent to the Medici villa at Cafaggiolo north of Florence, where she died on 11 July. The next day, Pietro reported to his brother, Grand Duke Francesco, that, "Last night at six hours an accident occurred to my wife, and she died" and asked for instructions regarding how to proceed. Francesco conveyed the news to their brother Fernandino in Rome that, "Last night, around five o'clock, a really terrible accident happened to Donna Leonora (Dianora). She was found in bed, suffocated, and Don Pietro and the others were not in time to revive her." In fact, the grand duke understood that the death had not been accidental. Six days later, Isabella de' Medici also died suddenly, this time at another Medici villa at Cerreto Guidi.

Despite the blatant attempt to present the two deaths as tragic accidents, diplomats and others in and around the Florentine court soon pieced together a far different story, which spread as rapidly as couriers could carry it. At the end of July, Duke Alfonso d'Este of Ferrara received a coded message from his ambassador in Florence that summarized the shocking tale.

> I advise Your Excellency of the announcement of the death of Lady Isabella; of which I heard as soon as I arrived in Bologna, [which] has displeased as many as had the Lady Leonora's [death]. Both ladies were strangled, one at Cafaggiolo and the other at Cerreto. Lady Leonora was strangled on Tuesday night. Having danced until two o'clock, and having gone to bed, she was surprised by Lord Pietro [with] a dog leash around her throat, and after much struggle to save herself, finally expired. And the same Lord Pietro bears the sign, having two fingers of his hand injured by [being]

> bitten by the lady. And if he had not called two wretches from Romagna for help, who claim to have been summoned there precisely for this purpose, he would perhaps have fared worse. The poor lady, as far as we can understand, made a very strong defense, as was seen by the bed, which was found all convulsed, and by the voices which were heard by the entire household. As soon as she died, she was placed in a coffin prepared there for this occurrence and taken to Florence in a litter at six o'clock in the morning, led by those from the villa, and accompanied with eight white tapers [carried] by six brothers [frater? friars? lay brothers?] and four priests. She was interred as if she were a commoner.[4]

Like Dianora, Isabella had been strangled by her husband, and it is highly likely that Grand Duke Francesco not only knew the truth but had sanctioned both cold-blooded murders in advance. Enough people in high places soon became aware of the murders that Francesco had to revise his official announcement, crafting a tale sent to Felipe II of Spain that Dianora's death had been a justifiable execution by her husband for acts equivalent to treason. Whether Felipe believed the bogus tale, the proprieties had been observed. Despite the protests of Dianora's brother and the outrage of many other Spaniards in high places, Pietro de' Medici was never punished. Instead, Grand Duke Francesco exiled him to Spain, where he spent the rest of his life as a dissolute playboy. In the political universe of the time, Spain's alliance with the Médicis was too important to risk. Dianora's refusal to fulfill her assigned role in supporting that alliance made her expendable, and her tragic death at the age of twenty-three sprang from her failure to recognize the vulnerability of her position.

Other women also refused to fulfill their assigned roles in the marital strategies of their families, but the outcome did not always result in tragedy. One interesting story concerns Doña Josefa Portocarrero y Jiménez de Urrea, whose father, Don Melchor Portocarrero, served as viceroy of New Spain and then of Peru in the late seventeenth century. During his tenure in Peru, he succeeded to the title of III Count of La Monclova. When he died in 1705, his son, Antonio José Portocarrero y Ximénez de Urrea, succeeded to the noble title, and his daughter Josefa was well positioned to make an advantageous marriage. Rather than accepting her assigned role, however, Doña Josefa was determined to become a nun, against the vehement objections of her mother and brother. Why were they so opposed to her wishes, especially in a strongly Roman Catholic environment? The most likely reasons relate to Viceroy Monclova's reputed fortune when he died. If Josefa's inheritance were used as a marriage portion, even in part, it would presumably enhance her family's

[4] Quoted in Langdon, pp. 176–178. The story also appears in Murphy, pp. 315–17. Both sources are included in the suggested readings at the end of this chapter.

fortunes over the long term. If she brought her entire inheritance into the religious life, however, any benefits to her family would be spiritual rather than material.

Another likely reason that Josefa's mother and brother opposed her religious vocation also relates to Viceroy Monclova's reputed fortune. Every major officeholder in the Spanish bureaucracy had to undergo a review called a *residencia* when leaving office, which generally included an examination of subordinate officials as well. If the judge appointed to administer the review found evidence of wrongdoing, the penalties could be harsh, and Monclova's estimated fortune alerted officials in Madrid to possible wrongdoing. Before the review began, his widow was asked to supply one million *pesos*[5] as a kind of down payment on any penalties assessed once the review was completed. Although she pleaded that she could not supply such a sum, the request itself presumably alarmed her and her son that there was worse to come. It was therefore even more important that Josefa marry into a prominent and wealthy family as soon as possible.

Josefa's desire to become a nun had wider implications as well. Many of Lima's elite citizenry supported the position of Josefa's mother and brother, but the broader population of Lima became vocal supporters of Josefa's religious vocation. The aged archbishop of Lima, Don Melchor de Liñán y Cisneros, who had been in office for three decades, declined to intervene in the dispute, perhaps because he was reluctant to alienate generous donors to the religious establishment. The controversy became even more complicated when the new viceroy, Manuel Oms y Sentmenat, the Marquess of Castelldosrius, officially took office in Lima in May of 1707. Castelldosrius could have stayed out of the fight like the archbishop, but he seems to have favored Josefa's right to make her own decision. She was twenty-four years old when her father died—certainly old enough to know her own mind. Her wish was to join the new monastery in Lima dedicated to Santa Rosa of Lima, canonized in 1671 as the first Roman Catholic saint born in the Americas. The Monastery of Santa Rosa in Lima was established by royal decree in 1704 near the end of Viceroy Monclova's tenure, though it was not officially inaugurated until February 1708 with a procession that included Archbishop Liñán, Viceroy Castelldosrius, and virtually all of Lima.

The old archbishop died in late June of 1708. Shortly thereafter, defying the continued objections of Josefa's mother and brother, the vicar general in Lima met with Josefa in secret and administered her religious vows, much to the delight of the local citizenry. Her mother still refused to hand over Josefa's inheritance, which reinforced her image as caring more about money than her daughter's happiness.

[5] A *peso de a ocho* was a coin worth eight *reales*, so one million *pesos* was worth eight million *reales*—roughly the equivalent of a year's royal tax revenue from Spanish America.

Viceroy Castelldosrius reportedly remarked that "her repugnance was not for her daughter (*hija*) but for her daughter's inheritance (*hijuela*")—a clever play on words. Witty though he was, Castelldosrius's stance in the controversy over Josefa's future made him powerful enemies in Peru, with consequences that will be discussed in a later chapter.

For Josefa, at least, there was a happy outcome. She joined the Monastery of Santa Rosa and became its first prioress and a major donor to its establishment. As Josepha de Santa Rosa Portocarrero y Ximénez, she lived until 1743, enjoying one of the few options besides marriage for a Spanish noblewoman. The controversy surrounding her choice provides a reminder that the decisions and actions of elite women could have repercussions that went far beyond their immediate families.

ELITE WOMEN AND THE WAR OF SUCCESSION

Doña Josefa's story took place during the global conflict known as the War of the Spanish Succession, which lasted from 1701 to 1714, with diplomatic negotiations continuing until 1725. The Habsburg dynasty had held the throne of Spain for two centuries, and wars between the Habsburgs and the Bourbons in France had punctuated both centuries. However, peace treaties often included the marriage of a princess from one dynasty into the rival dynasty across the Pyrenees. For example, France's Louis XIV was a grandson of Spain's Felipe II, and Louis's first wife María Teresa was a daughter of Spain's Felipe IV. When Spain's last Habsburg king, Carlos II, died in 1700, he designated as his successor a grandson of France's Louis XIV, Philippe, Duke of Anjou, who arguably had the strongest dynastic claim to the Spanish throne. Taking the name Felipe V, he and his wife, both teenagers when they arrived in Spain, worked hard to rally support for his accession, but most of the rest of Europe backed the Habsburg pretender to the Spanish throne, the Archduke Karl, and went to war to place him on the throne. That war and its implications in Spanish America will be the focus of a later chapter.

Many members of the Spanish elite had benefited from the favor of the Habsburgs during their long tenure in Spain. Moreover, those who lived at the end of the seventeenth century had experienced decades of warfare against Louis XIV's France. As a result, the choice of a French prince to succeed the last Habsburg posed a dilemma for many members of the Spanish elite. Nonetheless, the heads of most noble families accepted Felipe V as their new king. Others disliked and distrusted the French so much that they became supporters of the Austrian Habsburg pretender and were known as *austriacistas*. Ordinary people faced the same choice of whether to accept the new king. As a result, although the war is often presented as a global

struggle, with Spain and its empire as no more than the spoils of war, it was also a civil war within Spain.

Among the elite Spaniards supporting one side or the other in the conflict, women played crucial roles. Virginia León Sanz has written many detailed studies of notable Spanish *austriacistas* during and after the War of Succession. Their loyalties were often defined by personal and familial concerns rather than by politics or ideology, which of course was true for men as well. However, elite women were sometimes caught between loyalty to the lineage of their birth and loyalty to the lineage into which they had married. A woman's personal relationship with her husband and her in-laws further complicated matters. Moreover, in some cases a woman with a powerful personality could influence the political choices of her husband and other members of her extended family. Although the stories of these women are often neglected in histories of the War of Succession, their actions had a far from trivial influence on the course of the conflict.

Many women corresponded with family members near and far to aid one side or the other, and some maintained communication with both camps. In fact, noblewomen participated in all the intrigues of the day for a complex range of motivations that defy simple analysis. Because strategic marriage alliances in every generation linked diverse families together, a Spanish noblewoman might potentially owe her loyalty to either side, and not necessarily the same side as her husband. That became clear to some of the French bureaucrats sent to Spain by Louis XIV to advise—and ideally to control—his grandson. Jean Amelot wrote to Louis XIV in August of 1707 about the political intrigues he observed in Madrid, noting that, "the women […] are much worse and more dangerous than their husbands."[6]

One example concerns Juana Petronila Silva Fernández de Híjar y Pignatelli. Born in 1669, by 1700 she had inherited more than a dozen noble titles, the most important being the duchess of Híjar in Aragón. Although she had served Queen María Luisa de Orleans, the French first wife of Carlos II, Juana Petronilla chose the side of the Habsburg pretender in the War of Succession, perhaps influenced by her second marriage in 1701 to a nobleman born in Naples. Another aristocratic woman, Jerónima de Rocamora, Marchioness of Rafal (1691–1736), held a title based in the bishopric of Orihuela in Catalonia, which declared for the Habsburg pretender in 1704. In addition, her marriage to her cousin José Rosell Ruiz, the lord of Benejúzar, a prominent *austriacista* who became the Marquess of Rafal with their marriage, practically guaranteed her loyalty to the Habsburg pretender. Other high-ranking

[6] Letter of Amelot to Louis XIV, 29 August 1707, cited in Catherine Désos, *Les Français de Philippe V. Un modèle nouveau pour gouverner l'Espagne (1700-1724)* (Strasbourg : Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, 2009), p. 296 ; my translation.

women in the Kingdom of Aragón were brought into the entourage of Archduke Karl as wives and children, rather than by their own choices. High-ranking Castilian supporters of the Habsburg pretender were less common. One example was Josefa de Velasco, Countess of Siruela, and her prominent *austriacista* husband, Fernando de Silva, Countof Cifuentes, who held titles based in central Spain.

One of the most prominent noblewomen supporting the Habsburg pretender was the Countess of Oropesa, Isabel Téllez Girón y Pacheco Velasco. Her husband, Manuel Joaquín Álvarez de Toledo, the VIII Count of Oropesa, had served the Habsburg monarchy in a variety of important posts in the late seventeenth century. Nonetheless, his political career lurched from triumph to disgrace several times, and he was twice passed over to become Viceroy of Aragón, despite the connection of his title to Aragón and the preference of its council for his candidacy. As King Carlos II's chief minister in 1680, Oropesa had the necessary prestige to institute the drastic monetary devaluation that ultimately stabilized the currency at the cost of considerable short-term economic distress. The devaluation spawned a host of enemies at court, and Oropesa fell from favor more than once, though the king continued to hold him in high regard. When Carlos II died, Oropesa was torn between loyalty to the monarchy and loyalty to the Habsburg dynasty, though he honored the late king's choice and initially supported the Bourbon succession.

Oropesa's wife had no such personal ambiguity. Her implacable hatred for the French defined her unwavering Habsburg loyalties. According to the contemporary chronicler, Vicente Bacallar y Sanna, Marquess of San Felipe, the countess eventually persuaded her husband to support the Habsburg pretender. When the anti-Bourbon allies captured Madrid in 1706, Oropesa's household was essentially placed under house arrest, which gave him an excuse to stay on the Habsburg side. When Archduke Karl was forced to withdraw from Madrid after a brief occupation, Oropesa accompanied his wife to Barcelona, where he died in December of 1707. The Countess of Oropesa may also have influenced her brother, Manuel Pacheco Téllez Girón, the Duke of Uceda. Initially, Uceda seemed to be loyal to Felipe V, who appointed him to the Council of the Indies and then as his ambassador in Rome in 1703. Bacallar y Sanna, among others, suspected Uceda of secretly favoring the Habsburg pretender rather than supporting the king's diplomatic interests in Italy, but King Felipe continued to trust him.

When anti-Bourbon forces again occupied Madrid in the fall of 1710, the head of the Austrian army, Guido Starhemberg, became aware of the intrigues of noblewomen who supported King Felipe. As a preventive measure, on October 12, 1710, he ordered all noblewomen in the capital to pack up within four days and leave for Toledo, which was garrisoned largely by British troops. Some women defied the order, staying behind closed doors at home or in monasteries in Madrid. However,

most of the noblewomen, including those who favored Archduke Karl, obeyed the order and moved to monasteries in Toledo. Among the *austriacistas* was Luisa Gonzaga Manrique de Lara (1649–1729), whose father had served as captain general of Spain's Atlantic fleet. She had married Tomás de la Cerda, Marquess of La Laguna de Cameros Viejos, in 1671 and traveled with him to Mexico in 1680, where he served as Viceroy of Mexico until his death in 1686. Luisa returned to Spain as a widow to serve as the chief attendant of Carlos II's German second queen, Mariana of Neuberg. Unwavering in her connection to the Habsburg dynasty, she willingly moved to Toledo upon Starhemberg's order in 1710.

Catalina de Haro y Guzmán (1671–1734), the Marchioness of Carpio, was another high-ranking Spanish noblewoman who supported the Habsburg pretender. Although her husband, Francisco Álvarez de Toledo (1662–1739) of the powerful Alba clan, remained loyal to King Felipe, when the anti-Bourbon armies left Madrid in 1710, she followed the Archduke Karl to Barcelona with her daughter, María Teresa de Haro Toledo y Guzmán. Born in 1691, María Teresa inherited all the estates concentrated in the hands of her parents. Although Doña Catalina's husband became the Duke of Alba in 1711, she and her daughter remained in the entourage of the Habsburg pretender. In 1712, María Teresa married Manuel José de Silva y Mendoza (1677–1728), Count of Galve, brother of the Duke of Infantado and a follower of the Archduke Karl. When the archduke abandoned Spain, they all followed him to Italy and then to Vienna when he was elected Holy Roman Emperor as Karl VI. Doña Catalina returned to Spain with her grandchildren in 1725, even before the Peace of Vienna in that year. María Teresa and her husband returned to Spain later. As a widow, María Teresa became duchess of Alba in 1739 when her father died. Her son, Fernando, born in Vienna in 1715, married the heiress of the Count and Countess of Oropesa, arguably the highest-ranking *austriacistas* during the war. Doña Luisa Gonzaga Manrique de Lara and her son followed a similar trajectory as exiles in the Habsburg lands. Although Doña Luisa died in Milan, her son would eventually return to Spain and—surprisingly—recover his status at the court of Felipe V.

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All the individuals featured in this chapter provide examples of the importance of family connections in the Spanish world and the conflicts and tensions that formed an inevitable part of family loyalties. Even when an individual stayed well within the boundaries of the role that society and tradition required, tensions and conflicts were unavoidable, especially in matters of inheritance. Individuals who defied legal norms or even committed crimes might escape punishment for their acts if broader political

or diplomatic considerations protected them. Whatever the fate of a given individual, there is no doubt that their family connections helped to shape their lives.

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Chapter 3
SPAIN IN THE WORLD: EXPLORERS, CONQUERORS, AND COLONIZERS

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MOTIVES AND MEANS FOR SPANISH EXPLORATION

Any discussion of Spain in the world begins with the history of exploration. Scholars have used many themes to examine global exploration, but motives and means feature in many analyses. Before turning to Spanish explorers and the development of the Spanish Empire, it makes sense to briefly discuss the motives and means that came together in the fifteenth century to make Spain and Portugal likely pioneers in global exploration. As the historian J. H. Parry noted long ago, many voyages of exploration were not launched to explore the unknown but to reach lands and peoples that were already known or believed to exist. In other words, the motives for some of the most famous expeditions undertaken by European explorers were more conservative than we often realize.

Educated Europeans in the Renaissance understood that the sources of spices and other luxury goods brought to Europe lay far to the east in Asia. The Ottoman capture of Constantinople in 1453 effectively blocked western Europeans from traveling overland to reach those sources. However, they knew that trade with Asia could generate enormous profits if they could find a sea route around Africa to avoid the hostile lands in the Middle East. The Iberian Peninsula was ideally located to explore southward down the African coast. West Africa was already partly known to Iberian mariners in the fifteenth century, but it was not clear how far Africa extended toward the south.

Another motive for exploration was curiosity about other places, people, and things. That curiosity seems to have been characteristic of Europeans in general. The urge to map, to collect, to categorize, to measure, and to describe interesting people and places was present from the earliest voyages of exploration—and presumably long before that. From Columbus onward, explorers recorded and described winds and currents at sea, plants and animals, people and things, partly from a desire to find opportunities for profit, but also from what we can recognize as intellectual or scientific curiosity.

Among personal motivations to explore, the quest for fame and glory attracted individual explorers as well as merchants and heads of state. From the earliest days of global exploration, many expedition leaders traveled beyond their homelands to wherever they saw the best chances for personal advancement. If they found a sponsor for their exploration and abided by the rules established, the wealth and glory they claimed for that sponsor could bring them fame and riches as well.

In addition to seeking their own advancement, explorers were often motivated by religious beliefs of one sort or another. One widely held belief among European Christians, including missionaries and monarchs, was the need to spread the knowledge of Christianity to all people in preparation for the Apocalypse and the second coming of Jesus Christ. Another sort of motivation resided in the quest to find men and women untouched by the baser attributes of civilization. The earliest European explorers often described the peoples and places they encountered as if they represented the unspoiled earthly paradise described in the Bible, a vision reinforced by late medieval and early Renaissance travel books. Sooner or later, explorers realized that the new worlds they encountered already knew violence, despotism, diseases, and various other ills, but the quest for an unspoiled paradise was remarkably persistent in the history of European exploration.

The means that enabled exploration included a wide range of technical, financial, and bureaucratic support, as well as individuals willing to venture far beyond their familiar surroundings. The most important technical requirements for sea-borne exploration included appropriate vessels, navigational devices, information, and weaponry. Those components were represented in fifteenth-century Europe by the full-rigged ship; the mariner's astrolabe, compass, and sailing charts; and gun-powder weaponry. Both Portugal and Spain had all those components for potential explorers to use, along with a favorable geographical location from which to launch expeditions into the Ocean Sea—the Atlantic Ocean—to the west.

Political rivalries in Europe contributed to both the motives and the means for overseas exploration. The consolidated monarchies of Portugal, Spain, England, and France were the major players in those rivalries, which provided a powerful incentive for ruling monarchs to sponsor voyages of exploration. During the late fifteenth century, mariners from Portugal and Castile found and claimed various islands in the Ocean Sea for their sovereigns and contended with one another in the exploration of West Africa, first in search of trade goods—including enslaved peoples—and later in search of a sea-borne route to India and beyond. Rituals to claim newly discovered lands were carefully managed and recorded in meticulous detail to preempt rival claims. Portugal and Castile also fought one another in the numerous wars that defined the late fifteenth century. The marriage of Isabel of Castile and Fernando of Aragón in 1469 led to another war with Portugal, and the treaty ending that war in

1479 began the process of defining separate areas of exploration for Portugal and Castile into the Atlantic Ocean and beyond. The Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494 confirmed Portugal's right to explore south and east of a demarcation line in the Atlantic Ocean, continuing decades of Portuguese exploration down the African coast and around its tip to India. The treaty also confirmed Castile's right to continue exploring toward the west of that demarcation line, in the aftermath of Columbus's first two voyages that claimed lands for the Kingdom of Castile. It remained unclear where the demarcation line fell on the other side of the globe, but continued peace between Spain and Portugal depended upon explorers from each country avoiding the exclusive sphere of the other.

IN SEARCH OF A WESTWARD ROUTE TO ASIA

Columbus's voyages toward the west promised not only an entry into the rich markets of Asia but the chance to bring the Christian message to the huge populations in that part of the world. Although Columbus continued to believe that he had reached some part of Asia, he had in fact discovered lands and people in the Western Hemisphere unknown to Europeans. The word "discovery" and similar words in Spanish, French, Italian, and Portuguese are appropriate to use in that context, because they all mean to uncover or reveal something that was unknown to the discover beforehand. In other words, discovery does not mean to create or invent. The peoples of the Western Hemisphere existed long before Europeans arrived, and they had a clear sense of their own identities and histories. They discovered the existence of Europe and its peoples at the same time that Spaniards and Portuguese explorers discovered the existence of the Americas and their peoples.

Dozens of Spanish voyages after Columbus made clear that the lands to the west were not part of Asia, or at least not the rich, densely settled parts of Asia that Marco Polo had described two centuries before. By contrast, Portuguese voyages around Africa to the east in fact reached Asia. Along the way, Portuguese explorers established trading enclaves (*feitorias*) along the coasts of Africa, India, and some of the islands in East Asia, on the fringes of land-based empires. The political situation in most of those places favored trade but did not permit the establishment of a land-based colonial empire, even if the small (1 million) population of Portugal had been sufficient to attempt it. The Spanish voyages sailing west found a far different situation. Instead of establishing trading relations with well-organized and powerful empires, Castilian monarchs had to decide how to incorporate the lands claimed in their names on the other side of the ocean. Their immediate solution was to set up an administrative structure based like that already existing in Spain, which had

developed over the centuries as frontier territories were recaptured from the Muslims.

EARLY EXPLORATION AND EXPLORERS

Early Spanish exploration across the ocean moved from the islands in the Caribbean Sea toward the mainland of what would be called North and South America. Isabel and Fernando soon withdrew the exclusive privileges they had granted to Columbus, and individual explorers thereafter had to request royal permission to explore. Their agreements with the crown were laid out in carefully worded legal contracts, always with the crown in control of the process. In the first decades after Columbus's four voyages, other explorers claimed lands for Castile in the Caribbean, on the Mexican coast, and along the north and east coasts of South America. In medieval times, monarchs had granted *encomiendas* to their followers to hold and defend the land newly conquered from the Muslims, as well as land such as the Canary Islands that had no powerful overlord. With these precedents in mind, Spaniards who conquered territory in the Americas hoped to be granted *encomiendas* as well. They could also hope for appointments to official posts and other rewards.

Among the best-known of the early explorers, Juan Ponce de León was appointed the first governor of Puerto Rico (1509), where he established a settlement before becoming the first European to explore the area that Spaniards called La Florida (1513). Vasco Núñez de Balboa settled on the island of Hispaniola, then established the first permanent European settlement on the North American continent on the Isthmus of Darien in 1510. From there, he led an overland expedition that reached the shores of the Pacific Ocean (1513). Although Balboa could not know it, he was staring at a body of water that dwarfed anything that he and his men had ever encountered. Balboa assumed that Asia lay a short sail farther on and had no idea of the vastness of the ocean. From that moment forward, the relationship between Spaniards and the Pacific was a struggle to come to grips with the largest geographical feature on the face of the earth. That same challenge would defy other European explorers and mapmakers as well, even after they became experienced Pacific mariners.

Juan Díaz de Solís, a ship's pilot who may have been Portuguese, was typical of many ambitious men of obscure origins who found opportunities for advancement by serving the Spanish crown in the early decades of exploration. Díaz explored the east coast of Central America in 1508–9, then was appointed in 1512 to succeed the Italian Amerigo Vespucci as Chief Pilot of the House of Trade in Seville. Sent to look for an opening through the huge continent to the west, in 1516 Díaz reached the broad mouth of the Río de la Plata, which seemed to be the hoped-for passage.

Unfortunately, shortly after he entered the estuary, he was killed and reportedly eaten by the local inhabitants.

As discussed in previous chapters, in addition to sponsoring early voyages of exploration, the Catholic Monarchs Isabel and Fernando negotiated a series of marriage alliances for their children with the three other consolidated monarchies of their time and with the Habsburg dynasty in the Holy Roman Empire. The unexpected and unwanted result of that strategy was the inheritance of a huge collection of territories by Karl Habsburg, who became King Carlos I of Spain at the age of seventeen and was elected Holy Roman Emperor two years later. Although his long reign would include the shattering of European Christianity with the Protestant Reformation, ongoing rivalry with France, and frequent wars with the Ottoman Turks, Carlos was also able to direct Spanish exploration overseas and shape the administrative structure of the Spanish Empire in the Americas.

The same year that King Carlos was elected Holy Roman Emperor (1519), he sent the Portuguese explorer, Ferdinand Magellan, to look for a westward sea route to the Spice Islands (Moluccas) in southeast Asia and claim them for Spain. Merchants as well as the king had much to gain if the Spice Islands lay within the Spanish sphere of exploration on the other side of the earth, and a consortium of merchants partly financed the voyage. Magellan and his brilliant but unstable partner, Rui Faleiro, the joint commanders of the expedition, enjoyed extraordinary support from the king as plans for the voyage took shape. For example, the king appointed both Magellan and Faleiro to the prestigious noble Order of Santiago in the summer of 1518. To be granted such distinction in advance of a royally sponsored voyage was unprecedented.

Despite the king's confidence in Magellan, his advisers made sure that the legal arrangements between Magellan and the crown were clear and binding, from the initial contract dated March 22, 1518, in Valladolid to the various royal orders and detailed instructions issued before the expedition sailed in September 1519. Among other instructions, patterned on those for earlier voyages of exploration, the crown forbade Magellan or anyone but royal appointees to conduct trade overseas. Moreover, Magellan was required to consult with those royal appointees and obtain their unanimous agreement regarding every matter related to royal service during the voyage. That included, above all, consultations with the senior officers of the fleet regarding the route and responses to changing conditions as they sailed. The commander of every Spanish fleet was bound by the same requirement to consult the other senior officers, which was designed to ensure the good governance and smooth functioning of the fleet, even when disagreements arose.

The noble courtier Juan de Cartagena was appointed general overseer (*veedor general*) of the expedition in April 1518 to monitor the behavior of Magellan and

Faleiro for the crown and ensure that the two Portuguese commanders followed the prescribed route. Cartagena was also authorized to assume command of the expedition if both Magellan and Faleiro died. As preparations continued, Faleiro's behavior became increasingly erratic. As a result, the king removed him from the expedition by July of 1519 and designated Cartagena as *conjunta persona*—literally, joint person—with Magellan and captain of the *San Antonio*, the largest ship in the fleet. Cartagena's appointment as *conjunta persona* with Magellan implied that he held co-equal status with Magellan as Faleiro's replacement. Although Magellan protested those arrangements, he had no choice in the matter.

Before the fleet of five ships left Spain, Magellan consulted with the other officers and officials in Seville to agree upon a course, and he consulted them again when they reached the Canary Islands. Once the fleet left the Canaries, however, he deviated sharply from that course and refused all further consultations. His behavior created conflicts with the senior officers in the fleet, above all with Juan de Cartagena. Though most historians who have studied the expedition tend to favor Magellan in those conflicts, Cartagena's appointment as general overseer and *conjunta persona* with Magellan gave him the right and the duty to hold Magellan responsible for obeying the king's orders. Nonetheless, when Cartagena acted on that duty and challenged Magellan as they crossed the Atlantic, Magellan had him arrested and stripped of command of the *San Antonio* for insubordination, though, legally, Cartagena was not Magellan's subordinate.

Once the expedition arrived at the Rio de Janeiro in Portuguese Brazil, a two-week layover restored a semblance of good feeling in the fleet, but other Spanish officers besides Cartagena also ran afoul of Magellan, and he ultimately appointed his cousin, Álvaro de Mesquita, as captain of the *San Antonio*. When the voyage continued south and the weather worsened, conflict erupted again. Magellan would allow no questioning of his authority, and though he had claimed to know the location of a passage through the land mass toward Asia, he could not find it. The smallest ship in the fleet was wrecked exploring one possible channel, and the remaining four ships were battered by wind and heavy seas and needed repairs. They took refuge in the bay they named San Julián on March 31, 1520, planning to spend the winter there. The next day was Easter Sunday. That night, Gaspar de Quesada and Luis de Mendoza, noblemen and royally appointed captains of two of the ships, led an uprising protesting Magellan's behavior and demanding that he share information about the route and otherwise obey the king's instructions.

The young Italian Antonio Pigafetta, a steadfast admirer of Magellan and the best-known chronicler of the expedition, devoted only fifteen lines to the uprising in his original French text. Although the events have often been called mutiny, those who opposed Magellan seem to have had more limited and specific aims in mind, but

there is no question that they posed a serious challenge to his leadership. After a day of tense negotiations failed to end the stalemate, Magellan was able to overcome the uprising, ably supported by Gonzalo Gómez de Espinosa, the expedition's master at arms (*alguacil mayor*), who saw his primary duty as supporting the commander.

In the aftermath of the uprising, Magellan sentenced forty of the participants to death, including Juan Sebastián Elcano, master of the *Concepción*, although no one has found records of any formal trial or court martial, which Spanish law required. Luis de Mendoza had already been killed in the uprising, but his dead body was sentenced along with the others. Before being quartered, his corpse was beheaded, which his noble status required. Gaspar de Quesada faced the same fate. When no one else would execute him, his squire was coerced into carrying out the sentence in exchange for his own life. It is worth emphasizing that Mendoza and Quesada, as well as having noble status, were the most senior officers in the fleet after Magellan and Juan de Cartagena. The dismembered bodies of Mendoza and Quesada were hung on a gibbet (*horca*) for the five months that the ships remained at San Julián. Their rotting corpses served as constant reminders of the fate awaiting anyone who challenged Magellan.

Ironically, Magellan pardoned the other men condemned to death after the uprising, because he needed their labor. They were simply shackled during the layover in San Julián and given the worst jobs involved in refitting the ships. Magellan presumably did not dare to execute Cartagena, the most senior of his challengers. Instead, when the fleet departed San Julián, he left Cartagena behind with a French priest who supported him, which was an indirect death sentence in that unforgiving environment. Continuing south, the expedition finally found the strait that led to the Pacific Ocean at 52°30′S latitude. The strait contains a confusing array of channels, which made it difficult to choose a route that would lead through to the other side. When Magellan sent the *San Antonio*, the largest ship in the fleet, to explore two possible channels, the crew took command of the ship from Captain Mezquita, Magellan's cousin, and returned to Spain. There, the crew defended their actions by accusing Magellan of failing to obey the king's orders and otherwise abusing his position as the expedition's leader.

The same year that Magellan's expedition left Spain, Hernán Cortés, a notary who had studied law, was sent on a reconnaissance mission to the Mexican coast by the governor of Cuba, Diego Velázquez de Cuéllar, a successful conquistador. Instead of following orders, Cortés burned his ships to prevent dissenters from returning to Cuba, won over the expedition sent to punish him, led a force inland to challenge the Aztec Empire in alliance with their local enemies, and—against all odds—emerged victorious. In his letters to King Charles, who by then also held the title of Holy Roman Emperor, Cortés presented his disobedience as part of the eventual victory

that brought the Aztec Empire into the Spanish orbit. His gamble that success would compensate for his disobedience was justified, and he was rewarded with lands and administrative posts in New Spain (Mexico), along with the noble title of the Marqués del Valle—the Marquess of the Valley of Mexico. The conquest of Mexico was noteworthy for the active participation of at least two women who fought in the battles for the capital of Tenochtitlán: Beatriz Bermúdez de Velasco (fl. 1520s) and María de Estrada (c. 1480–c.1540). Like Cortés, they survived the period of conquest, but most explorers and conquistadors were not so fortunate. While Cortés and his followers confronted the Aztecs, Francisco de Garay explored along the northern Mexican coast and the Gulf of Mexico, but he died (1523) before gaining any reward from the crown for his exploits.

Magellan would also die before achieving any of his goals. Once through the strait, he navigated his remaining three ships across the Pacific, continually underestimating how far he had sailed. As scurvy began to afflict the crew in the spring of 1521, the expedition reached the island of Guam, where fresh food restored the men to health. Magellan knew the latitude of the Spice Islands or Moluccas, but for unknown reasons he set a course farther north and arrived among the islands that would later be named the Philippines. Continuing to disobey royal instructions, he intervened in a local power struggle on the island of Mactan, where he was killed in late April of 1521, along with dozens of his officers and men.

To restore the chain of command, the men elected João Lopes Carvalho, a Portuguese pilot, as captain of the *Trinidad* and captain general of the expedition, based largely on his seniority. The Genoese Juan Bautista de Poncevera continued as the *Trinidad*'s master. The principal military officer in the fleet (*alguacil mayor*), Gonzalo Gómez de Espinosa, became the *Victoria*'s captain, with Juan Sebastián Elcano as its master. Magellan's Malay slave, Enrique, had been promised his freedom in Magellan's will for his valuable services to the expedition. Unfortunately, the newly elected officers refused to honor that promise immediately, so Enrique betrayed them. At a banquet in their honor, the local chief and his followers staged a massacre. The number of survivors was insufficient to sail all three ships, so they burned the least seaworthy vessel, the *Concepción*, and fled the Philippines on May 3 or 4.

Carvalho, the newly chosen captain general, proved unfit for command. On September 21, 1521, when the ships were being refurbished on an island off the coast of Borneo, Poncevera and Elcano, as masters of the *Trinidad* and the *Victoria*, made a joint motion to depose Carvalho for poor leadership and other faults. The crews of both vessels approved the motion and elected Poncevera as captain general. Gómez de Espinosa became captain of the *Trinidad*, and Elcano replaced him as captain of the *Victoria* as well as treasurer of the fleet. These successive changes in leadership

followed established legal norms in Spain's maritime tradition and reinforced the importance of the command structure and standard rules of procedure, even on the other side of the world.

Under Poncevera, Gómez, and Elcano, the expedition returned to the expedition's original goals. Relying on Elcano's superior navigational skills, they reached the Spice Islands, negotiated agreements with local rulers, and traded for spices. Elcano recorded these agreements and transactions fully, as the expedition's elected treasurer. When the ships had full loads for the homebound voyage, their captains had to decide how to return to Spain. Gómez and the *Trinidad's* crew followed the expedition's original instructions and sailed eastward, attempting to find a route to New Spain. Unfortunately, they failed to locate the necessary winds and currents and were forced to return to the Spice Islands. The survivors would remain there for more than a decade at the mercy of the Portuguese. By contrast, Elcano and the crew of the *Victoria* decided to disobey royal instructions and sail westward through the area reserved for the Portuguese. Sailing far from land, the *Victoria* crossed the Indian Ocean, then rounded the Cape of Good Hope and arrived in Spain on September 6, 1522, with eighteen half-starved Europeans and three Moluccans, many suffering from scurvy and barely alive. Thirteen other crewmen had been arrested by the Portuguese at São Tiago in the Cape Verde Islands when they went ashore to barter for food, but King Carlos was soon able to obtain their release.

As Elcano noted in his letter to the king, the *Victoria* had accomplished the first voyage around the world—sailing toward the west and returning from the east—but that was an unplanned accomplishment, not the original goal. The king had hoped the voyage would reach the Moluccas and prove that they lay in the Spanish sphere. Instead, Francisco Albo, a Greek pilot with the expedition, judged the Moluccas to be 191 and a half degrees west of the Tordesillas meridian, well beyond the 180 degrees that marked the beginning of the Portuguese sphere in the Far East, even allowing for the difficulty of calculating longitude at the time. Moreover, Portuguese authorities in the Moluccas, the Cape Verdes, and Lisbon had confiscated most of the charts and other papers that the pilots and others had produced, so that the survivors had little to show for what they had learned in three years. At least they had survived. According to an accepted count, 247 Europeans from diverse backgrounds sailed from Spain on the Magellan-Elcano expedition in 1519, and only thirty-five eventually returned: the eighteen who arrived with Elcano; the thirteen imprisoned in Cape Verde but soon released; and the other four as the only survivors from the fifty-four men from the *Trinidad* who returned to the Moluccas and surrendered to Portuguese authorities. They eventually returned to Spain under Portuguese authority in 1536.

Despite the limited success of the Magellan-Elcano expedition, it fulfilled Columbus's aim of finding a westward route to Asia, which gave Spain the right to explore and claim lands on the other side of the globe without violating the Treaty of Tordesillas. However, even if Spanish voyages decided to risk the hazards of rounding the tip of the great western continent, they had to find a way to return eastward across the Pacific to stay within the restrictions of the treaty.

In pursuit of that return route, in 1525 García Jofre de Loaísa led an expedition that planned to follow Magellan's trajectory from Spain through the strait and across the Pacific Ocean. Juan Sebastián Elcano accompanied the expedition, but three of the seven ships were lost to mishaps and desertion even before Loaísa attempted to cross the Pacific. One of the ships, the caravel *San Lesmes,* vanished in a storm shortly after emerging from the strait, and persistent oral traditions in Polynesia suggest that some survivors settled on various islands. The expedition continued to be plagued by misfortune, and Loaísa and Elcano both died during the Pacific crossing, though the survivors made it to the Spice Islands. One ship that had deserted Loaísa at the strait carried news of the expedition's troubles to Hernán Cortés in the new capital of Mexico City. After hearing the story, Cortés himself funded a voyage across the Pacific from New Spain in 1527, led by his cousin Álvaro de Saavedra.

Saavedra was supposed to locate and reinforce Loaísa's expedition and find out if the Portuguese were encroaching on the part of Asia that Spain claimed under the Treaty of Tordesillas. With three ships and one hundred men, Saavedra left the Mexican coast in November 1527 and ran into a fierce storm in late December that scattered the tiny fleet. Only Saavedra's flagship reached the Moluccas. The other two ships were never heard from again. In the Moluccas, Saavedra collaborated with the remnants of Magellan's and Loaísa's crews and managed to buy a shipload of spices for an attempted return across the Pacific. He first tried to find a southern route in the latter half of 1528 but turned back to make needed repairs to the ship. Sailing northward again in mid-1529, Saavedra died at about 26ºN, and his ship continued to about 31ºN, the latitude of Japan's southern tip, before giving up the attempt and returning to the Moluccas.

The disappearance of ships from several early Spanish voyages into the Pacific have long fueled speculation that Spaniards from one or more voyages were the first Europeans to reach the Hawaiian Islands. Like speculation that the caravel lost on Loaísa's outbound voyage carried some survivors to Polynesia, various writers have claimed that the two missing ships from Saavedra's outbound voyage could have reached Hawaii, given the position of the fleet and the direction of the winds when the storm hit. Other writers have speculated that Saavedra's attempted return eastward reached some part of the Hawaiian Islands before turning back. Local

traditions and physical evidence suggest that some Spaniards made it to Hawaii, but there is no proof in documentary records to support those speculations. More than two centuries later, the English captain James Cook was the first European to document his discovery of the Hawaiian Islands and deserves the credit for that discovery, among his many other accomplishments.

Given the length and difficulty of the route around the tip of South America, after the 1520s Spaniards realized that it made sense to launch Pacific voyages from the lands in the Western Hemisphere, but the return route from Asia to New Spain remained as elusive as ever. Lucas Vázquez de Ayllón (c. 1480–1526) was one of the expedition leaders who tried and failed to find an ideal route to and from Asia. Vázquez had studied law in Spain and received appointment as a magistrate in Santo Domingo in 1511. Unwilling to remain in a settled administrative position, he joined the expedition of Pánfilo Narváez in 1520 that was supposed to capture Cortés and bring him to justice for disobeying orders from the governor of Cuba. Instead of staying with Narváez or joining Cortés, however, Vázquez de Ayllón went off on a slaving expedition in 1521, thereafter returning to Spain and getting a contract in 1523 to look for a way into the Pacific much farther north and less difficult than Magellan's strait. To establish a base before heading north, he brought 600 settlers from Santo Domingo in 1526 and settled them on the Georgia coast. Within a few years, however, hunger, disease, and skirmishes with local Indigenous groups led to the deaths of all but 150 settlers, and they fled back to Santo Domingo. This first Spanish attempt to colonize North America would have vanished like so many other failed colonies but for a detailed map made in 1529 by Diogo Ribeiro (fl. 1518–32), a Portuguese cartographer in Spanish service. Ribeiro's map of the world (*carta universal*) labeled much of what would become the southeastern United States as the 'Land of Ayllón' (Tierra de Ayllón). Following these and other expeditions that claimed lands for Spain, Spaniards established colonies in the Americas, with or without the agreement of Indigenous populations, and a bureaucratically defined Spanish Empire began to take shape.

In Asia, the failure of the expeditions of Magellan, Loaísa, and Saavedra to find a return route back across the Pacific stranded all the survivors in the Moluccas, where they maintained a tenuous Spanish presence while holding out against Portuguese pressure. Their presence added substance to Spanish claims in Asia, as Portugal and Spain negotiated the implications of the Treaty of Tordesillas on the far side of the world. In 1529 King Carlos sold Spain's dubious claims in the Moluccas to Portugal, but the news took three years to reach the stranded Spaniards. Realizing that there was no point in remaining in Asia, they asked Portuguese authorities for passage back to Europe. Only a handful of men from the earliest voyages had survived the rigors of virtual captivity and related hardships, however. Of the fifty-four men

who had remained in Asia with Gonzalo Gómez de Espinosa after Elcano headed home, a few had deserted, many had died in Portuguese custody, and others had died in transit from East Asia to the Indian Ocean and Cochin. The four who reached Lisbon in 1536 added to the list of Spaniards who had sailed around the world, most of them without meaning to do so. Their stories are told in the book by Harry Kelsey listed at the end of this chapter.

EXPLORING, CONQUERING, AND SETTLING THE AMERICAS

The men who fought in the early decades of conquest in the Americas were as diverse as the Spanish population. Some were professional soldiers, but others had followed a wide range of occupations before venturing across the ocean. They might have been merchants, farmers or rural laborers, notaries, accountants, or artisans of one sort or another. Some came from noble families. What most of them had in common was a willingness to take considerable risks to improve their lives. Some succeeded, at least for a time, but many were lucky simply to survive the hardships of battle and privation across the ocean. Catholic missionaries were also prominent among the early explorers, hoping to bring countless souls to Roman Catholicism to compensate for the souls lost to Protestantism in Europe. Because the early conquistadors and settlers represented a broad cross-section of Spanish society, once they settled in the Americas they could organize functional town governments and produce whatever was necessary to supplement shipments from home.

Some of the conquistadors, settlers, and missionaries also became explorers. The nobleman Pedro de Mendoza (c. 1499–1537) established a short-lived settlement dubbed Buenos Aires on the Río de la Plata in 1536, but he died the following year. Domingo Martínez de Irala (c. 1509–c. 1556) moved the surviving settlers across the wide river to Asunción before establishing a tentative overland route from the Paraguay river basin to Peru. In the north, Jerónimo de Ortal (c. 1500–post 1541) pioneered a route from Venezuela to the Orinoco River in 1540, and the lawyer and judge, Gonzalo Jiménez de Quesada (1509–79), explored and conquered parts of Peru and founded the city of Santa Fe de Bogotá in 1538, despite having no prior military experience.

Álvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca (1507–59) had an extraordinary career that began with an expedition in 1528 to explore from La Florida to Mexico along the Gulf Coast. Shipwrecked, enslaved by an Indigenous tribe from whom he eventually escaped, he and a few other Spaniards trekked for 2,400 miles to reach Spanish settlements in Mexico, accompanied by several hundred Indigenous people attracted by Cabeza de Vaca's piety and medical skills. Later appointed to lead an expedition to Paraguay in 1542, he survived near mutiny by his men and ouster as governor of

Río de la Plata, followed by a trial for misrule and condemnation to North Africa for eight years. In a final twist of fate, he was subsequently pardoned and appointed to a judgeship in Seville, where he chronicled his adventures in two books that scholars consider important early examples of ethnography.

Ironies also abounded in King Carlos I's concession in northern South America to the German banking firm of Welser that had loaned money for his election as emperor. From the late 1520s through the 1530s, the Welser firm sent several employees to explore and plant settlements in areas where Spaniards with royal contracts were also exploring. Ambrosius Alfinger/Ehinger, the Welser representative in Madrid, led 300 settlers into Venezuela in the late 1520s and then explored westward into Colombia. Nikolaus Federmann (c. 1505–42), another Welser employee, led the first European expeditions into the Andes, while Georg Hohermuth (1500–40)—styling himself Georg von Speyer—explored the Colombian highlands in the 1530s. To the east, Philipp von Hutten (1505–46), a relative of the humanist Ulrich von Hutten, explored into the middle Amazon region in the 1540s before being murdered by a rival for the governorship of Bogotá. Another German, Ulrich Schmidl, had much better luck after he signed up with a Spanish expedition to the Río de la Plata in 1535. As one of the founders of Buenos Aires and Asunción, he also explored inland into Paraguay. When he inherited German estates in 1552, Schmidl returned home wealthy and became a respected member of the community, holding public office and writing his memoirs.

The Río de la Plata region also provided the venue for the impressive expedition led by Mencía Calderón y Sanabria (1514–64) in the 1550s. A Spanish noblewoman, Doña Mencía assumed leadership of the expedition after her husband died before they left Spain. The 300 travelers included some fifty women who hoped to find husbands among the single men who had settled around the Río de la Plata. Other women in the group hoped to find their absent husbands who had effectively abandoned them in Spain. The expedition also included the German, Hans Staden (c. 1525–c. 1576), who would later be captured by Tupinambá cannibals and live to chronicle his extraordinary adventures among them. Sailing to the Río de la Plata, Doña Mencía led the expedition for six years through the jungles around the estuary to fulfill the various aims of the participants. In all, they covered nearly 1,000 miles before settling in Asunción.

Farther north, Francisco Pizarro and a surprisingly small force of Spaniards conquered the Inca Empire in Peru. Pizarro had served as a soldier and conquistador in the Americas from the start of the sixteenth century, fighting in the Caribbean and with Balboa in Panama before receiving royal permission in 1524 to conquer the Incas. Between 1529 and 1532, Pizarro and his followers completed the conquest, through treachery as well as military prowess. He founded the Spanish capital in

Lima in 1535 but proved to be a poor leader, unable to keep order or administer the area properly, before being killed by rioters in 1541.

Other participants in the Inca conquest subsequently turned to exploration. Sebastián Moyano de Benalcázar (c. 1495–1550) launched expeditions northward, searching for 'El Dorado,' the legendary ruler of a land so rich that he covered himself in gold dust. Not surprisingly, the mythical El Dorado could not be found, but other Spaniards such as Hernán Pérez de Quesada (c. 1515–44) continued to search for him in the process of exploring into the Amazon region. Another veteran of the conquest of Peru, Francisco de Orellana, gained his place in history by traveling alone down the Amazon River to the coast—some 4,000 miles. Although he toyed with the idea of exploring for Portugal in that disputed area, he settled for Spanish permission to colonize the vast area he had traversed and died while exploring the Amazon basin.

Among other explorers in South America, Pedro de Valdivia trekked from Venezuela to Peru and then south through the Atacama Desert into Chile in the late 1530s. One of the few women whose names appear among the early conquistador-explorers was Inés Suárez, a member of Valdivia's expedition who later fought in the defense of Santiago in 1541. Another veteran of the conquest of Chile, Francisco de Aguirre, later held various administrative posts in the region in the 1540s and 1550s.

Farther north, Antonio de Mendoza, the first viceroy of New Spain, held office from 1535 to 1550 and oversaw more than a dozen important exploratory missions by land and sea. Among them were expeditions up the west coast of North America as part of the continuing search for an ideal route to and from Asia. One of the key figures in that effort was Pedro de Alvarado, a veteran of the wars of conquest in the 1520s in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Based on his services to King Charles, Alvarado obtained royal permission to send one expedition up the coast of New Spain and another westward into the Pacific. The planning and preparation took more than a decade. Alvarado entrusted much of the responsibility for overseeing shipbuilding and assembling the fleets to Juan Rodríguez Cabrillo, who had fought against the Aztecs and in the conquest of Guatemala as a subordinate of Alvarado. In part through Alvarado's patronage, Cabrillo became a wealthy landowner and shipbuilder. At one point, Alvarado commandeered a ship that Cabrillo had built for himself to trade with Peru, and Cabrillo had no choice but to acquiesce. In 1540, Alvarado was ready to depart on his Pacific expedition when Viceroy Mendoza sent him to fight rebels in the Mixtón War, where he was killed in 1541. Mendoza then assigned Cabrillo to lead part of Alvarado's fleet exploring up the coast. During that voyage Cabrillo discovered San Diego Bay in September 1542. Although he died a few months later, the expedition continued north as far as Oregon and learned much about sailing conditions along the west coast of North America.

In 1538, Viceroy Mendoza dispatched the Franciscan friar, Marcos de Niza, to explore overland to the north. Fray Marcos followed established Indigenous paths along the western edge of the Sierra Madre into what would become the southwestern United States. Along the way, he collected hearsay evidence that the famously wealthy Seven Cities of Cíbola lay somewhere farther on. Based on that faulty evidence, Viceroy Mendoza sent Melchor Díaz to scout the best route for a major expedition to search for them. Díaz did a thorough survey of southeastern Arizona and reported that he found no trace of the legendary cities. Nonetheless, Viceroy Mendoza put together a three-part expedition under the leadership of Francisco Vásquez de Coronado (1510–54), who sent Díaz overland to the west to meet a seaborne contingent under Hernando de Alarcón (fl. 1540s) that mapped the coast from Acapulco to lower (Baja) California. Despite their failure to find the wealthy seven cities, Coronado's expedition collected considerable information about the lands and peoples in the North American southwest and the western Great Plains as far as Kansas, whose rich farmlands he named Quivira.

Viceroy Mendoza also dispatched a major expedition under Hernando de Soto northward from the Gulf of Mexico to scout likely sites for future colonies. De Soto (c.1499–1542) was a veteran of the wars of conquest in Central America, the Yucatán Peninsula, and Peru in the 1520s and 1530s. His expedition into the far north included some 620 soldiers and reconnoitered a large area that would much later become the southeastern United States. Although the precise route of de Soto's expedition remains unclear, from 1539 to 1542 he traveled inland from the Gulf of Mexico through much of the future southeastern United States. He died of fever in late May 1542 and was reportedly buried in the waters of the Mississippi River. His surviving officers eventually decided to return to New Spain, in part by going down the Mississippi River in brigantines they built for the journey. Just over 300 survivors made it back to Mexico City, without having found likely venues for colonization. Farther west, García López de Cárdenas explored into the North American southwest in the 1540s. After launching these impressive exploratory ventures during his tenure in New Spain, Viceroy Mendoza was appointed viceroy of Peru in 1550. He died in Lima in 1552.

Several other expeditions by sea and land during the middle third of the sixteenth century also added important information to European knowledge about the Americas and the vast ocean on its western shores. Apart from these pioneering efforts, Spaniards would show little interest in traveling far inland in North America until the eighteenth century. The one notable exception was Juan de Oñate's attempt to establish a colony in New Mexico at the end of the sixteenth century and then to search for riches in Coronado's Quivira a few years later. Oñate is remembered less

for exploration, however, than for his brutality to both the settlers and the Indigenous peoples he encountered in the region.

PACIFIC EXPLORATION

The man who would finally solve the mystery of the eastward return route across the Pacific from Asia had spent much of his life in pursuit of that goal. In his youth, Andrés de Urdaneta sailed on the Loaísa expedition of 1525–27 as a page to Juan Sebastián Elcano. He remained in East Asia for eight years, along with the survivors of Loaísa's expedition and those that preceded it. Transported to Lisbon in 1536, Urdaneta had to relinquish all his maps and papers to Portuguese authorities. Two years later, after reporting to Spanish officials, Urdaneta met Pedro de Alvarado in Valladolid and agreed to join his planned expedition into the Pacific. Urdaneta returned to New Spain and fought in the Mixtón War in which Alvarado died. Thereafter, he carried out various administrative and military assignments for Viceroy Mendoza before joining an Augustinian monastery in 1552 and professing as a friar in the order a year later.

From the time of his service with Elcano as a youth, Urdaneta had studied the various failed attempts to sail eastward from Asia to New Spain. Despite the confiscation of his accumulated research by the Portuguese, he continued his studies as an Augustinian friar and gained fame for his knowledge of Pacific navigation. Though Urdaneta had planned to spend the rest of his life in pious and scholarly pursuits, King Felipe II called him into royal service in 1564 to accompany the expedition of Miguel López de Legazpi to conquer the Philippines and continue the search for a return route across the Pacific.

While Legazpi carried out the conquest, Urdaneta established the first Catholic church in the Philippines and planned the return route to New Spain. Based on his decades of study, he departed the Philippines in June of 1565, sailing northeast with the southwest monsoon to intersect the Kuro-Shio or Japan Current, which flowed northeast to the North Pacific Current. That took his ship across the far northern Pacific to the extreme northwest of North America. From there, Urdaneta followed the prevailing winds and currents southeastward along the coast all the way to New Spain. Urdaneta's pioneering voyage took only four months, and his route seems obvious in retrospect, but it is worth remembering the decades of failure by numerous explorers that preceded his success. Whereas Columbus discovered the prevailing winds and currents in the Atlantic on his first voyage, several generations of explorers had been confounded by the vastly greater size and complexity of the Pacific, even though a similar pattern of clockwise winds and currents north of the Equator characterized the Pacific as well as the Atlantic.

Spain's trans-Pacific trade began directly after Urdaneta's pioneering voyage, linking Acapulco in New Spain with Manila in the Philippines. In what became known as the Manila Galleon Trade, ships carried silver from Spanish America to the huge bullion-hungry markets of Asia to purchase the silks, spices, and porcelains for which Asia had long been famous. The Manila Galleon Trade would last for two-and-a half centuries, enriching the merchants of New Spain and injecting American silver into Asian markets. The circulation of American silver from the Spanish Empire to Asia and Europe was one of the crucial elements in the development and growth of world trade from the mid-sixteenth century on.

The pace of Spanish exploration in the Pacific slackened once a viable trade route had been established between Asia and New Spain, though much of the ocean itself and its islands had yet to be explored and mapped by Europeans. In one of the few exploratory voyages into the Pacific after Urdaneta's return, Álvaro Mendaña y Neira left Peru late in 1567, with the support of an uncle who held several important posts in Peru's colonial government. Young and inexperienced, Mendaña had the advice of Hernando Gallego and the cosmographer Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa. Unfortunately, the three men did not get along, and contention marked the voyage from beginning to end. Although the expedition discovered the Solomon Islands, tropical ailments and skirmishes with the islanders soon forced them to head back. Following Urdaneta's route, they arrived in Peru in September of 1569. Mendaña spent the better part of the next three decades planning another voyage, this time to colonize the Solomon Islands. The voyage finally departed in 1595, but Mendaña died before fulfilling his dreams, like so many others before him. Ironically, his voyage is remembered largely because his widow, Isabel Barreto, then led the expedition safely to the Philippines as the first female admiral in the history of navigation.

Other European states challenged Spain's claims in the Pacific from the late sixteenth century on, but the scale of the Pacific continued to defy comprehension. In the absence of accurate ways to calculate longitude, even the most experienced mariners tended to underestimate the distances they traveled. That was certainly the case with the Spanish expeditions under the Portuguese Pedro Fernández de Quirós and Luis Váez de Torres in 1605–06, which covered more of the Pacific than any other European voyages of their day.

The heyday of the Manila Galleon Trade in the seventeenth century marked a low point in Spanish exploration of the Pacific, as Spain concentrated on commerce and struggled to make its Asian territories prosper or at least survive. Although a desire to spread Christianity had motivated Spaniards to explore since the fifteenth century, missionary efforts in the Pacific islands began only in 1668, more than a century after Urdaneta's historic voyage. When Father Diego Luis de Sanvítores arrived on Saipan in 1668 to begin a long process of evangelization, he was greeted

by shipwrecked sailors from the trading galleon *Nuestra Señora de la Concepción*, who had spent the previous thirty years marooned on Saipan.

POPULATION TRENDS IN THE AMERICAS

Many Indigenous people in the Americas suffered disastrous demographic losses after their first contact with European diseases, warfare, colonization, and exploitation. Spanish clerics and bureaucrats in the sixteenth century chronicled the catastrophe in anguished tones and were the first to carry out censuses to gauge its magnitude. Those primitive censuses became the basis for virtually every subsequent analysis of population in the Americas. Not surprisingly, the precontact population was densest in the great empires of Mexico and Peru and very sparse in the seminomadic societies north of Mexico and in less hospitable areas of South America. This variability of settlement patterns complicated the counts, as did the genetic mixing among peoples of Indigenous, European, and African ancestry, which very quickly became a distinctive feature of the population after Europeans and Africans arrived in the Americas. In the mid-twentieth century, estimates of the total precontact population were derived by working backwards from the early primitive censuses, often with more zeal than care. As a result, estimates ranged from a conservative low of fourteen to twenty million to an improbable high of 100 million or more. Scholars will probably never reach consensus, barring the unlikely discovery of new sources of information. In any case, the demographic disaster took more than a century to unfold, and the population reshaped itself in the process.

Spain included about 8.5 million people in 1600. In the Americas, by 1650, a century and a half after the start of sustained contact, the population probably stood somewhere between four and a half and ten million. By then, the number of inhabitants in Spanish America had begun to recover, partly through natural increase and partly through continued immigration from Europe and Africa, the latter mostly as enslaved labor. By 1700, huge urban areas such as Mexico City (105,000), Lima (70,000), and the mining center of Potosí in today's Bolivia (60,000, down from over 100,000 a century earlier) accommodated some of the population. Others lived in regional centers, ports, small towns, and villages, and still others lived on the fringes of the Spanish Empire, continuing to resist assimilation.

Although immigration played a large role in the population recovery of the Americas, the precise numbers of immigrants and native-born inhabitants varied from place to place. Official records indicate that up to 450,000 people emigrated legally from Spain to Spanish America from the late fifteenth century to the mid-seventeenth century, with the highest rates occurring in the late sixteenth century. By the end of the eighteenth century, perhaps half a million people had emigrated

from Spain to America. Illegal emigration added an unknown quantity to the total, but some scholars estimate that the official figures may account for no more than twenty percent of the total emigrants for the sixteenth-century, and an unknown percentage in later periods. Andalusia, Extremadura, and Old and New Castile produced the majority of the migrants in the sixteenth century, whereas regions in the north and east of Spain contributed more during the seventeenth century.

Spaniards emigrated for a variety of reasons, some driven by economic necessity, others attracted by opportunities in the expanding colonies, others to serve the crown. Whereas Portugal and most other colonizing powers sent criminals to their overseas colonies, Spain rejected that option. There was a large enough Indigenous and mixed population in the Spanish territories to form viable colonial societies, even with the demographic devastation of the first century after contact. As a result, the government in Madrid aimed to send colonists who were stable, Catholic, law-abiding members of the community. Moreover, Spanish emigrants were generally not bound by labor contracts, though many traveled as personal servants. Overall, migration to Spanish America was voluntary, related to population trends and to the juridical structures that governed inheritance. For example, the sixteenth-century population increase in Spain, especially in the dry-farming areas of Extremadura, New Castile, and Andalusia provided ample incentives for emigration by males who had little hope of inheriting land.

Unmarried males formed the bulk of early migrants, and the clergymen among them may have comprised nearly one-third of the total migrants from Spain in the first three centuries of empire. Their numbers underscore the importance placed on evangelization, but the crown consistently encouraged the migration of families as well. High-ranking bureaucrats generally brought their families with them, and others were encouraged to do so as well. Families were more prevalent among the migrants in the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries than in the seventeenth, but they were always present. Women accounted for 5.6 percent of legal immigrants for 1493–1519, 6.3 percent for 1520–1539, 16.4 percent for 1540–1559, 28.5 percent (60 percent single) for 1560–1579, and 26 percent (59.5 percent single) for 1580–1600. Among legal emigrants from Andalusia in the seventeenth century, women accounted for fifty-one percent. In short, contrary to persistent assumptions, women and families played a continuing and important role in Spanish migration across the Atlantic.

There is no question that families were separated when men went overseas alone to explore and conquer in the name of the crown and in hopes of improving their status and wealth. Some of those who survived returned to Spain; others sent for their wives and families to join them in the Americas; and still others neither returned nor maintained contact with their wives and families in Spain. In addition to the efforts of Mencía Calderón's expedition to find absent spouses, various women

in Spain petitioned the Council of the Indies to locate their errant husbands and force them to return to Spain and resume their married life (*vida maridable*). One suspects, however, that the formidable Mencía Calderón had more success in that regard than the Council of the Indies.

SHAPING SPANISH AMERICA

Basic knowledge about the size, shape, and geographical features of Spanish America was well developed by the late sixteenth century, and an extensive network of municipalities, trade routes, and administrative jurisdictions defined the colonial landscape. Spaniards founded towns and cities from the earliest days of exploration, conquest, and colonization, reproducing the pattern of life that they knew in Spain. As noted in an earlier chapter, nearly all of Spain is composed of municipalities and their lands, and most Spaniards identified themselves as citizens (*vecinos*) of an urban enclave, whether they lived in a village of twelve families or in the largest city in the monarchy. Towns in the Indies became the centers of trade, administration, religion, and culture, just as they were in Spain.

When Cortés and his men left Cuba for the Mexican coast in 1519, Spaniards had already founded about thirty towns on the island of Cuba alone. Cortés and his men founded the town of Veracruz on the Mexican coast, established a municipal council, elected Cortés as one of the town's officials, and authorized his expedition inland. Strictly speaking, therefore, the Aztec Empire was conquered by the municipality of Veracruz, with the notary Cortés as a principal town official. Elsewhere as well, as Spaniards extended the frontiers of conquest and colonization, the towns they founded became the visible symbols of the empire. Early settlers shaped their new towns spatially and administratively after the models they knew from home, often with little direction from the crown. Only in 1573 did the crown issue a detailed set of royal ordinances regarding urban formation, which was largely a summary of practices that had worked effectively since Spaniards had arrived in the Americas. Revised and expanded, the ordinances for town formation were still being used in the late eighteenth century as Spain pushed the frontiers of New Spain north of the Rio Grande.

True to its Renaissance heritage, the Spanish monarchy placed a high value on handsome, well-planned towns as the basis for an orderly society, and that belief transferred across the ocean. It was a fortunate coincidence that urban identity was a crucial organizing principle for the empires of the Aztecs and Incas as well. The spatial regularity of the largest Indigenous cities before the conquest persuaded Spaniards that Aztec and Inca rulers shared the opinion that an orderly town plan encouraged good government and industriousness on the part of the citizenry. Most

of the important cities in Latin America in the present day were founded in the first century and a half of Spain's presence in the Americas. King Carlos I and his successors expected the new towns founded in their names to become self-sufficient and self-governing as soon as possible, so that they could sustain their inhabitants and generate tax revenue for local government and the monarchy alike.

Typically, a central plaza defined the heart of a Spanish town, both in Spain and in the Indies, and all land and economic activities in the jurisdiction were subject to regulation by the municipal government. Spanish towns founded in the Indies were often laid out according to the ideals of Renaissance city planning, re-discovered from principles established in antiquity and immortalized as well in the regular plan of the ancient Roman military encampment or *castrum*. Spanish colonial cities, like the communes of the empires they had conquered, were linked into networks designed to foster commerce, administration, and communication for the empire as a whole. Though many cities in the Spanish Indies were in highland areas away from the unhealthful coasts and were closer to the Pacific than the Atlantic, the focus of their activities was the Atlantic world.

To gain more detailed information about New Spain, King Felipe II launched two extraordinary initiatives in the late sixteenth century. The first, which took place from 1570 to 1577 with a generous budget of 60,000 ducats, aimed to identify and study the medicinal plants of New Spain. Francisco Hernández, the king's personal physician appointed as Chief Physician of the New World, led an expedition that included botanists, translators, geographers, and artists from Spain and drew on the expertise of Indigenous healers, botanists, and artists in New Spain. Hernández and his team traveled all over the viceroyalty for three years collecting specimens and information and then spent three more years in a Mexican hospital studying the accumulated materials before returning to Spain. In all, Hernández and his team collected and classified an estimated 3,000 species of plants.

King Felipe's second great initiative began shortly after Hernández returned to Spain. With the goal to improve governance in New Spain, the king ordered the viceroy to administer an extensive survey with fifty or more question in every administrative district and principal town of the viceroyalty. The questionnaire, known as the *Relaciones geográficas,* was administered and collected between 1579 and 1585, providing an extraordinary range of information about people, places, and conditions throughout New Spain. Some of the questions concerned population size, ethnic groups, languages, and local customs; natural resources and the environment; markets, trade and communications; politics and taxes; and the history of any natural disasters in the region. Many of the responses also included maps of the locale, for which local officials drew on the knowledge and expertise of the resident population.

Modern scholars continue to study these extraordinary documents, each generation bringing new perspectives to the information they contain.

Explorers described and mapped the physical characteristics of the Americas from the earliest days of their exploration. Nonetheless, it took several generations for European thinkers and writers to assimilate the reality of the lands and people in the Western Hemisphere, which altered every aspect of their understanding of the world and its inhabitants. Meanwhile, however, Spanish merchants, soldiers, sailors, priests, bureaucrats, and ordinary settlers learned to deal with their new environment, presumably without thinking much about how it fit into European cosmography. Indigenous peoples in the Americas faced an even more profound adjustment of their understanding of the universe, as Old-World diseases and military defeat devastated their civilizations. Yet they, too, adjusted to the changed circumstances with impressive speed, while their own leaders and thinkers struggled to redefine the expanded cosmos and their place in it. In short, over the course of the sixteenth century, the Spanish Atlantic world became a mundane reality for people on both sides of the ocean.

At the level of material culture, borrowings and adaptations affected people on both sides of the Atlantic as well. The historian Alfred Crosby developed the notion of a 'Columbian Exchange' of plants, animals, and diseases that shaped not only the Atlantic community but the world in general In a surprisingly short time, the adoption of foods from the Americas (potatoes, cassava, tomatoes, maize, peppers, and others) altered the cuisines of Europe and Africa, while food and animals from Europe and Africa (especially horses, mules, cattle, sheep, pigs, and goats) altered labor structures and diets in the Americas. The chroniclers of Iberian voyages commented on the plants and animals they encountered across the western ocean and compared them to the species they knew from Europe and Africa. Their short-term interest aimed largely at filling their bellies and finding profitable goods to trade, but a lively intellectual curiosity nonetheless permeated their accounts. The so-called scientific voyages of the eighteenth century were the logical outgrowth of that curiosity, and scholars continue to study the earlier voyages for their insights into life on both sides of the Atlantic.

Spanish conquest and colonization of the Americas also changed the ways that Indigenous people worked and earned a living. A few decades after the conquest of the Aztec Empire, immigrant artisans from Spain organized and supervised large forces of Indigenous and mixed heritage workers, using skills, tools, and technologies imported from Europe as well as those indigenous to the Americas. Landowners organized their estates on European models, aiming at self-sufficiency and the production of a surplus for the growing cities. At first the overseers on those estates came from Spanish colonists and creoles, but later they were drawn from the growing

racially mixed community (called generically *castas*) that helped to define Spanish colonial culture. The widespread development of livestock ranching in the Americas also relied on European models, most notably from the ranching frontier of medieval Castile. In other words, both urban and rural workforces in Spanish America evolved along the lines of European models, and the products they supplied supported not only colonial cities but also the markets of Spain and the rest of Europe.

RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL LIFE IN SPANISH AMERICA

While European religious orders organized evangelical missions to Spanish America in the 1520s, European Christianity shattered with the Protestant Reformation, which some call a revolution because of its far-reaching consequences. Many missionaries viewed the numbers of new converts to Catholicism in the Americas as compensation for the loss of souls to Protestantism in Europe. As noted above, many Catholic missionaries, notably Franciscans, believed in the twelfth-century prophecies of Joaquim of Fiore that the end of the world was fast approaching. To prepare for the coming Apocalypse, the Christian message had to be transmitted to all peoples, which posed a daunting challenge that the missionary orders were duty-bound to accept.

Hernán Cortés urged King Carlos I to send a large missionary contingent to the lands he had wrested from Aztec control. Though Cortés had no training in theology, he recognized his duty to reinforce Catholic Christianity in the lands he had conquered, both among new converts and among Spanish colonists. The Christian message represented many layers of history and complex theology that were very difficult even for erudite Europeans to understand fully, and the broad range of explorers, conquistadores, and settlers were not among the most erudite of their contemporaries. Nonetheless, even if they did not fully understand their own religion, they brought it with them. As a result, the Roman Catholic Church played an extraordinary role in the colonial societies of Spanish America, and clerics documented that role in parish registers, inquisitorial proceedings, visits and inspections by bishops and archbishops, and so on. The records provide detailed information about the size, wealth, and power of the Church in various parts of the Spanish world, as well as the syncretism of belief and ritual that emerged from the interaction of European, Indigenous, and African traditions in the Americas. Moreover, because of the pervasive influence of the Church, ecclesiastical records also provide unparalleled detail about virtually every other aspect of culture in Spanish America.

Christianity had evolved through the centuries not only by theological disputes but also by the refinement and repetition of ritual observance. Catholics at every level

of intellect and education had at least some familiarity with the audible and visual trappings of their faith, even if they had no more than a tenuous grasp of the theological wrangles raging in the sixteenth century. Moreover, they had undoubtedly experienced firsthand the audible and visual reminders of the sacred. In virtually every church, the life of Christ, the Virgin Mary, the four evangelists, and various other saints and heroic figures from the Bible appeared in sculptures, bas-reliefs, paintings, choir-stall decorations, stained-glass windows, and other art forms. Local parishioners, regardless of their social status or educational level, could learn what it meant to be a Christian from the exemplary stories portrayed before their eyes. The sacred sounds of plainchant, polyphony, hymns, organ music, and various other musical forms embellished church services throughout the liturgical year and suffused the atmosphere with the audible presence of the divine.

Visual and audible culture were also important to other aspects of life. Armies and navies fought to the accompaniment of drums, trumpets, and other instruments, and the commanders of military units had distinctively painted battle flags proclaiming who they were. Music, painted banners, and ephemeral architecture accompanied civic processions, festivals, royal entries, and other displays of communal identity and the relationship between rulers and subjects. In short, European culture in general was inseparable from its visual and audible traditions, and those traditions were rich and varied in every part of Spain. In thinking about the implantation of Spanish traditions in the Americas, we need to discard or at least nuance the notion that cultural forms were tools, or even weapons, of empire, as if they were only used to reinforce conquest. Instead, we should recognize that Spaniards would have implanted their culture in the Americas even if those lands had been uninhabited before they arrived. They carried the trappings of their culture and their religious beliefs with them as essential parts of their identity.

Anyone who wanted to emigrate from Spain to Spanish America had to apply for a license from the House of Trade in Seville. Founded in 1503, the House of Trade‘s responsibilities grew to include supervision over most of the connections between Spain and America, especially trade and migration. Spanish monarchs tried to keep non-Spaniards out of the Indies, in part for political and commercial reasons, but more importantly to keep Protestantism from taking hold among the new converts to Christianity. To allow heresy to infect the new converts would have been a serious failure of their duty. In Carlos I’s role as Holy Roman Emperor Karl V, he allowed certain of his Catholic subjects from the Germanies to explore parts of the Americas, as noted above, but otherwise the House of Trade rarely issued licenses for lay foreigners to immigrate to Spanish America.

The situation was quite different for ecclesiastics, however. The religious orders that took part in the missionary enterprise in the Indies included individuals

from all over Europe. Franciscans, Dominicans, Augustinians, Carmelites, and Jesuits from a variety of European regions devoted their lives to converting and fostering the spiritual and material well-being of the Indigenous peoples of the Americas. Although the missionaries were operating within a Spanish political context, they represented European Catholicism and, more broadly, European culture. That is hardly surprising. Carlos I of Spain had spent the first sixteen years of his life as Karl Habsburg of Ghent, steeped in the rich artistic and musical culture of the Netherlands. Because of the popularity of artistic and musical styles from Flanders, it was logical that they would play a prominent role in the cultural baggage that the early missionaries carried to the Americas. Musical forms also came to Spain from Italy via the Castilians and Catalonians resident in Naples, and missionaries carried those forms to the Indies as well.

When European clerics arrived in Spanish America with their audible, visual, and devotional traditions, they discovered that Indigenous peoples also had visual and audible traditions linked with religious beliefs, political power, and civic identity. Missionaries and bureaucrats commented on that fact and realized that European musical and visual forms would be ideal vehicles to attract Indigenous peoples to Christianity. Just as the Christian message was thoroughly embedded in the public and private lives of believers, the reception of that message in the Americas was bound to be affected by the embedded traditions of religious observance and beliefs of Indigenous peoples. To the extent that they adopted or assimilated the Christian message and its outward manifestations of visual and musical forms, they did so from within their own cultural milieu and on their own terms. Recent scholarship has deepened our understanding of that dynamic reception.

The first three Franciscan friars arrived in the Valley of Mexico in 1523 while Cortés was still conquering the Aztec Empire. Their leader, Pedro de Gante (d. 1572), was born in Ghent in the Netherlands in about 1480 and spent much of his long life teaching the Indigenous peoples of Mexico reading, writing, and the rudiments of Christian doctrine. He was also the first missionary to teach European styles of music and singing to the skilled Indigenous dancers, singers, and musicians he encountered. Indigenous traditions used a variety of drums, whistles, rattles and flutes, but they seem not to have had any stringed instruments until Spaniards brought them to the Americas. Indigenous men and women soon learned to sing European plainchant and polyphony, and their musicians learned how to play instruments such as harps, as well as plucked or bowed *vihuelas,* trumpets, oboe-like flageolets (*chirimías*), trombones, and organs. Documents and artwork from the colonial period indicate the presence of a wide variety of such instruments. Pedro de Gante and many other early missionaries wrote enthusiastically about how quickly local peoples picked up the techniques for singing and playing European music.

Various Spanish conquistadors such as Diego de Nicuesa also knew how to sing and play various instruments, and they often took part in ceremonial occasions, along with other professional or amateur musicians, whether they were part of the military, the clergy, or the local government sponsoring the event. Many of the instruments depicted in art were associated with popular or secular music as well as sacred liturgy, and their depiction allows scholars to trace the evolution of instrument design as well as ceremonial observance. Instrument makers in America developed their own styles of European instruments. For example, Colombian documents from the early seventeenth century already distinguished between guitars and *vihuelas* from Spain and those made locally. It seems likely that sculptors participated in making musical instruments along with other artisans.

From early in the sixteenth century, bishops in Spain sent musical instruments and scores to churches being established in America, and scholars have found such materials listed in the inventories for many churches in important towns. We know that music for the mass and other sacred ceremonies by Tomás de Victoria, Giovanni Palestrina, Francisco Guerrero, Cristóbal de Morales, and others made their way to New Spain, and even to Peru, shortly after its introduction into the European liturgy. Performances in the Americas, however, could differ significantly from their European counterparts. Whereas in Europe, no more than a dozen or so musicians might perform a typical mass, chronicles from New Spain report hundreds and even thousands of Indigenous singers and musicians participating in some events. That was a noteworthy departure from European performance norms and an indication of the importance of music in the evangelization of Spanish America.

As an indication of that importance, the cathedral of Bogotá had thirty-two volumes of choir books at the end of the sixteenth century, when the government of Zapata de Cárdenas (1573–91) decreed the renewal of the repertory and ordered all the books copied. Francisco de Páramo carried out that work in Bogotá between 1606 and 1614, adding embellished capital letters and other artwork to the copies. During his work, another twenty-two boxes of choir books arrived for use in royal towns in Colombia, sent from the monastery of El Escorial northwest of Madrid.

Samuel Claro Valdés wrote an excellent overview of sacred music in the whole of Spanish America in 1970, relying on the work of dozens of scholars in various regions. His work reinforces the European-wide origins and training of the early missionaries and lay musicians who served in churches all over Spanish America. Soon, the chapel masters and teachers included not only Europeans, but also Creole Spaniards and mestizos such as Diego Lobato (ca.1538–ca. 1610), the chapel master of the Cathedral of Quito in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. From that period as well, churches, monasteries, and town governments in Spanish America often employed music teachers. Indigenous peoples, Africans, and peoples of

various mixed heritage who learned from them became teachers in their own communities, spreading the knowledge of European musical forms but also interpreting them from within their own cultural traditions. This was particularly noteworthy in the port town of Cartagena de Indias, for example, which had a huge population of African origin from the sixteenth century onward.

The role of Indigenous peoples in music education is exemplified by the life of an organist and violinist named Melchor Bermúdez, who held the post of *maestro de música* in the Cathedral of Bogotá. When he retired from that post, he went to a village and trained residents to read, write, play and read music, and to act as cantors and instrumentalists in the church. Unfortunately, the official who held the post of Protector of the Indians (Protector de Indios) refused to appoint him as the official music teacher in the village, even though he had been doing the job already. It is not clear why, as his career clearly demonstrated his talent and experience as a music teacher.

In the early decades of Spain's evangelization in the Indies, the missionaries assumed that Indigenous people were accepting the Christian message along with sacred music on terms familiar to Europeans. Later the missionaries recognized the ambiguity of that acceptance. Many of the early converts retained much of their traditional belief systems, picking and choosing among points of Christian doctrine, often based on how closely those points seemed to replicate traditional beliefs. In effect, local leaders and their people grafted selected features of European religion onto the deep roots of their own traditional beliefs. Alarmed by this realization, the missionaries backed away from their aim to create an Indigenous Christian priesthood. Nonetheless, the incorporation of Indigenous peoples as cantors and musicians in Christian religious rites remained central to the evangelization process.

In 1566, the Spanish crown and the Catholic Church hierarchy took over the missionary effort in New Spain, displacing the Franciscans. In their place, secular priests and bishops, Dominicans with the Inquisition, and the Jesuits became the dominant forces in evangelization, though music remained central to their efforts. Many of the Jesuits, including Francisco Borja, were excellent musicians. In his former life as the Duke of Gandía, Borja had written sacred music performed in several Spanish cathedrals. The Jesuits made music and musical instruction an essential part of their mission. They had already used it effectively in Brazil in the 1550s and in La Florida (1566–1572), before arriving in Mexico. The elaborate ceremonies they arranged in Mexico City in 1578 to honor the arrival of holy relics from Rome involved countless local dancers, musicians, and singers. The participants seem to have played both traditional and European instruments, and they sang polyphony in Latin, Spanish, and Náhuatl, which made a vivid impression on many observers. Eventually, Jesuit missions and their musical components suffused the

whole of Spanish America. There were 419 members of the Company of Jesus in Mexico in 1622, and 491 in Peru in 1636. They founded colleges in Mexico and the major cities in the huge Viceroyalty of Peru, from Lima, Cuzco and Chuquisaca (La Plata/Sucre) in the Andean region to Santiago in Chile and Córdoba in Argentina.

The Viceroyalty of Peru was much more remote from Europe than the Viceroyalty of New Spain, and yet the capital at Lima and the other major cities enjoyed a surprising variety of European cultural forms, secular as well as sacred. Trumpets, flageolets, and sackbuts featured commonly in public events as part of the European civic ceremonial tradition transplanted onto American soil. The city of Cuzco attained its cultural maturity in the late seventeenth century, during the tenure of Bishop Manuel de Mollinedo y Angulo from 1673 to 1699. Born in Madrid and trained in Spain, the bishop devoted his enormous energy to deepening the connections between religion and culture in the Viceroyalty of Peru and served as both a source of and a magnet for patronage of the arts. During his tenure, the Seminary of San Antonio Abad de Cuzco was a focus of Baroque musical training. At the same time, the famed Cuzco school of painting produced the stunning portraits of gun-toting angels (*ángeles arcabuceros*) that will be discussed in a later chapter.

Scholarly work about music in the Viceroyalty of Peru usually mentions the Milanese composer and conductor, Roque Ceruti, who came to Lima in the entourage of the Marquess of Castelldosrius, viceroy from 1704 to 1710, although Castelldosrius did not actually arrive in Lima until 1707. With Ceruti as the musical director of the Palacio del Gobierno, Castelldosrius brought the taste for Italian musical styles to one of the farthest outposts of Spain's American empire. Ceruti remained in Peru for the rest of his long life (d. 1760), during which time sophisticated European musical styles spread to all the major cities in Peru and later to New Spain. The history of music and evangelization in the Caribbean followed a similar trajectory to that of the major centers of Spanish colonization, but at a much lower level of activity.

The architecture of colonial Spanish America developed as a mixture of European and Indigenous characteristics—mostly European forms but constructed and embellished by skilled local artisans. The cathedrals in major cities throughout Spanish America are virtually indistinguishable from their European counterparts, at least to the untrained observer. The plans relied on European principles of proportion, shape, and style, and the building materials, though indigenous, followed European standards of durability wherever possible. Many large cathedrals were completed during the heyday of the European Baroque period, and their facades and embellishments are often even more elaborate than their European counterparts. Away from the centers of wealth and power in Spanish America, churches and other buildings were necessarily simpler. Nonetheless, mission churches on the far northern frontiers of New Spain—for example, in California and New Mexico—have

many characteristics in common with simple village churches in Spain: a single nave, an elevated choir loft, and a decorated ceiling (*artesonado*). The motifs and colors used, however, are distinctly New World, displaying the artistic sensibilities of the local artisans and artists involved in the construction and decoration.

In painting and sculpture, European artists and cartographers took note of the discoveries across the Atlantic and worked to incorporate elements from the New World into their standard iconography. They did not, however, adopt pictorial traditions from the Americas, except occasionally for evangelical purposes. Instead, the Jesuits and other Catholic religious orders led the way in implanting the European cultural heritage in Spanish America. Bureaucrats, soldiers, and settlers also played a role in the process, though their contributions were arguably more concentrated on the heritage of Spain rather than Europe as a whole. Many recent works of scholarship acknowledge the contributions of the diverse strands forming the cultural fabric of colonial Spanish America. Over time, the combination of European, African, and Indigenous traditions gradually coalesced and evolved into the forms recognized as distinctly Latin American.

TWENTY MILLION PEOPLE UNITED BY AN OCEAN

Spain had close to eight million people by the end of the Habsburg period, despite the wars and population losses of the seventeenth century. Spanish America probably had ten to twelve million people, spread over millions of square miles, including some of the most challenging terrain on earth. Those characteristics presumably made it difficult for the people in the Spanish world to feel a sense of shared community, yet they were arguably bound together by the complex strands of law, government, religion, trade, custom, culture, and loyalty to the monarchy. The numbers of ordinary Spaniards involved in transatlantic trade and migration and their efforts to maintain connections with family members contributed to their sense of being part of a larger whole, regardless of the daunting challenges presented by distance and the perils of seafaring. The hispanized part of the mixed population in the Americas seems to have shared that collective identity, and all the inhabitants of Spanish America were vassals of the crown, regardless of wealth or status.

Spanish monarchs occupied the top of the governmental and social pyramid in the Americas as well as in Spain, though none of them ever visited their domains across the ocean. Nonetheless, in the peculiar but effective formulation of the time, the royal bureaucracy promoted the fiction that the monarch was present everywhere, embodied in painted and printed portraits, in tapestries, in statuary, and even in administrative documents issued by the crown. Public rituals and celebrations marked every major event in the royal family's life and the political

affairs of Europe, often with an image of the monarch presiding over the event. Such performances of loyalty and royal protection continually reinforced the bonds of reciprocity that held the empire together.

Evidence of those bonds comes from a multitude of recent studies regarding the strong ties that linked emigrants to their homelands and the families left behind. A broad cross-section of society made its way to the Indies. Some, such as merchants and bureaucrats, tended to travel back and forth. Most, however, such as artisans and farmers, tended to settle permanently in Spanish lands overseas, but it was nonetheless common for them to retain ties to their extended families and hometowns in Spain. They wrote letters, sent money to endow religious, educational, and charitable foundations, owned property in Spain, and provided legacies to Spanish relatives and local parish churches and charities in their wills. Their legacies provide proof of their belief that they could be physically in one place but mentally and emotionally in several places at once.

A small proportion of Spanish migrants made their fortune in the Indies and returned to Spain as rich *indianos* and *peruleros*. Their wealth and the stories they told of life in the Indies inspired some of their fellow citizens to try their luck across the ocean as well. It was a rare village that did not have contact with and knowledge about the Indies, and some small towns and villages sent a considerable number of migrants across the ocean. The earliest migrants came disproportionately from the west and south, but the whole of Spain was eventually drawn into the Atlantic orbit.

The Basque scholar Juan Javier Pescador calculated that at least eighty percent of Basques had a family member with connections to the Indies by the late sixteenth century. A typical notion from that period identified five regions as Basque: the Spanish provinces of Vizcaya, Álava, Guipúzcoa, Navarre—and parts of the Indies. Religious confraternities and chartered societies had members on both sides of the Atlantic. The Royal Basque Society, founded in 1764, had nearly 300 members in Spain and more than 300 in the Indies, including many members of the royal bureaucracy. Similarly, the religious confraternity of San Fermín de los Navarros in Madrid conceived of its community as pertaining to the whole Spanish Empire. Although the Indies were physically remote, due to distances and the difficulties of communication, they were nonetheless incorporated into the daily reality and mental universe of Basques in Spain, and many other Spaniards as well.

BUREAUCRATS AND ADMINISTRATION

The legal and bureaucratic traditions that evolved in Spain over the centuries provided the framework for administration in Spanish America. Overall, the structure of advisory, thematic, and territorial councils and committees incorporated

the new lands across the Atlantic just as it had incorporated Flanders, Portugal, and large parts of Italy into Spain's composite monarchy in Europe. The framework of legal traditions, especially Roman law, linked the diverse parts, and the bureaucrats who staffed administrations in Spain, lands elsewhere in Europe, Spanish America, and even the Philippines, shared culture, religion, education, and traditions. Their common background, together with the large numbers of individuals involved and their rotation among diverse positions, created a shared sense of purpose among generations of bureaucrats, wherever they happened to be sent.

From the early sixteenth century, the Spanish Habsburgs intended their American colonies to become largely self-governing under royal sovereignty, which followed the model of their European domains. The crown initially appointed explorers, adventurers, and conquistadors to administrative posts but soon established a structured bureaucracy staffed by educated men. To form members of local elites for careers in government and the religious establishment, Spain established universities in Spanish America, rather than restricting higher education to peninsular universities. The most important early foundations were in Santo Domingo (1538), Lima (1551), Mexico City (1551), and La Plata (1552). By the end of the colonial period, some two dozen universities existed in Spanish America, which together had awarded nearly 150,000 university degrees in a traditional range of disciplines.

Several decades ago, the common notion was that appointees from Spain dominated the administrative structure in colonial Spanish America, so that local elites had little independent power or experience in the complexities of representative government. That picture has undergone considerable revision in recent decades. Scholars have burrowed into the records of colonial administrations, parishes, merchant companies, and other troves of documentary treasures to learn how government and society functioned over the centuries. At first, peninsular Spaniards dominated all levels of the bureaucracy, which was patterned on the government of Castile. Gradually, however, creoles gained offices and authority, predominantly in local administration but over time as part of the highest levels of colonial administration as well.

The growing consensus emphasizes the flexibility and stability of the Habsburg system, in which local officials regulated and monitored colonial society for the crown in return for favor and status. A complex system of overlapping authority prevented the accumulation of power by any one group of officials and tended to diffuse conflicts among them. Within that framework, local bureaucrats had considerable control, above all at the level of municipal councils (*cabildos*). In both Spain and the empire, urban governments were responsible for carrying out royal decrees, but whether they did so was subject to negotiation. There are numerous cases of local officials dragging

their feet and effectively nullifying royal decrees, even as they protested their loyalty and obedience to the crown. That startling ambiguity is immortalized in the Spanish phrase, 'to obey but not to comply,' and local officials were perfectly capable of placing local interests ahead of royal decrees, while still considering themselves loyal subjects of the crown. Moreover, municipal councils had the right to petition the crown directly and commonly availed themselves of that right to further local agendas.

Officials seem to have been aware of the negotiated quality of government under the Habsburgs and of their power within that system. Studies of municipal councils in the Indies have provided richly detailed portraits of local elites and the extent and application of their power. Over time, the system had the unintended consequence of producing local leaders with a sense of the separate identity of the colonies and confidence in their administrative abilities. Spanish America reached maturity in the eighteenth century with a large population, a well-developed economy, and an experienced and well-educated elite. Members of that elite would find it difficult to accept the Bourbon dynasty's efforts to exert more control than the Habsburgs had attempted. Under the pressure of war at the end of the eighteenth century, most of Spanish America would successfully fight for independence in the early nineteenth century, but that is beyond the scope of this book. During the Habsburg centuries, members of the elite in Spain and Spanish America would recognize that their best hope for social and economic advancement lay in loyalty and service to the crown.

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Chapter 4
AMBITION AND SERVICE: EXPECTATIONS, BENEFITS, AND COSTS

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All the individuals discussed in this chapter served the monarchy in some capacity. Most came from ordinary backgrounds, a few belonged to the highest level of Spanish society, and one—a cloistered nun—was unique in volunteering her service with no expectation of personal gain. Regardless of their backgrounds, their lives exemplified the benefits and costs of royal service. Although most initially saw royal service as their path to success, they soon learned that the path was strewn with hazards and obstacles. Many had trouble securing the funds they needed to do their jobs properly. They also had problems being paid in a timely fashion for their efforts—or being paid at all in money rather than recognition. Some became so disillusioned with royal service that they retired, and a few realized that failing in their duty or challenging the government would cost them their lives.

Whether they succeeded or failed owed in part to their personal characteristics, but luck—both good and bad—played a powerful role as well. The Roman goddess Fortuna personified that luck. In medieval times, Europeans who lived where the Roman Empire had flourished widely believed that the capricious turning of Fortuna's wheel determined their fate. During the early modern period, however, although Fortuna continued to feature prominently in literature and folklore, many believed that an individual with sufficient character and willpower could ride Fortuna's wheel to the top and stay there much longer than caprice decreed. Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527) discussed such exceptional individuals in *The Prince*, and many other authors held similar views. However, some individuals were carried around Fortuna's wheel more than once during their lives, including several in this chapter.

Figure 4.1 - The Roman goddess of fortune,
whose caprice determined human fate

SERVING THE CROWN FROM OBSCURITY TO GREATNESS

Chapter 3 discussed the famous voyage to find a westward route to the Spice Islands, initially led by Ferdinand Magellan and often associated only with his name, even in the present day. Without the contribution of Juan Sebastián Elcano, however, history would only remember Magellan for pioneering a westward route from Spain to Asia by sailing around the tip of South America. Elcano's success in bringing the spice-laden *Victoria* back to Spain made the voyage famous and made Elcano a hero, while Magellan was hardly remembered at the time. Elcano's unlikely ascent from obscurity to greatness illustrates the effects of Fortuna's caprice, as well as the ambiguities inherent in royal service.[7]

Juan Sebastián Elcano was born in Guetaria, a town in the Basque province of Guipúzcoa in northern Spain, most likely in the year 1487. As one of the eight children of Domingo Sebastián de Elcano and Catalina del Puerto, Juan Sebastián must have known from an early age that he would have to make his own way in the world. His father, like many of his fellow citizens, was probably a mariner or fisherman, but he seems to have died young. By the time Juan Sebastián was an adolescent, he likely worked on or around fishing vessels and learned the ways of the sea along the rugged Cantabrian coast. He may have sailed on vessels trading with southern France, and it would not be surprising if some of that trade was contraband. Although his first spoken language was probably Basque (Euskera), he acquired a fluent knowledge of spoken and written Castilian as he matured and traveled elsewhere in Spain. Wherever he went during his life, he retained strong emotional ties to the town of his birth.

Rather than remaining in his home region, however, Elcano looked to royal service to make his career. While still in his early twenties, he participated in the Italian wars of King Fernando of Aragón, serving in several battles in North Africa with a ship of 200 *toneles* that he had bought with loans from Savoyard merchants. Elcano's activities as a soldier and shipowner had the potential to make his fortune. However, the king failed to pay him in a timely fashion for his personal service or for the use of his ship, which had served as collateral for the loan. Unable to pay his creditors, Elcano had to turn the ship over to them—in effect, selling his vessel to a foreign power, which was a criminal offense in Spanish law. Destitute and subject to

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[7] My discussion of Elcano's contribution to the first voyage around the world first appeared in "La expedición Magallanes-Elcano," in *Congreso Internacional de Historia "Primus Circumdedisti Me", Valladolid, Spain, 20-22 March 2018,* ed. Carlos Martínez Shaw (Madrid: Ministerio de Defensa, 2018), pp. 151–163. An English version, "The Magellan-Elcano Expedition," was later published in *The Nautilus: A Maritime Journal of Literature, History, and Culture*, vol. XI (Spring 2020): 26–40.

imprisonment, Elcano left Guetaria and seems to have traveled to various Spanish cities on the Mediterranean coast, but that period of his life has left little trace.

It was only in 1518, after he settled in Seville, that Elcano surfaced in documentary records. At that time, several Basques held important positions in the House of Trade, but it is not clear whether the network of Basques in high places in Seville helped Elcano to circumvent his legal status as an outlaw. Nonetheless, in 1518 he was appointed master of one of the five ships being prepared for Magellan's expedition. Elcano's assigned ship, the *Concepción*, had been built in Galicia on Spain's far northwestern coast, and Elcano supervised its refitting for the voyage as part of his duties as its master.

As mentioned in an earlier chapter, when disagreements with Magellan led to the uprising at San Julián on Easter Sunday of 1520, Elcano was a prominent participant. After the uprising failed, Elcano was first condemned to death and then pardoned, but he undoubtedly lost his position as master of the *Concepción.* For more than a year thereafter, he presumably served as a simple sailor. Regardless, his fellow mariners seem to have appreciated his personal and professional qualities, because they elected him master of the *Victoria* under Captain Gonzalo Gómez de Espinoza after Magellan's death. From that point on, Elcano began the long, difficult climb toward the top of Fortuna's wheel.

With successive changes in leadership, Gómez became captain of the *Trinidad*, and Elcano became captain of the *Victoria,* as well as the expedition's treasurer. Sailing to the Spice Islands—the original goal of the expedition—they arranged treaties with local rulers and traded for spices. In all these activities, Elcano proved himself to be a natural leader, respected by his crew and fellow officers, but not by die-hard admirers of Magellan such as Antonio Pigafetta, the most famous chronicler of the expedition. Presumably, Pigafetta never forgave Elcano for participating in the uprising against Magellan at San Julián.

With their two remaing ships filled with valuable spices, Elcano and Gómez de Espinoza faced the question of how to return to Spain. As a good soldier, Gómez opted to obey the expedition's instructions to avoid the Portuguese sphere, sailing northeastward on the *Trinidad* to search for a route to New Spain. Elcano, the more experienced navigator, reasoned that the *Victoria* should take advantage of the prevailing monsoon winds and sail southwestward across the Indian Ocean and around southern Africa, even though that route would violate the terms of the Treaty of Tordesillas and the king's explicit instructions. The survivors of the expedition then chose which ship and captain they wanted to accompany. Despite Pigafetta's animosity toward Elcano, he chose to sail on the *Victoria.*

Elcano and his crew navigated far from land to avoid Portuguese enclaves, which meant that they had no friendly port to resupply or refit the ship. As they

crossed the Indian Ocean and struggled to round the Cape of Good Hope, their route inflicted unimaginable hardships on the men. Nonetheless, when Elcano polled his crew about whether to head for a port and take their chances with Portuguese authorities, they voted to keep going. As they sailed northward along the coast of West Africa—near starvation, afflicted by scurvy, and desperate for supplies—the surviving crew members finally voted to drop anchor in the Portuguese Cape Verde Islands off the northwest coast of Africa. Thirteen men sent ashore to trade for food were arrested when local authorities realized that they had come from Asia, in violation of the Treaty of Tordesillas. Elcano and the rest of the crew escaped on the *Victoria*. On September 6, 1522, twenty-one men—eighteen Europeans and three Moluccans—finally arrived in Spain, near the end of human endurance after their ordeal. Despite the suffering that Elcano and his crew experienced, their disobedience had led to success, whereas Gómez's obedience had led to failure, which provides yet another example of Fortuna's caprice in human affairs.

Elcano's extraordinary leadership in bringing the *Victoria* home to Spain has been almost forgotten in the present day, largely because Antonio Pigafetta's chronicle barely mentioned him. Pigafetta had followed his own best interests in sailing with Elcano rather than Gómez, but his chronicle praised Magellan and ignored Elcano. Ironically, if he had sailed with Gómez, his chronicle might never have been written. Contradicting Pigafetta's chronicle, official statements from Elcano's crew proved his worth as an exemplary and heroic captain. His first communications with King Carlos praised the crew and urged the king to reward all of them handsomely. In his own behalf, he justified his participation in the uprising at San Julián by blaming Magellan for disobeying the king's instructions. Elcano also made clear that Magellan's actions at Mactan, in defiance of royal instructions, had resulted in his death. The first circumnavigation of the globe and the impressive value of the cloves and other spices that the *Victoria* carried allowed Elcano to claim that the successes of the voyage outweighed his violation of the treaty with the Portuguese.

After basking in the fame of his successful voyage around the world, in 1525 Elcano again sailed toward the Spice Islands, this time with García Jofre de Loaísa's expedition. Unfortunately, after following the route pioneered by Magellan into the vast Pacific Ocean, Loaísa and Elcano both died of scurvy before reaching the Spice Islands. In Elcano's last will and testament, written at sea on July 26, 1526, he described himself as a legal resident (*vecino*) of Guetaria and a sea captain—the two elements of his identity that were foremost in his mind as he faced death. During his lifetime, Elcano had experienced several turns of Fortuna's wheel serving the crown, and he died while still in royal service.

WEALTH AND POWER, DUTIES AND REGRETS

Unlike Elcano, García Álvarez de Toledo y Osorio (1514–77) was born into one of the most exalted lineages in Spain—the powerful Alba clan. Don García was the grandson of the II Duke of Alba (Fadrique Álvarez de Toledo y Enríquez de Quiñones), and the nephew and contemporary of the III Duke of Alba (Fernando Álvarez de Toledo), the distinguished general who served the Spanish monarchy in numerous venues. Don García's father, Pedro Álvarez de Toledo y Zúñiga, served as Viceroy of Naples from 1532 to 1553, which provided an ideal role model for his son to emulate. Don García's mother, María Osorio y Pimentel, the II Marchioness of Villafranca del Bierzo, linked him and his siblings to another distinguished lineage. We have already met his younger sister, Leonor Álvarez de Toledo y Osorio, in a previous chapter. She would marry Duke Cosimo I de Medici of Florence, strengthening the family's Italian connections.

Given his lineage and the example set by his father, it was expected that Don García would enter royal service. Although service at sea was not the most common way to serve for the sons of noble families, García may have inclined toward serving in the Mediterraneanto after spending much of his youth in Naples. While still quite young, he owned two galleys in the Squadron of Naples, under the great Genoese admiral and statesman, Andrea Doria. By 1535, at age twenty-one, Don García commanded six galleys in several important naval battles between Spain and the Ottomans. After he defeated the Muslim pirate Hayreddin Barbarossa, King Carlos I named him general of the Squadron of Naples, and in 1544, when he was just thirty, the king named him Captain General of the Sea.

In his full maturity, Don García would serve in a variety of posts on land for King Felipe II, Carlos I's successor: Colonel General of Infantry of the Kingdom of Naples; Viceroy of Catalonia (1558–64); and Viceroy of Sicily (1564–1566). From Sicily he coordinated the reconquest of the North African port of Peñón de Vélez and sent forces to relieve a Turkish siege of the strategic island of Malta in 1565. Because of his extensive military experience in the Mediterranean, García became a member of Felipe II's Council of State. In that role, he advised Don Juan of Austria, the king's twenty-four-year-old half-brother, before the crucial Battle of Lepanto in 1571, arguably contributing to the stunning Christian victory in that engagement. When Don Juan moved to the Netherlands afterwards, he and Don García kept up a warm correspondence.

Although Spain and the Ottomans backed away from direct confrontation after Lepanto, galley activity in the Mediterranean did not cease. In fact, Spain had about 150 galleys in the Mediterranean in 1575. Their numbers increased demand not only for oarsmen but also for officers able to command crews that were multi-national and

widely diverse in status. As in other European galley fleets, by the late sixteenth century most of the oarsmen on Spanish galleys were enslaved, either through purchase or through capture in battle. Others were convicted criminals condemned to galley service for a specified number of years, and a minority were free men who had signed on voluntarily and worked for wages. To keep order and ensure efficient performance from such a varied assemblage of men required extraordinary skills. Many of the king's advisers favored the recruitment of noblemen as galley officers, in large part because their birth and early education had prepared them to be military leaders. One of the potential noble recruits evidently asked Don García de Toledo for his advice in 1575, just as the galley fleets reached their peak. It is not clear who he was, but we can assume that he was familiar enough with Don García to receive an honest reply. However, he may not have been prepared for the depth of negative commentary that the reply contained.[8]

Given Don García's long and distinguished career serving the crown, the bitter disillusion revealed by his letter seems surprising, even shocking. Yet, from start to finish, he did not offer the slightest encouragement to serve the crown as an officer on the galleys. Moreover, it does not take much imagination to read much of his letter as a criticism of King Felipe II. What might have accounted for Don García's negative attitude about royal service?

Among other possibilities, he may have been irritated by the crown's inability or unwillingness to repay the monies he had advanced to carry out his duties. Like other military commanders on land and sea, Don García had often used his own funds to fulfill his responsibilities as an owner and commander of galleys. That meant paying for food for everyone on board and clothing for all the oarsmen who entered the galleys as slaves or condemned criminals. In addition, when oarsmen needed to be replaced because of death, injury, or, in the case of criminals, when they completed their sentences, it was the galley owner's responsibility to replace them.

Don García's letter made the financial hazards of commanding galleys clear. "If you do not have the payments in hand [at the start of a campaign] because they have not been consigned to you, the men turn against you, fail to do their jobs at sea, and commit outrages on land that damage your reputation and honor." And if royal funds dry up during the campaign, "because many times the needs of kings require this," the commander has to use his own funds to continue.

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[8] The quotations in the following section are all translated from the "Discurso de García de Toledo sobre los inconvenientes que tienen los cargos de galeras," in Juan Martínez de Burgos, "Miscelánea literaria de los S. XV–S. XVI," Biblioteca Nacional de España (BNE), Madrid, MS 19164, fols 100r–107v. The discussion of the discourse formed part of my essay on "Spanish Noblemen as Galley Captains: A Problematical Social History," pp. 9–18 in *Strategy and the Sea: Essays in Honour of John B. Hattendorf,* eds. N.A.M. Rodger, J. Ross Dancy, Benjamin Darnell, and Evan Wilson (Woodbridge, Suffolk, UK: Boydell & Brewer, 2016), presented here in revised form with permission from the publisher.

By the late 1560s, the crown seems to have owed Don García 130,000 ducats, a sizeable sum, but the royal coffers were in no condition to repay him. To compensate for his loss of capital, in 1569 Don García received two Italian titles that Felipe II created for him: Duke of Fernandina and prince of Montalbán. He also inherited the Spanish title of IV Marquess of Villafranca del Bierzo when his brother died that same year. Although the latter title made Don García a grandee—the highest level of the Spanish nobility—he never used his Spanish title but only the Italian titles that had been created for him. One possible explanation for his surprising behavior might be that he had earned the Italian titles in compensation for the crown's unpaid debts to him, whereas he had merely inherited his title and grandee status.

Don Garcia's disillusion with galley service was uncompromising, warning his correspondent that such service would damage "one's person, finances, life, honor, and perhaps even one's soul." He also observed that,

> ... a man's honor is more affected by fortune at sea than in any other circumstance. In many instances, neither good judgment nor experience will help you – though you have them – and in infinite other instances, the lack of good judgment and experience will destroy you. It is like holding a wolf by the ears; if it is dangerous to hang on, it is no less dangerous to let go.

Moreover, he argued that,

> there were only two galley captains who might be envied, but many more who came to grief in various ways, some by drowning, others by having their ships smashed to pieces on land, others by dying at the hands of their enemies, others ending their labors as slaves of the Turks, others having their ships burned, others being rowed to Barbary by their own crews, and others who, in maintaining their ships, destroyed their limited finances. … Their names are so familiar that even a four-year-old child could recite them.

The only reason he had escaped the fate of so many others, he continued, was that he had withdrawn from galley service fairly early in his career. His posts were land-based from the mid-1550s on, although he continued to draw on his knowledge of seaborne command and warfare in those posts. Regarding his decision to withdraw from galley service, he noted that whatever reasons might lead to such a decision, "you will be accused of putting your own particular interests above service to the king, and you cannot be freed from blame without shifting the blame to your master"—in other words, to the king himself.

Many of Don García's warnings related to the difficulties inherent in commanding crews that were a turbulent mixture of oarsmen who were nearly all slaves or convicted criminals, plus a small number of paid crewmen and officers. In

earlier times, he noted, both the paid crews and the galleys themselves were of better quality than they were by the late sixteenth century, well able to confront "the Turks and Moors" who opposed them in the Mediterranean. Those days were long past, he claimed, and Spanish galleys had become inferior to those of their enemies,

> ... so that they can neither flee nor overtake an enemy. And if you say that one does not always encounter enemies, I would respond that unless you encounter them, there is no way to achieve the honor and wealth that you wish to gain.

He also bemoaned the lack of good subordinate officers and the harm caused to a ship's morale and discipline by officers who were incompetent. Moreover, regardless of the decision made by a galley captain, he was bound to face criticism from one quarter or another.

> If you decide not to take inexperienced crews out in bad weather, some will call you a coward. If you stay near port for some months until the sailors and the *chusma* [oarsmen, literally rabble] learn to work together efficiently, some will accuse you of being too fond of life in port, wasting the king's wages, and will argue that it would be better for the king not to have galleys at all.

Although a galley captain was technically in charge of his ship and everyone on board, Don García warned that the captain general of a fleet might interfere with the authority of an individual captain,

> assigning *patrones*, *cómitres*, or officers to your galleys, which will cause your own men, who hoped to be promoted to such jobs, to grumble and complain against you. Even so, in the face of such interference, it is better not to absent yourself to do other tasks, because at least you can defend yourself in person before the general.[9]

During Don García's own career at sea, he served under Andrea Doria, whom he considered one of the two men whose career might be envied. His correspondent had argued that Doria only became famous when he began to serve the crown at sea rather than on land. In response, Don García noted that, "those were other times, … and he was also sustained by a great master (*amo*), despite the perils that assailed him from the sea and from shifts in fortune." Don García had begun his career with Doria under Carlos I, so that his observation can easily be understood as a veiled criticism of Felipe II. He concluded his dismal assessment of galley service by urging

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[9] In the context of Spain's Mediterranean galleys, a *patrón* was second in command to the captain and often more knowledgeable in nautical matters. A *cómitre* was the officer charged with directing the work of the crew, whether oars or sails propelled the galley at any given time.

his correspondent to avoid it at all costs, instead devoting his energies to managing his estates and caring for his family. To do otherwise, "will expose you to financial ruin and an early death, leaving your children not only fatherless, but penniless."

Don García's bitterness can only have been reinforced by an event that occurred after he wrote his letter. As discussed at length in an earlier chapter, his sister, Leanor, had married Duke Cosimo I de' Medici of Florence. When Don García's wife, Vittoria Colonna, died shortly after the birth of their daughter, he entrusted her upbringing to his sister at the Medici court. Duchess Leanor died when her niece, known as Dianora, was just ten years old, and her mentor thereafter was her older cousin Isabella, whose moral standards fell considerably below those of the late duchess. To reinforce the ties between the Alba clan and the Medicis, a marriage was arranged between Dianora and her cousin, Piero, the unstable youngest child of Duke Cosimo and Leonor. The marriage was a disaster from the start, and the unhappy Dianora amused herself more or less openly with lovers. In revenge, Piero strangled her with a dog leash at a remote Medici villa in 1576, almost certainly with the foreknowledge and tacit approval of Cosimo's successor, Duke Francesco. Embarrassed when the shocking story leaked out, the duke claimed that Dianora had been killed for treasonous dealings with enemies of the Medici—a charge that was clearly untrue. Don García's son, Pedro Álvarez de Toledo y Colonna, made every effort to have Piero punished for Dianora's murder, but Felipe II and his government viewed the alliance with the Medici family as too important to jeopardize. Instead of facing punishment, Piero was simply exiled to Spain, where he lived a long and dissolute life. Dianora's murder and its aftermath may well have added to the bitterness and disillusion regarding royal service that show so clearly in Don García's letter. He died in Naples at the age of sixty-three, less than a year after his daughter's murder.

BUREAUCRATS AND BEAN COUNTERS

Spanish monarchs contracted with individuals to secure crews and supplies for galley squadrons in the Mediterranean during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. However, that was not an option for military fleets such as the Armada of the Ocean Sea (the Atlantic Ocean) or the guard squadrons assigned to escort and protect the large merchant fleets to New Spain and Tierra Firme. Instead, royal bureaucrats and accountants of the House of Trade in Seville supplied provisions and equipment for those fleets, as well as for other fleets formed for specific purposes.

The far-reaching responsibilities and enormous power of the House of Trade grew rapidly from its foundation in 1503, just a decade after the first voyage of Christopher Columbus. Initially, the House of Trade was defined as a kind of

warehouse and customs depot for merchandise shipped to and from the Indies. The merchandise was registered and warehoused in facilities in Seville, supervised by the bureaucrats of the House of Trade, who also assessed and collected royal taxes due on the merchandise. Following further conquests and colonization in the Americas and the increasing number of ships in Spain's transatlantic trade, the responsibilities of the bureaucrats in the House of Trade were greatly expanded by ordinances published in 1510 and 1511, designed above all to protect the interests and tax revenues of the crown.,

The principal officials of the House of Trade were the treasurer, the factor or purveyor, and the chief accountant. All three posts were virtual lifetime appointments in the early years, which gave the individuals appointed extraordinary authority over Spain's relationship with its colonies across the western ocean. All matters related to royal interests had to be decided, registered, and signed by all three officials. Even the treasurer, the principal official among them, could not disburse funds without the recorded approval of the other two officials. The government did not engage in trade but relied on the officials of the House of Trade to monitor, register, and tax commerce that was organized, financed, and conducted by private merchants as individuals or members of partnerships. It made sense to appoint officials to the House of Trade who understood commerce, but those same officials were supposed to control and regulate the very commerce in which they were involved, so that conflicts of interest were embedded in the organizational structure of the House of Trade from the beginning.

Sancho de Matienzo, as his name is usually rendered, had been a canon of the cathedral in Seville before his appointment as treasurer of the House of Trade in 1503, but Francisco Pinelo, who served as factor from 1503 to his death in 1509, was a merchant and shipowner. Likewise, the wealthy merchant and shipowner Juan López de Recalde, one of several Basques who held prominent positions in the House of Trade, served as accountant in 1507–22 and 1528–32 and also functioned as a general purveyor for the kingdom of Castile. Another Basque, Domingo de Ochandiano, a merchant and financier, held various posts related to the treasury of the House of Trade and served as its accountant from 1523 to 1529. Not surprisingly, the relationships between such officials and their counterparts in the merchant community in Seville resulted in numerous opportunities for collusion, bribery, and conflicts of interest in the early decades of the transatlantic trade.

To safeguard royal revenues and the integrity of the institution, in 1522 King Carlos I banned officials of the House of Trade from participating in commerce with the Indies. Although royal decrees could not eliminate corruption with the stroke of a pen, it is reasonable to assume that the situation improved thereafter. As trade expanded, the bureaucrats in the House of Trade acquired the power to judge

commercial disputes, organized the training and licensing of pilots, controlled who could make and sell navigational instruments, and decided who could and who could not travel to the Indies. In short, to one degree or another, officials of the House of Trade controlled virtually everything and everyone dealing with Spanish America.

In addition to overseeing commerce, one of the most complicated responsibilities of the officials of the House of Trade was to organize and provision the fleets that carried merchandise and people across the ocean. The number of ships heading to New Spain and Tierra Firme increased in both number and capacity during the sixteenth century, and the estimated numbers of people on those ships—sailors, soldiers, settlers, merchants, clerics, bureaucrats, and others—grew enormously as well. They all had to be fed.

Figure 4.2



Figure 4.3



Provisions for the crews ideally included enough for the round-trip and any layovers in the Americas, because American ports and their hinterlands simply could

not feed hundreds or even thousands of extra mouths once a fleet docked. Private passengers such as settlers only needed food for the outbound voyage, which was generally provided for a price by whoever organized their travel, but their needs added to the total that had to be bought, prepared, packed, and stowed aboard in Spain before departure. Official rations for the sailors and soldiers included ship's biscuit; wine; water; oil; garlic; and salted meat, fish, or cheese as the main meal item in a weekly rotation, accompanied by rice and a mixture (*menestra*) of chickpeas and fava beans. Special items for the sick and for senior officers included eggs, almonds, sugar, quince preserves, raisins, and the occasional fresh meat from chickens or even cattle, sheep, or pigs carried live until they were slaughtered on board.

Purveyors and their agents and assistants working for the House of Trade were tasked with locating, buying, and arranging for the transport and loading of everything needed for the ships, in addition to food. Even assuming that the amount paid and recorded by officials was honest, food prices could fluctuate wildly from year to year, affected by harvest volume and countless other variables. Given the rampant inflation of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, virtually all prices trended upward, judging from price lists in random years. Private buyers with cash in hand could often acquire supplies in preference to officials from the House of Trade, who had to buy on credit until the previous year's fleets arrived with tax revenues from the Americas. Those variables greatly complicated the tasks assigned to officials of the House of Trade and their agents.

Figure 4.4 – Prices of basic shipbord rations




Vinegar - Price in Reales per *Arroba*, 1542–1626
10
0
Reales
Random years


Salt Pork - Price in Reales per 16 oz., 1555–1626
5
0
Reales
Random Years


Beef - Price in Reales per 16 oz., 1555–1578
1
0
Axis Title
Random Years


Salt Cod - Price per 25 lbs., 1540–1635
20
0
Reales

Cheese - Price per 25 lbs., 1555–1626
50
0
Reales
Random Years


Rice - Price per 100 lbs., 1542–1626
100
50
0
Reales



Given Spain's difficult topography, most food items were purchased from the fertile farmlands of southwestern Andalucía and transported to Seville by the existing network of roads.

Figure 4.5 - Andalusia in southwestern Spain



Once provisions arrived in Seville, they were stored in the remnant of the enormous medieval shipyards (*atarazanas*) on the banks of the Guadalquivir River, whose history Pablo Emilio Pérez-Mallaína has studied in detail. Over time, as the shipbuilding industry shifted to northern Spain, many of the seventeen original bays in the shipyards—each measuring one hundred meters long and twelve meters high—were leased out by the crown and remodeled by the lessees for other uses. During the heyday of the transatlantic fleets, seven bays warehoused provisions and supplies for both outgoing and incoming fleets. Ordinarily, two large merchant fleets were outfitted to sail to the Indies each year—the New Spain fleet and the Tierra Firme Fleet. From time to time, however, additional squadrons or fleets had to be prepared and provisioned at the same time, which put enormous strains on the supply network.

Figure 4.6 – Seville in the sixteenth century, showing the location of the former medieval shipyards



Figure 4.7 - A bird's eye view of the seven storage bays, labeled to show their contents.



Even without extra fleets, there were always unforeseen delays, cash-flow problems, harvest short-falls, severe weather, outbreaks of illness, and numerous other contingencies. As a result, the historian Sergio Rodríguez Lorenzo noted that it was a miracle for the fleets to depart at all, especially when the needs of warfare and commerce coincided.

The logistical challenges behind that miracle were managed by the competent leadership of the House of Trade. For nearly a century beginning in the 1530s, three generations of the Duarte family played a crucial role in provisioning both mercantile and military fleets organized through the House of Trade. Their experience, their large network of agents (*comisarios*), and their close relationships with the Council of the Indies in Madrid and the guilds of merchants, shipowners, and mariners in Seville and Cádiz gave successive Duartes extraordinary power in the complicated provisioning process.

Francisco Duarte de Mendicoa, also known as Francisco Huarte/Duarte de Mendieta, was the founder of the dynasty. Thought to have been born in Navarre, though some sources say he was Portuguese, he served Carlos I in Italy as an accountant as well as the general purveyor for the army and navy. From 1536 until his death in 1554, he also held the post of chief purveyor (factor) for the House of Trade. His various posts taken together gave him broad experience in providing supplies for the armed forces of the Habsburg monarchy, both inside and outside Spain.

As Duarte's responsibilities grew, so did his personal wealth and status. When the lordship of Benazuza in a district of Seville came up for sale, Juan de Almansa, a member of Seville's city council, and his wife, Constanza de Alcocer, purchased it for Duarte and his wife, who were Almansa's brother-in-law and sister-in law. They paid the impressive sum of more than four million *maravedís* for the lordship. Benazuza was an *encomienda* of the military order of Santiago, which had been under royal jurisdiction since the time of Isabel and Fernando. Duarte's wife received transfer of the lordship of Benazuza in August of 1540. Exactly five years later, as the first noble lords of Benazuza, Duarte and his wife established the entail (*mayorazgo*) of Benazuza for their son. At that point, although Benazuza was a small property, it contained houses, mills, vineyards, and fields growing grain and hemp. The entail also included several other small properties in Seville, all of them generating income.

Duarte was the principal benefactor of the convent of Our Lady of Victory in Seville and paid for the construction of its main altar, among his many charitable donations. The elaborate tombs of Duarte and his wife were originally located in that convent. However, because of his importance to the cultural and religious life of Seville, the tombs were moved to the Pantheon of Illustrious Sevillians that was established in the former house of the Jesuit order in 1840. In his nearly two decades as chief purveyor for the House of Trade, Francisco Duarte served the interests of the crown, his adopted city, and his family. In many ways, his service to the crown was an unblemished success. Moreover, he was able to ensure that his son continued the family tradition.

The second-generation Duarte held the position of chief purveyor of the House of Trade for almost four decades, from 1554 to 1593. With the same name as his father—Francisco Duarte de Mendieta—he was the second lord of Benazuza. At the House of Trade, he oversaw provisioning during the greatest period of growth in Spain's transatlantic fleet system, which strained every link in the supply chain for the fleets. The official timetable aimed to dispatch the fleet for New Spain in April and the fleet for Tierra Firme in August. The most important goal was to avoid simultaneously provisioning both fleets, let alone three. In 1581, however, an extra fleet of twenty-three ships and nearly 3,000 people—the Armada of the Strait—was

hastily assembled to counter Francis Drake's peacetime attacks in the Americas and to establish a settlement in the Strait of Magellan. According to the great French historian Pierre Chaunu, supplying the Armada of the Strait, along with both regular Indies fleets, exceeded not only the technical capabilities of the House of Trade but of the late sixteenth century in general. In trying to accomplish the impossible, Francisco Duarte came into conflict with the captain general of the Armada of the Strait, Don Diego Flores de Valdés. Duarte prevailed. In the end, Flores had to purchase additional food in the Canary Islands and again immediately upon arriving in Brazil.

The second generation of the Duarte dynasty died in 1593, and he, like his father, had occupied the post of chief purveyor until his death. The third generation of the family, Francisco Duarte Cerón, was appointed as an interim purveyor in 1580, presumably with the help of his father. Unlike his father, his association with the House of Trade was marked by controversy. In 1586 and again at the end of the century, a review of Duarte Cerón's activities led to accusations of irregularities in supplying the navy. To defend himself, in 1601 he traveled to the court of Felipe III, which resided in Valladolid at that time. Although he only had a license to stay away from his duties in Seville for two months, he actually stayed in Valladolid for nearly a year, reinforcing his networks of clients and his connections at court, especially with the Duke of Lerma, the king's favorite and chief minister. Ultimately, however, he was ordered back to Seville to focus on his duties there.

A few years later, Duarte Cerón was back at Court, since he had been appointed to the Council of the Indies in January of 1605. He and Juan de Ibarra were the first nobles to serve on the Council of the Indies, ostensibly to avoid problems of precedence within the Committee of War of the Indies (Junta de Guerra de Indias). That committee was composed of four members each from the Council of the Indies and the Council of War, and the latter council habitually included noblemen. Another unusual feature also marked Duarte Cerón's appointment. His accounts at the House of Trade contained many irregularities at that point, and he should not have been able to join the Council of the Indies until he had cleared up the discrepancies and put his accounts in final form. Instead, he was allowed to attend the council's deliberations, except when the members were considering financial matters. It would seem that his diligence in cultivating friends and supporters at court had worked to his advantage.

Duarte Cerón continued to enjoy favored status. He was named president of the House of Trade in December 1608 and held that office until 1615, although he continued to be a member of the Council of the Indies. Moreover, he was somehow allowed to collect the salary for both positions, despite the king's rule that only one salary could be collected when an individual held multiple appointments. In Seville,

Duarte Cerón seems to have enjoyed considerable influence as well. For example, from 1611, during his tenure as president of the House of Trade, he also functioned as purveyor and general commissary of the armadas, galleys, and presidios of Spain. When his term as president of the House of Trade ended in 1615, he again assumed his post on the Council of the Indies in Madrid, where he died the following year. Like his father and grandfather, Francisco Duarte Cerón undoubtedly benefited from his position as chief purveyor of Spain's transatlantic fleets. Unlike his ancestors, however, he was able to add political power and influence at court to his prominence as a high-ranking bureaucrat.

COMMANDERS AT SEA

Spanish fleets, like those of other states, were organized in a well-defined hierarchy. The captain general (capitán general) of each fleet occupied the top of the hierarchical pyramid, with powers and duties that included executive, judicial, administrative, and even spiritual responsibilities. Juan Escalante de Mendoza (1575) described the ideal captain general as,

> a very good man, of good family and well born, a native of Seville, a good Christian and experienced with the sea, since he has made other voyages on this same course to the same destination. He is discreet and very fair and even-handed in dispensing justice, well-intentioned and understanding, vigilant and careful of everything in his charge, affable and of a proper age, neither old nor young.
>
> Along with being very brave, forceful, and skillful with weapons, he is also slim and fit, because he can jump agilely into any ship's boat when he needs to visit any other ship in the fleet, no matter how rough the sea and wind. He is not covetous nor greedy nor avaricious, but generous, sharing whatever he has with the soldiers and officers of the fleet, and all are content with him. He is determined in all his duties and careful that punishments due are carried out, and very diligent in pursuing any opportunity for battle with the enemy. He has good judgment and is circumspect in all his duties. He is sober and temperate in eating and drinking, and very disinterested in the use of his charge and command, because he has no business interests of his own, contenting himself with the ordinary salary of his office, although it is not as much as he merits. In all the fleet, [the officers] are very content to have such a good captain-general . . . and they pray that God protects the king for many years for appointing such a man to the job.[10]

[10] Juan Escalante de Mendoza, *Itinerario de navegacion de los mares y tierras occidentales* (Madrid, 1575), in Cesáreo Fernández Duro, *Disquisiciones náuticas, 6* vols. (Madrid Sucesores de Rivadeneyra, 1876-81), 5:482-83.

From 1609, captains general for the merchant fleets sailing to New Spain and Tierra Firme were appointed by the king from nomination lists prepared by the Committee of War of the Indies. Experience and character weighed most heavily in the committee's nominations and in the king's final selections, as befitted a matter of such importance, but the lineage and professional recommendations of each nominee also entered into the deliberations. If the person chosen was in Madrid, he swore his oath of office before the Council of the Indies; otherwise he took his oath in Seville before the officials of the House of Trade.

Before setting sail, the captain general was supposed to inspect the entire fleet, seeing that ships, equipment, crews, provisions, and munitions were adequate for the voyage and for any battle that presented itself. At sea, the captain general arranged with the fleet's overseer (veedor) and chief scribe (escribano mayor) for regular musters of the men and inspections of the provisions and armaments. In addition, he judged any civil or criminal quarrels that arose among the crews, with the right to shackle serious offenders or turn them over to local authorities for punishment upon arrival in a suitable port. Like Escalante's ideal captain general, many of the men who rose to command a fleet were noblemen, identified by the honorific "Don" before their names. Those born to a lower social status were particularly noteworthy, because they would have begun their careers without the benefit of a privileged lineage.

Once in the Indies, the captain general took effective command of any port he visited, with responsibility and authority over all civil and military authorities—even the viceroy—for as long as the fleet remained there. When two fleets met, each with its own captain general, a carefully defined hierarchy of command determined precedence, with the Armada of the Ocean Sea at the top and merchant fleets at the bottom. When two fleets of equal rank arrived at the same port, the captain general of the first to arrive took precedence, and the captain general of the second fleet became his second-in-command (almirante) for any subsequent joint voyage. Regardless of the social status of the individuals involved, the status of their fleets determined the hierarchy of command. In an attempt to avoid conflicts of interest, a 1568 law barred captains general from trading in the Indies for themselves or for anyone else. Any captain general who defied the law and engaged in trade faced harsh penalties, including the loss of the merchandise traded, plus half his possessions in Spain and the inability to hold any further post of honor. Although contemporaries commented at various times on the widespread flouting of this prohibition, captains general of high social and economic status would presumably have been less tempted than others to disobey the law.

To protect the merchant vessels from pirates and enemy attack, the Guard Squadron (Armada de la Guardia) of the Indies fleets had been formed in the late

sixteenth century. The small armada typically consisted of four to eight galleons and a few small, fast dispatch craft (*pataches*). In the first third of the seventeenth century, some two dozen men served as captains general of the merchant fleets and guard squadrons sailing to New Spain and Tierra Firme, according to the exhaustive research of Pierre and Huguette Chaunu.[11]

Among the most notable commanders at the start of the seventeenth century, Don Juan Gutiérrez de Garibay had a long association with the New Spain Fleet, serving as its captain general five times between 1600 and 1613. Those years saw the peak of Spain's trade with the Americas, and Don Juan's fleets consistently delivered royal tax revenues and private treasure remittances to Spain. In that same period, Don Alonso de Chaves Galindo alternated with Gutiérrez de Garibay as captain general of the New Spain Fleet, serving at the start of the century in 1602–03 and 1605–6. In a typical career trajectory, he had previously served as almirante, then captain general, of a squadron of small craft (*felibotes*) and as almirante of the Tierra Firme Fleet. Like many other captains general, Don Lope de Hoces y Córdoba had experience with both mercantile fleets to the Indies in a career that spanned several decades. His many successful voyages carried much-needed tax revenue for the Spanish crown, which was frequently short of cash.

One of the most successful commanders of the Guard Squadron in the early seventeenth century was Tomás de Larráspuru, who escorted Indies fleets eight times from 1621 to 1632 without serious mishap, despite the constant threat from pirates in peacetime and enemy ambush in wartime. Larráspuru was famous for his luck as well as for his skill, but he could not alter the fate of the New Spain Fleet in 1631. While the ships in that fleet battled October storms in the Gulf of Mexico, Larráspuru and the Guard Squadron waited for them in Havana. He finally sent a *patache* to Spain in December reporting that they still had not arrived. When the news reached Sanlúcar de Barrameda in mid-February of 1632, it was feared that the entire New Spain Fleet had been lost. The reality was bad enough. Among the ships from the New Spain Fleet that survived the storm, only two could withstand the voyage from Havana back to Spain. Larráspuru safely escorted them, along with the Tierra Firme Fleet, on that final leg of the journey, arriving in April of 1632.

Don Martín de Vallecilla exemplified the career trajectory of many senior officers in Spain's transatlantic armadas and fleets. After rising through the ranks, he became captain general of the New Spain Fleet on its voyage to the Indies in

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[11] Portions of the following discussion first appeared in Spanish as "Generales y almirantes en el primer tercio del siglo XVII," pp. 118–127 of the catalog for the exhibition, *La Flota de Nueva España y la búsqueda del galeón* Nuestra Señora del Juncal (Madrid: Ministerio de Cultura y Deporte, 2021), excerpted here by permission. The full catalog is available for download free of charge from the list of publications of Spain's Ministry of Culture, www.cultura.gob.es.

1615–16. In the 1620s he served in the Armada of the Ocean Sea as captain general of the squadron of Vizcaya and briefly as almirante of the entire armada under Don Fadrique de Toledo y Osorio, arguably the most distinguished naval commander of his time. Thereafter, Don Martín became captain general of the Guard Squadron in 1629–30. In the extraordinary period that followed the sinking of most of the New Spain Fleet in 1631, Vallecilla led the combined 1632 fleets of New Spain and Tierra Firme, as well as the guard squadron, on the return voyage from Havana to Spain in 1633.

Don Lope Díez de Armendáriz was famous not only for his long service in the Indies fleets, but for the overall trajectory of his career. Born in 1575 to noble Navarrese parents in Quito, Ecuador, he was brought to Spain at six years of age and raised for a career in the navy. He commanded the New Spain Fleet from 1606 to 1611, the Tierra Firme Fleet in 1614, and then the Guard Squadron intermittently from 1615 to 1633. King Felipe III named him the first Marquess of Cadereyta in 1617, and documents generally mentioned him only by that title thereafter, rather than by his name and surname. He also served on the king's Council of War. As the capstone of Cadereyta's career, King Felipe IV appointed him viceroy of New Spain in 1635, the first individual born in the Americas to hold that office and a rare distinction for a man who had made his career at sea. After serving as viceroy for five years, he returned to Spain, where he died in 1644.

Another captain general, Roque Centeno, began life at the lower end of Spain's social spectrum, but he ultimately achieved an impressive career on both land and sea. Beginning as a soldier in 1585, he continued to serve the crown for more than fifty years, participating in every major theater of war and displaying conspicuous bravery in countless battles. Like other ambitious soldiers, when serving in seaborne infantry units he also acquired a thorough knowledge of ships and the sea. The early seventeenth century saw the rise of a new officer in Spain's navy, the captain of sea and war (capitán de mar y guerra), and Roque Centeno's career proved that officers equally versed in naval and land commands were possible, as well as highly desirable. Such versatile officers were already common in several northern European countries, but they remained controversial in Spain, where soldiers held much higher social status than sailors. During debates in the Council of War, the Marquess of Cadereyta argued that officers equally proficient on land and sea should be the goal, but only if appropriate candidates could be found—obviously, candidates such as Roque Centeno. As a senior naval officer, Centeno's expert supervision of careening and repairs became legendary, and he was captain general of the Tierra Firme Fleet in 1627, as well as serving for many years in the Armada of the Ocean Sea. Moreover, when ministers in the royal government debated naval matters, they consulted Roque Centeno along with Don Fadrique de Toledo Osorio and very few others.

The global conflict known as the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648) pitted Catholic Spain as part of a Habsburg coalition against virtually every Protestant state in Europe, as well as Catholic France. As the primary naval power in the Habsburg coalition, Spanish naval forces were overextended. Necessity could lead the crown to harsh measures if a captain general failed in his primary duty to bring home tax revenues from the Indies. The most chilling example was provided by Don Juan de Benavides, who served as captain general of the New Spain Fleet three times between 1620 and 1628. His first two roundtrips in 1620–21 and 1623–24 were successful. Appointed captain general again in 1627, disaster struck in September of the following year, when the Dutch Admiral Piet Heyn and a war fleet of thirty-two ships blocked the Spaniards from entering the harbor at Havana—the first stage of their return to Spain. Without consulting his almirante or other senior officers, Benavides decided to take his eleven merchant ships and four galleons toward the port of Matanzas instead. In the uncharted shallows, they ran aground. Benavides ordered the fleet destroyed, primed explosives on his flagship, and went ashore. The Dutch nonetheless captured all fifteen ships and imprisoned the almirante, Juan de Leoz.

When news of the humiliating loss reached Spain, King Felipe IV was outraged. Although Benavides belonged to a prominent noble family and had a distinguished career before the disaster at Matanzas, he was imprisoned for five years while a case of negligence and dereliction of duty proceeded against him. In the end, he was publicly executed in Seville on May 18, 1634, for his own failings and as an example to others. With Spanish resources of money and manpower stretched beyond normal limits, any real or perceived lapse among those who served the crown could not be tolerated.

By the sheer luck of timing, Don Gerónimo Gómez de Sandoval escaped the fate of Benavides. Gómez had served as almirante on the New Spain Fleet in 1620 and 1623 and became captain general of that fleet in 1628–30. Unlike Benavides, however, Gómez de Sandoval did not encounter enemy vessels at sea. Instead, he and his fleet simply spent an extra year in New Spain after the disaster at Matanzas. Gómez went on to lead the Guard Squadron and received substantial gifts of income and Indian labor in Guatemala for his repeated success in delivering revenue to the crown.

Another successful commander was Don Carlos de Ibarra, who served as captain general of several fleets to the Indies from 1616 on, and later as the Marquess of Cadereyta's almirante in 1633. In 1630, however, the crown needed his services elsewhere. His replacement as captain general of the New Spain Fleet was Don Miguel de Echazarreta, a gentleman of the noble military order of Santiago—in other words, a member of the middle ranks of the Spanish nobility. Echazarreta

had been captain general of the Tierra Firme Fleet in 1620 and voiced his reluctance to leave the fleet where he had served for thirty years, but he had to accept the royal appointment. He swore his oath of office in Seville in April of 1630 and arranged a loan to pay for the preparation of the fleet, a common occurrence for captains general. He also posted a bond guaranteeing the faithful completion of his armada's round-trip voyage, which was standard practice. Fate intervened, however, when Echazarreta died in Veracruz before setting sail for Havana and the return to Spain. His almirante, Manuel Serrano y Rivera, replaced him as captain general and designated his own ship, *Santa Teresa*, as the fleet's flagship (*capitana*). Andrés de Aristizábal, a gentleman of the Order of Santiago like Echazarreta, replaced Serrano as second-in-command (almirante), with his ship *Nuestra Señora del Juncal* as *almiranta*. Both Serrano and Aristizábal died in the storm off Campeche at the end of October 1631, along with hundreds of others. The careful archaeological study of the wreck of *Nuestra Señora del Juncal* took several decades to complete by scholars and archaeologists from Mexico and Spain. Their collaboration provides an ideal example of international cooperation regarding shipwrecks.

The second-in-command of a Spanish fleet was chosen and sworn to office by the same process that selected the captain general. Most, if not all, of the men who became captains general previously served as almirantes on one or more fleets as an essential stage in their careers. The titles of both captain general and almirante referred to functions of command rather than to rank, however. An individual who had sailed as captain general of the New Spain Fleet might later sail as almirante of the more important Armada of the Ocean Sea. In other words, appointment as almirante of a higher-ranked fleet marked a promotion for someone who had previously served as captain general of a lesser fleet.

The personal qualities desired in an almirante differed little from those of the captain general, and both positions required the posting of bonds (*fianzas*) to guarantee faithful performance. The best almirantes would have spent their lives at sea, often passing through all the offices in the chain of command and gaining an expert knowledge of ships and their equipment and crews. That knowledge would enable the almirante to perform the inspection duties technically falling to the captain general but often delegated to his second-in-command. The almirante also arranged for the best sailors and gunners to serve on the two principal ship in the fleet—the *capitana* of the captain general and his own ship, the *almiranta*.

As a fleet left port, the almirante arranged the sailing order behind the *capitana* in the vanguard. Ideally, his *almiranta* remained in the rear guard for the duration of the voyage, although in practice the *almiranta*'s position varied. Wherever he sailed, the almirante would daily count the ships in the fleet, always alert that they stay close together for safety and to ensure that pirates and enemy

intruders were promptly identified and driven off. Twice a day he was to contact all the ships, receiving fresh orders from the captain general and spreading the next day's password—usually a saint's name—among the fleet. If any ship fell behind, the almirante was supposed to visit it by launch and help get it back on course, advising the captain general to halt the fleet and send further assistance to the straggler if necessary. Approaching any port, the almirante was to remain alert for enemy vessels and keep his own fleet in close order and ready for battle. If the captain general did not choose to establish his residence in port, the almirante did so instead, to supervise the unloading of merchant vessels. Perhaps the most important function of any almirante was to take command of the fleet immediately following the death or absence of the captain general for any reason. This happened with some frequency in the early seventeenth century. For example, Almirante Juan Pérez de Oportu twice replaced captains general for the return voyage of the New Spain Fleet, once in 1603 and again in 1605.

Although the Armada of the Ocean Sea was separate from the merchant fleets sailing to the Indies with their guard squadrons, on occasion contingents of that senior armada were assigned to escort the merchant fleets or sailed with them to conduct military missions in the Americas. To be appointed captain general of the Armada of the Ocean Sea was the highest position in Spain's naval hierarchy. Don Fadrique de Toledo Osorio achieved that position in 1618 in recognition of an already-stellar career serving the Spanish crown at sea. Born in Madrid in about 1580, his family belonged to the same exalted lineage that included the Duke of Alba. As a second son, it was natural that he would choose a military career, and he served with distinction in countless battles in the Mediterranean against pirates and Turkish and Berber corsairs based in North Africa. As captain general of the Armada of the Ocean Sea, he achieved notable victories against Dutch fleets in the Atlantic as well as the Mediterranean during the Netherlands' rebellion against Habsburg rule (1568–1648). Created Marquess of Villanueva de Valdueza in 1624, he ousted the Dutch from Bahia in northeastern Brazil in 1625.

His relationship with the central government was often stormy, however, in part because he complained about inadequate crews, money, and supplies for the navy, and in part because he shared the aristocracy's animosity toward Felipe IV's chief minister, Don Gaspar de Guzmán, Count-Duke of Olivares. Don Fadrique had many times ignored orders from Madrid that he disapproved of or had delayed following them. His repeated requests for additional resources for his fleet and his notable advocacy on behalf of the men in his command had done nothing to endear him to Olivares, and he had come close to open disobedience several times. Even worse, his military achievements and well-deserved honors seem to have provoked Olivares's jealousy.

Don Fadrique's difficulties with the government worsened shortly after his triumphant return from the Indies in 1630 with a small fleet that had ousted the English and French from the island of San Cristóbal in the Caribbean. While he was still aboard his ship in Cádiz Bay, he received orders to proceed directly to Lisbon to rejoin the Armada of the Ocean Sea, without rest or time to visit his home and deal with family business. Although he eventually received a brief official leave, he lingered in Madrid to manage a lawsuit and had to be ordered back to Lisbon. Matters approached a crisis in the fall of 1633, when Don Fadrique was ordered to prepare another expedition to Brazil. He protested that his health had been ruined in royal service and that he needed to deal with urgent family matters that had been neglected in his many years at sea. Though the Armada Committee (Junta de Armadas) urged abandoning plans to send a war fleet to Brazil in 1634 due to a lack of resources, Olivares persisted. In July, he and Don Fadrique had a heated argument overheard by several witnesses. Olivares refused Don Fadrique's request to be relieved from the expedition to Brazil because of his previous service, noting that he had received great financial rewards for that service. Deeply offended, Don Fadrique retorted, according to one witness, "Sir, I beg to differ. And even if it were true, I did it by risking life and limb, unlike Your Excellency, who, by sitting in a chair, makes more in a day that I have in a lifetime."[12]

As a result, the Council of Castile tried Don Fadrique for disobedience to royal orders and found him guilty, for which he was first placed under house arrest and then imprisoned in the fortress of Santa Olalla in Andalucía, which caused a public scandal. When he fell ill in early September, the council grudgingly allowed him to return to Madrid, but not to his own home or that of any prominent relative. Instead, he lodged in his secretary's modest home, forbidden any visitors but his wife and his doctors, while the Council of Castile decided on his ultimate punishment. As Don Fadrique's health continued to decline, the Duke of Alba and his son were ordered to leave Madrid in late October, presumably to thwart any organized resistance by the Alba clan.

Don Fadrique's official sentence on 12 November included exile from Castile for ten years, a fine of 10,000 ducats, and the withdrawal of all public honors, official positions, and financial benefits that he had hitherto enjoyed. Legend has it that when a contingent of the king's soldiers arrived to deliver the sentence, Don Fadrique's wife, Doña Elvira Ponce de León, stood in the doorway of the secretary's home and refused them entry. Such was her moral authority in that situation that the soldiers turned away and departed. Don Fadrique's rapidly failing health finally

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[12] Jonathan Brown and J. H. Elliott, *A Palace for a King: The Buen Retiro and the Court of Philip IV* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1980), p. 173.

persuaded the king to allow him to return home, where he died less than a month later, on December 11, 1634. Throngs of mourners paid their respects as he lay in state in his home, but the government forced the Jesuits to cancel the large funeral they had planned, presumably to avoid inflaming public opinion even more at the perceived injustice to Spain's celebrated naval hero. Even so, an impressive sampling of Spain's high aristocracy carried his body to the private ceremony in the Jesuit congregation's church, while crowds in the street chanted that the envy of a court favorite had effectively killed him.

A near contemporary of Don Fadrique's, who rose to serve as almirante general of the Armada of the Ocean Sea, also experienced several rotations of Fortuna's wheel. Don Antonio de Oquendo was born in 1577 in San Sebastián, the capital of Guipúzcoa in the Basque region of northern Spain. He followed his father Miguel de Oquendo into a life at sea, and his early appointment documents often mentioned his father's honorable service. At the age of sixteen, Don Antonio embarked on a Mediterranean galley squadron as a gentleman soldier for two years and was then posted to the Armada of the Ocean Sea in 1594. The armada was based in Lisbon in July 1604, when Oquendo was sent with two small vessels to hunt for an English corsair doing great damage along the Atlantic coasts of Spain and Portugal. He found the enemy in early August in the Gulf of Cádiz, and, despite being boarded by one hundred enemy soldiers, Oquendo's men were victorious and captured one of the corsair's two vessels. This last battle in the long war against England confirmed Oquendo's fame as a skilled military leader.

As war against the Dutch rebels continued, Oquendo received command of all the squadrons of the Armada of the Ocean Sea associated with Spain's northern coast. This combined Squadron of Cantabria patrolled to prevent Dutch attacks on northern ports and protected fleets returning from America. In addition, Oquendo served as captain general of the New Spain Fleet in 1611–12 and 1613–14. Despite a truce arranged with the Netherlands between 1609 and 1621, the predations of Dutch corsairs continued, adding to the regular hazards of the Atlantic crossing.

The truce with the Dutch ended in 1621, and in 1623 the Guard Squadron under Oquendo had to winter over in Havana following shipwrecks during his attempted return home. Oquendo's squadron finally returned to Spain in May of 1624, but he was punished severely for the layover, which cost the government money and disrupted the rhythm of the fleets. Although an inquiry found that he had acted prudently in the circumstances, he was stripped of his offices in the Indies fleets for four years and fined 12,000 ducats. In 1628, he waited in vain off the Azores with a contingent of the Armada of the Ocean Sea to escort Don Juan de Benavides and the New Spain Fleet on the last leg of their return journey. News of the disaster at Matanzas in September did not reach Iberia until early December. At that point,

Oquendo was allowed to return to his official position and assigned to relocate the Armada of the Ocean Sea from Lisbon to Cádiz, which became the principal staging area for fleets to the Indies. Oquendo oversaw the refitting of the armada as Don Fadrique de Toledo's almirante and sailed to the Indies with that armada in 1630 to confront Spain's enemies. In the aftermath of Matanzas and the deadly storm of 1631, the regular rhythm of the Indies fleets would be revised, with layovers for the Guard Squadron so that both Indies fleets could be escorted home with increased safety. Although such changes were necessary, they required supplying more ships simultaneously and sending them to the Indies with additional supplies for the layover—an enormous logistical strain.

Oquendo served with distinction as Don Fadrique de Toledo's almirante during the armada's successful battles in the Caribbean in 1629 and 1630. No sooner had they returned to Cádiz than Oquendo took a small contingent to Lisbon to prepare for the return of the whole armada from Cádiz. By then a member of the Council of War, Oquendo would also cobble together a fleet of twenty-six ships to confront the Dutch in Brazil, leaving Lisbon in May 1631. For Oquendo, the 1631 fleet would result in triumph. He defeated a superior Dutch force in a fierce battle at sea on September 12, reinforced the defenses of Bahia, Pernambuco, and Paraíba, and escorted Portuguese ships laden with sugar into safe waters. Though the Dutch would not be completely driven from Brazil for two more decades, Oquendo's efforts during those critical years were nonetheless impressive and merited a hand-written note of praise from King Felipe IV. As Fortuna's wheel continued to turn, Oquendo was arrested for fighting a duel in 1636 and was then ordered to incorporate his contingent of vessels into the squadron of Naples. Three years later, the king made him a viscount.

In August 1639, at the height of the Thirty Years' War, Oquendo joined a contingent sent north to confront the French and Dutch. After a three-day battle in mid-September, he took refuge in a roadstead on the English coast to hastily repair his ships, then went to sea again a month later to meet the enemy. The Dutch under Admiral Maarten Tromp won the subsequent Battle of the Downs, with the Spaniards losing perhaps thirty-three of their forty-seven ships. Through superhuman efforts, Oquendo and his crew were able to reach the port of Mardick, though his flagship had sustained some 1,700 hits. Despite their defeat, they had been able to bring reinforcements and funds to the Spanish army in Flanders. When Admiral Tromp was criticized for failing to capture Oquendo, he supposedly replied that with Oquendo in command, the Spanish flagship was invincible. Oquendo was nonetheless broken in spirit and looked forward to nothing more than death. He suffered a high fever for forty days and never fully recovered. Nonetheless, when he reached the Spanish coast, he insisted on proceeding to La Coruña, as his orders

demanded, rather than going ashore to seek medical help. He died in La Coruña on June 7, 1640.

Oquendo's death, like the fate of Don Juan de Benavides, Don Fadrique de Toledo Osorio, and so many others, illustrated the perils of serving the Spanish crown at sea during the near-constant warfare of the early seventeenth century, whether that service led to success or failure. In just over a decade—from 1631 to 1641—Spain lost virtually its entire senior naval officer corps, including several whose histories appear above: Tomás de Larráspuru (1632); Fadrique de Toledo Osorio and Juan de Benavides (1634); Martín de Vallecilla (1635); Lope de Hoces (1639); Antonio de Oquendo (1640); and Carlos de Ibarra and Roque Centeno (1641). In the end, no amount of personal sacrifice or administrative talent could sustain Spanish naval power in Europe. The odds against it were too great. Yet by using every possible resource, Spain was able to hang onto a great deal and to keep other European powers out of the heart of Spanish America. The Dutch, the English, and the French were driven to the fringes of Spain's American empire in the early seventeenth century, a status that would change little in the centuries that followed. Moreover, the struggles of the early seventeenth century reinforced the importance of sea power to sustain Spain's position in the world.

SISTER MARÍA DE JESÚS OF ÁGREDA AND PHILIP IV

Not surprisingly, the turning of Fortuna's wheel affected kings as well as commoners. In the context of the Habsburg dynasty in Spain, Carlos I presided over the rapid development of the Spanish Empire in the wider world. At the same time, as Karl V of the Holy Roman Empire, he could not prevent the shattering of the Christian community in Europe. His younger brother, raised in Spain, presided over the Holy Roman Empire as Ferdinand I and had to make his peace with the many Protestant components of that empire. Felipe II of Spain ruled for the last half of the sixteenth century as the Spanish Empire continued to grow. Nonetheless, his reign included the outbreak of rebellion against Habsburg rule in the largely Protestant Northern Netherlands in 1568 and growing hostility with England that evolved into more or less open warfare by 1585 and lasted until 1604. Those two conflicts dominated the rest of Felipe II's reign, consuming a goodly portion of the revenues generated by the empire in the Americas. During the reign of Felipe III in the first two decades of the seventeenth century, although Spain fought no major wars, the economy entered into a depression lasting for decades.

When Felipe IV ascended the throne in 1621, many observers still considered Spain the most powerful country in Europe, but that power would all but collapse during his reign. As we have seen, the navy would lose virtually all its distinguished leaders in the Thirty Years' War (1618–48), and the famous Spanish armies would

also experience bitter defeats. When money and supplies fell short of wartime needs, loyal and ambitious men would be pushed to accomplish impossible tasks with inadequate support. If they balked or failed, often through no fault of their own, the penalties would be harsh. Yet the king himself could not escape blame altogether. Though Fortuna's wheel would continue to turn, many people at the time believed that the inevitable downward slide could be postponed with sufficient will and strength of character. Felipe IV notably lacked both qualities. From his youth, he had allowed himself to be dominated by Olivares, who supposedly facilitated the prince's notorious womanizing, even after his marriage in 1615. When he became king after his father's unexpectedly short reign, Felipe IV seemed content to allow Olivares, known as the king's *valido* or favorite, to be the dominant voice in government policy. In the critical period of the Thirty Years' War, however, Spain needed a king who would rule as well as reign.

King Felipe's first queen, the Bourbon princess, Isabel of France, had a much stronger character than her husband, and Olivares seems to have taken care to blunt any influence she may have tried to exert over her husband. As a result, she became Olivares's enemy. When both Catalonia and Portugal rebelled against the crown in 1640, Queen Isabel was the obvious choice to serve as regent in the king's absences from Madrid. Because of her astute performance in that role, her influence grew, especially because Olivares's policies were a major cause of the Catalonian revolt. In the growing crisis precipitated by war and rebellion, Olivares resigned in January 1643, arguably influenced by opposition from the queen and several other prominent women close to the court.

After Olivares fell from power, the queen continued to advise her husband and served again as regent later in 1643. In July of that year, the king paid a visit to a cloistered nun in the small town of Ágreda in Soria. María de Jesús, the name she had chosen as a professed Franciscan, had gained fame for her piety and sound judgment and maintained regular correspondence with a wide range of important people. Her meeting with the king was the start of an unlikely relationship between a king who had fathered several dozen bastards and a chaste and pious nun. Their correspondence would last without interruption for twenty-two years, from their meeting in 1643 until 1665, the year that both of them died. Queen Isabel, who died in 1644, was also a great admirer of the pious nun. After the queen's death, Sister María continued to counsel the king, especially since his second wife, Mariana of Austria, lacked sufficient gravity and intelligence to help her husband.

Sister María de Jesús began life as María Coronel y Arana in Ágreda (Soria) in 1602. Even given Spain's strong ties to Roman Catholicism, María's family was extraordinarily pious. As she wrote later, her mother persuaded the whole family to enter the religious life. When María was sixteen, she, her mother, and her sister

turned their home in Ágreda into a monastery of Descalced Conceptionist Franciscans. At the same time, María's father entered a Franciscan convent in another town as a lay brother, and her two brothers also became Franciscans. María was soon known for mystical visions both religious and political, possibly resulting from the harsh ascetic practices that undermined her health, and she wrote about her visions as well as writing numerous pious tracts and carrying on correspondence. Reports of her visions attracted the attention of the Spanish Inquisition, always worried about heresy, but her answers to all questions satisfied the inquisitors that none of her writings or beliefs deviated from the tenets of the faith.

Though Sister María's correspondence with King Felipe IV had political implications, it was similarly circumspect and astute. The king had become convinced that the trials afflicting Spain, from economic distress to rebellion and continual warfare, were God's punishment for his own sins. Sister María counseled the king that to please God he should take the responsibility of governing into his own hands, rather than relying too heavily on any chief minister or favorite. Olivares's replacement, Don Luis de Haro, though necessary to keep the complex machinery of government running, never had the power or the influence that Olivares had enjoyed, presumably in part because of Sister Maria's advice. She also urged the king to seek peace with Christian states, even as war with France, the Netherlands, Catalonia, and Portugal continued, and to respect the historic rights and privileges of the various kingdoms and territories that formed part of the composite Spanish monarchy. However reluctantly, King Felipe acknowledged the independence of the Netherlands in 1648, made peace with France in 1659, and accepted the independence of Portugal in 1660. Although it is not clear how much Sister María's encouragement and admonitions influenced the king, her consistent and well-reasoned advice provided him with a moral anchor in desperate times. In short, there is no doubt that she functioned as the conscience of the king.

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The life histories of the individuals discussed in this chapter spanned nearly the whole of the Habsburg period in Spain and Portugal. All the secular individuals saw royal service as their best chance for personal advancement with honor, and successive Habsburg kings relied on their loyalty and service to increase the territories, wealth, and vassals that were part of Spain's composite monarchy. Some of the individuals succeeded and earned rewards for their service, at least for as long as their success continued. Others found that their royal patron could easily turn against them when they failed. They all learned, in short, that Fortuna was a fickle arbiter of human destiny, and the inexorable turning of her wheel might be slowed, but it could not be stopped or reversed.

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Chapter 5
TRADE, CONTRABAND, AND GUN-TOTING ANGELS

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ORGANIZING TRANSATLANTIC TRADE

Several aspects of Spain's economic development would prove particularly useful in establishing and maintaining regular trade with the Americas.[13] The most obvious aspects were organizations of merchants and mariners to settle disputes; a body of commercial law and maritime insurance; a tradition of shipbuilding and seafaring skills; experience with war and piracy in a commercial context; large ports such as Seville that could handle virtually every aspect of seaborne trade; a tradition of financing long-distance voyages; and linkages to the international banking community. Although Indigenous people in the Americas had gold and systems of exchange, their commercial arrangements had little in common with the sophisticated trading networks of Asia, Europe, or Africa. To trade profitably with the New World, Castilians would have to organize a commercial infrastructure.

Mercantile concerns were central to the Spanish empire from its beginnings, although they were often overshadowed by further exploration and conquest in the early decades. Columbus focused on the possibilities for trade in his early letters about the islands where he landed, and a list of prices survives for dozens of goods in the market on Hispaniola in 1503. Financial backing primarily from Spain for trading voyages lasted only through the first fifteen years of the empire. As early as 1506, profits made in Cuba were being used to finance voyages elsewhere.

Foreigners were legally excluded from direct trade with Spanish America. Instead, they had to conduct their business through the port of Seville. Although merchants generally preferred to arrange their own transport, it soon became clear that an organized system of convoys was the best way to protect shipping across the Atlantic. As mentioned briefly in a previous chapter, by the 1520s, nearly one hundred ships sailed for America from Spain each year, with about 9,000 *toneladas* of carrying capacity, each tonelada representing some 1.42 cubic meters of space. By the 1540s, one fleet each year sailed for the Indies, dividing into two parts in the

[13] This chapter contains excerpts from my essay, "The Growth and Composition of Trade in the Iberian Empires, 1450–1750," pp. 34–101, in *The Rise of Merchant Empires,* vol. 1, ed. James Tracy (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). Copyright Cambridge University Press, 1990; excerpted with permission of the Licensor through PLSclear.

Caribbean. One part sailed on to New Spain and the other to Tierra Firme and Panama. Later, as mentioned in an earlier chapter, separate fleets served the two destinations in a system of regular merchant convoys accompanied by armed vessels to protect the merchant ships from pirates and attacks by enemy vessels in wartime. By the late sixteenth century, an average of 150–200 ships participated in the Indies trade each year, with a total capacity of about 30,000–40,000 *toneladas*—some 200 *toneladas* per ship. In other words, the number of ships had doubled since the 1520s, and their average size had also doubled, leading to a fourfold increase in carrying capacity for the transatlantic trade, known overall as the Carrera de Indias.

In the first several decades of conquest and colonization, Indigenous populations in the Americas declined drastically from Old World diseases, wars of conquest, and exploitation. Eventually, however, losses gave way to growth, fueled by natural increase and by immigration, which led to increasing demand in the marketplace. Transatlantic trade was fed by production in both Europe and the Americas. For example, livestock introduced from Europe multiplied easily in the Americas, which had few domestic animals, and no cattle, horses, or pigs before Spaniards brought them across the Atlantic. Soon hides and tallow became major exports from the Americas, along with other natural products, including dyestuffs such as indigo and cochineal and a wide range of aromatic and medicinal plants, either native to the Americas or introduced there for export. In exchange, a wide variety of European manufactured goods, especially textiles, arrived in the Americas.

The most valuable as well as the most famous items from the Indies were not traditional trade goods, however, but the gold, silver, pearls, and precious stones that constituted the 'treasure' of the Spanish empire. Originally based on plunder from the Caribbean islands and the conquest of the Aztec and Inca empires, gold dominated treasure exports during the early sixteenth century. Pierre Chaunu estimated that 23,000–27,000 kilograms of gold were shipped to Spain before about 1525, and several important gold fields were discovered in northern South America in the 1530s and 1540s, which attracted investors to organize mines and panning operations. Most of the labor for those operations was supplied by Indigenous peoples, some voluntarily for wages but the majority coerced through grants of labor given to conquistadors and others by the crown. Total gold production has been estimated at close to 23,000 kilograms for the early 1530s, and about 10,500 kilograms for the early 1540s, much of which remained in the Americas to fuel the growing economies. Registered exports of gold reached a peak of more than 4,200 kilograms per year in the 1550s but fell to less than 1,000 kilograms per year by the end of the century. The impact of New World gold on the Spanish and international economies is still the subject of much debate, but it undoubtedly contributed to the European price rise and economic boom of the sixteenth century.

Even more important, enormous deposits of silver were found in 1545 at Potosí in the Viceroyalty of Peru (present-day Bolivia), far exceeding gold in both volume and value. The Potosí mines proved to be among the richest the world has ever known, producing nearly 85,000 kilograms of silver each year during the late 1540s and increasing thereafter. Much of the silver that was mined at Potosí remained in the growing American economies, but exports were nonetheless impressive. Annual silver exports surged to 94,000 kilograms in the 1560s, 112,000 in the 1570s, and 271,000 in the 1590s. About 20–30 percent of the registered treasure that crossed the Atlantic belonged to the Spanish crown, primarily from a tax called the 'royal fifth' on both gold and silver, but also from fees for assay and coinage, the royal share of ecclesiastical taxes, penalties and condemnations for smuggling, the sale of offices, and miscellaneous taxes. In all, the royal share of treasure sent from the Indies in the late sixteenth century came to about 24,000 million *maravedís*. The rest of the treasure belonged to merchants and other private individuals, largely as profits from trade, mining, and other economic ventures. Merchants and other private individuals registered about 55,000 million *maravedís* for shipment to Spain in the late sixteenth century, plus an unknown amount of unregistered valuables as contraband. One careful scholarly study estimated that about 10 percent of the treasure that arrived in Europe never appeared in the registers, which seems plausible for the late sixteenth century. However, unregistered shipments could vary greatly from year to year, and estimates range as high as 50 percent in some years.

Sometime around the end of the sixteenth century the first expansionary cycle of transatlantic trade approached an end. The reasons were arguably related to crises of production, credit, and banking in the European economy, as well as disruptions to trade in wartime. Because other European powers had ambitions of their own to trade with the Americas and to explore, claim, and colonize areas overseas, every conflict within Europe also had a global dimension. When warfare hindered official trade across the Atlantic, smugglers and contraband traders moved in to satisfy market demand. Many merchants in Europe and the Americas were involved in contraband as well as legal trade, and they relied on the Spanish government to protect the fleets that carried their legal merchandise. However, neither smugglers nor contrabandists paid taxes on the merchandise they shipped, which reduced the funds available to protect the official fleets. That ironic situation formed the background to Spain's transatlantic trade during the Habsburg centuries.

Some studies suggest that merchants born in Spain (known as *peninsulares*) dominated transatlantic trade for much of the Habsburg period. Others have argued that ethnic Spaniards who were born in the Indies (Creoles or *Criollos*) gained the ascendancy in transatlantic trade during the seventeenth century, and that other Creole merchants played a pivotal role in the development of the American

economies. They often dominated local government through service on municipal councils; bought land and installed their sons in agriculture or mining to manage production for the international market; and found marriage partners for their daughters among newly arrived peninsular merchants, thus incorporating them into the local elite. The likely reality is that peninsular and Creole merchants formed a combined elite that also included miners and landowners, many of whom were also prominent politically. Though the economic elite in Spanish America may often have chafed at regulations from Spain, their commercial and familial ties with the peninsula remained close, and many Creole merchants as well as *peninsulares* were affiliated with commercial houses in Seville, Cádiz, Lisbon, and other cities in Iberia.

Scholars continue to debate the causes, timing, and effects of the so-called crisis of the seventeenth century and the extent to which the economic developments in Spain and America were linked. The fairs at Portobello on the Isthmus of Panama, having come to life during the final spurt of sixteenth-century growth, persisted into the seventeenth century, but at a much-reduced level, and the convoy system that had served the empire well in the sixteenth century almost ceased. In the late 1620s, there were still nearly 120 ships per year in the Indies trade, but the number fell to fewer than 75 ships in the 1640s and only 30 to 35 ships from the late 1650s to the late 1660s. Likely causes for the drastic decline include decreased mining production in the Americas, a crisis in European agriculture or manufacturing (or both), population declines on both sides of the Atlantic, or a host of other potential causes, some of which were discussed in an earlier chapter.

Responding to the reduction in transatlantic trade, there is evidence that the New World economies turned inward, producing some of the goods they had formerly imported and relying on local and interregional trade to distribute those goods. Smuggled and contraband items regularly seeped into American markets as well, especially when official fleets regulated by the House of Trade were delayed or cancelled. Despite attempts by the Spanish government to discourage interregional trade, Buenos Aires became an important entry point for illegal shipments across the Andes to and from Peru, using a network of roads that was largely in place by 1630. The Dutch were particularly active in the clandestine trade through Buenos Aires between 1650 and 1675. The total volume of merchandise shipped across the Atlantic began to show renewed growth after 1660, in a trade that was handled increasingly by foreign ships. Silver production in the Indies also began to recover after 1660, though the official shipments of silver to Spain remained low, in part due to the smuggling of unregistered treasure and also because more silver was absorbed by economies in the Americas.

TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND DAILY LIFE

Although statistics about transatlantic trade are undoubtedly important, they say very little about how that trade affected people's lives.[14] Alfred Crosby studied how a few New World plants—maize and potatoes, for example—affected the Old World, and how a few Old-World animals—horses and cattle, for example—had profound effects on peoples' lives in the New World. With few exceptions, however, the 'Columbian Exchange' of plants and animals, as Crosby dubbed it, had little to do with trade. Among the notable exceptions were wine, cacao, tobacco, and cattle hides.

Wine

Wine was commonly consumed by all levels of Spanish society. The novels of Miguel de Cervantes and paintings by Diego Velázquez and Juan Sanchez Cotán, among others, provide vivid reminders of the association between wine-drinking and Spanish daily life. It was natural that Spaniards in the Americas would want to have wine available, but vineyards could not thrive in all regions, and the crown restricted the implantation of vineyards to shield the wine-producing areas of Spain from serious competition. Wine therefore continued to be an important export from Spain to America, but it cost too much to be affordable by all social classes. As a result, the importation of Spanish wine had some interesting and unexpected social consequences in the Americas.

The strong white wines of Andalucía formed an essential part of the caloric content of sailors' rations on Spanish ships and were provided to them as part of their compensation as workers. In effect, by signing onto a crew, sailors acquired the future ownership of their daily rations. Because of the limited supply of Spanish wine in America, the sailors' rations of wine were an important asset. So, contrary to what we might expect, many Spanish sailors drank water or diluted wine with their shipboard meals and conserved at least some of their wine ration for sale in the Americas. They might simply trust the steward (dispensero) to keep an account of how much wine was owed to them, or they might enter into a formal contract with a merchant or consignment agent to take responsibility for, and later sell, the wine for them in America.

Some imported wine was destined for sacramental uses in Spanish America, as a part of the Roman Catholic mass. In addition, some priests and monks set lavish

[14] Part of the following discussion first appeared in Spanish in my essay, "Mercado, modas y gustos: las cargazones de ida y vuelta," pp. 187–202, *España y América. Un océano de negocios: Quinto Centenario de la Casa de la Contratación, 1503-2003*, exhibition catalog for the House of Trade's 500th anniversary, coord. Guiomar de Carlos Boutet (Madrid, 2003), available online in the Open Library of the Internet Archive.

tables that included imported wine and spirits. Although the English Dominican, Thomas Gage, later wrote disapprovingly of such unseemly luxury among men who had taken vows of poverty, he clearly enjoyed their hospitality during the twelve years he spent in Mexico and Guatemala in the early seventeenth century. Members of the elite also purchased wine at premium prices for their households. By contrast, it would have been impossible for the middle and lower classes in colonial society to replicate the Spanish pattern of daily wine consumption. Instead, in New Spain at least, people habitually drank water with meals, and if they consumed any alcoholic beverages they did so only after the meal, with dessert or as a dedicated pastime.

This behavior echoed customs in the time of the Aztecs, when the consumption of alcoholic beverages in great quantities was associated with religious festivals. The sap of a type of aloe plant (*maguey*) could easily be fermented into alcoholic drinks of varying strength, the most popular of which was called *pulque*. Ordinary people also brewed and drank *chicha* or corn beer. With the consolidation of Spanish colonial society, many Spaniards and Creoles adopted local alcoholic drinks if they could not afford imported wine. Over time, public *pulque* bars (*pulquerías*) evolved from being frequented only by people of low social status into places that attracted every level of society. In other words, the crown's prohibition on planting vineyards and the trade in wine as a precious commodity eventually led to the adoption of norms of public drinking behavior that differed considerably from common practice in Spain.

Cacao and its flavorings

Cacao, the main ingredient in chocolate, also became an important item in transatlantic trade, and its popularity had important repercussions for the evolution of social customs on both sides of the Atlantic. Long before the arrival of Spaniards in the Americas, the drinking of chocolate played an important role in the life of the Aztecs; the emperor Moctezuma reportedly drank chocolate several times a day. The Italian writer Girolamo Benzoni described cacao in considerable detail in 1565 as a perfect example of the exotic products from the New World. However, unlike other exotic American plants that were naturalized in Europe, cacao cultivation remained largely in the Americas in the early modern period. The most important reason was that the cacao tree requires very specific growing conditions—warm and humid, but sheltered from direct sunlight, which kills the plant. Cacao trees flourished in warm, humid areas from southwestern Mexico to Venezuela, and, although they would later be introduced into similar climatic niches in Africa, Asia, and even the Canary Islands, there is almost nowhere in Europe where cacao can be easily grown. As a consequence, when chocolate became a fashionable drink on both sides of the Atlantic, cacao also became a major export item from New Spain. Luis de Velasco, Viceroy of

New Spain at the end of the sixteenth century, noted that cacao had become so important that the coastal area of present-day El Salvador produced almost nothing else.

Thomas Gage developed a great fondness for chocolate and mentions it often in the famous memoir he wrote in 1648. Gage criticized the ignorance of English and Dutch privateers, who often threw the valuable cargo overboard when they captured a cacao ship. Gage abandoned his priestly duties in 1637 and sneaked back to England, where he later betrayed his Catholic family and friends to ingratiate himself with radical Protestants. His memoir became one of the foundation documents in the 'black legend' (*leyenda negra*) about Spain and its empire, but Gage never lost his enthusiasm for chocolate, which eventually became well known if not especially popular in England. The Spanish princess María Teresa, daughter of Felipe IV, took her fondness for chocolate to France when she married King Louis XIV, and chocolate later became fashionable at the French court, although never as popular as it was in Spain. Eventually, chocolate generated enough demand in Europe to assure a permanent place for cacao in the transatlantic trade.

Tastes regarding how to drink chocolate differed markedly on opposite sides of the Atlantic. Mesoamerican people flavored their cacao with vanilla, honey, and certain kinds of chili peppers, among other ingredients. Even today, the combination of cacao and chili peppers lives on in the classic *molé* sauce of Mexican cuisine. In colonial times, a typical breakfast for ordinary people in Mexico and Guatemala would include a cup of chocolate, or a mixture of chocolate and corn broth (*atole*), which made the drink cheaper and, from a modern point of view, more nutritious.

Spaniards and Creoles in the Americas, and Spaniards and other people in Europe, adopted a different range of flavors for their chocolate. Very early on, Spaniards seem to have decided that they preferred flavorings such as cinnamon rather than chili peppers. Moreover, Spaniards and Creoles generally avoided the use of vanilla as a flavoring, because Spanish physicians defined vanilla as harmful to the nerves. Northern Europeans, on the other hand, became very fond of vanilla as a flavoring, not only for chocolate but for all sorts of sweets. Vanilla therefore became an important export from New Spain, despite Spanish disdain for it. Because Spaniards and Creoles flavored their chocolate with cinnamon—the aromatic bark of a tree native to South Asia—cinnamon became a frequent and lucrative European export to America after its arrival from Asia. We will probably never know who first combined Asian cinnamon with American cacao. Nor will we likely know who first sweetened chocolate with sugar refined from sugarcane, a plant that probably originated in South Asia and was later grown on plantations in the Atlantic islands and the Americas. Nonetheless, those preferences in flavorings for chocolate added to the market for sugar and cinnamon in Europe and America. A cup of cinnamon-

flavored chocolate, thickened with corn flour and sweetened with sugar, provides a perfect example of early globalization, involving a complex network of production and trade that extended all over the world and converged on breakfast tables on both sides of the Atlantic.

The popularity of chocolate among fashionable ladies in Mexico and Guatemala had notable social, religious, and sometimes fatal consequences. When Thomas Gage was residing in Chiapa Real, he noted the following:

> The women of that city it seems pretend much weakness and squeamishness of stomach, which they say is so great that they are not able to continue in the church while a Mass is briefly huddled over, much less while a solemn high Mass (as they call it) is sung and a sermon preached, unless they drink a cup of hot chocolate, and eat a bit of sweetmeats to strengthen their stomachs. For this purpose it was much used by them to make their maids bring to them to church in the middle of Mass or sermon a cup of chocolate, which could not be done to all or most of them without a great confusion and interrupting both Mass and sermon.[15]

To put a stop to the unseemly disruptions, the local bishop forbade the drinking of chocolate in church, which created a great uproar among the social elite. Gage was drawn into the dispute to try to persuade the bishop to rescind the prohibition, but the bishop refused. While his female antagonists boycotted church services, the bishop fell mortally ill after drinking a cup of chocolate. As he lay dying, his doctors and everyone else close to him—including Gage—believed that he had been poisoned. The likely culprit, according to Gage, was a well-born woman whom he knew well. Gage used the story to criticize all female members of the elite in Chiapa Real, who he suggested would arrange the death of anyone who opposed them. Whether or not the story is credible, there is no question that chocolate was an indispensable part of social and dietary customs in both Old and New Spain.

Tobacco

Another product of the Americas that became important in transatlantic trade was tobacco. As early as the voyages of Columbus, Europeans had observed Indigenous inhabitants of the Caribbean smoking rolled tobacco leaves, and the Aztec elite also favored its use. Before long, Europeans established large-scale tobacco plantations in the Americas, primarily on the islands of Cuba and Santo Domingo, as well as in Venezuela. Spaniards, Creoles, and mixed-race individuals from all social

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[15] Thomas Gage, (c. 1603-1656), *The English-American his travail by sea and land: or, A new survey of the West-India's* (London, 1648), pp. 102-103.

levels used tobacco in one form or another in colonial Mexico: chewed raw; sniffed in pulverized form; smoked with leaves rolled into cigars (*cigarros* or *puros*); chopped and stuffed into the bowls of pipes; or shredded and rolled within small pieces of paper in what came to be called cigarettes (*cigarros de papel* or *cigarillos*).

In Europe, tobacco first took hold in Spain and Italy, and later in northern countries, initially among the elite and later as an article of mass consumption. Many paintings of daily life in the seventeenth century and later show companionable scenes of European men relaxing and smoking after a meal; drinking and smoking in taverns; or smoking, drinking, playing cards, and consorting with disreputable females, all at the same time—a visual catalog of popular vices. The widespread use of tobacco in the Americas helped to blur social distinctions. By adopting pastimes enjoyed by the elite, ordinary people might forget for a moment the gulf that divided them from more privileged and powerful members of society. In the same way, women and children could use tobacco to flout the restrictions of a society dominated by adult males, a practice that attracted the disapproval of foreign visitors. Though some women in Europe also smoked, it is fair to say that the habit was not socially acceptable to the extent that it was in America. Overall, the Carrera de Indias played an important role in transforming tobacco into an article of mass consumption in Europe as well as America.

Hides

Another important export item from the Americas related to daily life was animal hide, especially hides from the cattle that spread prolifically wherever Spaniards introduced them. Cattle became so plentiful and inexpensive in some areas that the hide was the only part of the animal that had any commercial value. The export of hides involved virtually every area in Spanish America: the Caribbean islands, Tierra Firme, and, above all, New Spain. In Europe the hides were used for furniture, wall coverings, carriage springs, saddlery, and a host of other uses, in addition to articles of clothing and footwear.

TRADE GOODS RELATED TO LEISURE PASTIMES

Reading played an important role among leisure pastimes, both for those who could read and for those who could only listen. Many—perhaps most—of the books shipped from Spain to America related to religious beliefs and rituals. During the sixteenth century, some of the most popular books taken to America included the works of Friar Luis de Granada and others on prayer and meditation, histories of the popes, and lives of the saints. Other books of a decidedly secular nature also found

their way to America, either legally or clandestinely, escaping the censors of the Inquisition. The chivalric tales that inspired the first generation of conquistadors continued to capture the imagination of Spanish colonial society. During the sixteenth century, the most popular secular books were romances and tales of adventure—the more lurid the better. Ludovico Ariosto's *Orlando Furioso* was a particular favorite, as well as the anonymous *Amadis de Gaula*, and Alonso de Ercilla's epic poem, *La Araucana*, about a famed chieftain in southern South America. Books published in Spanish America filled a considerable part of the demand for reading material. Spaniards established printing presses in all their administrative districts during the colonial period. Nonetheless, books imported from Europe, both openly and otherwise, allowed the intellectual elite in the colonies to keep up with the latest trends in Europe.

Those who could write as well as read created demand for several other important items in the trade between Spain and America, most notably paper. From 1637 on, the Spanish government produced paper printed with the year and the amount it was taxed, requiring that official documents be written only on this stamped paper (*papel sellado*). Spain's colonial bureaucracy generated an impressive output of official documents: testimonies, reports, correspondence, tax rolls, and the like. Public notaries produced documents for land sales, wills, legal briefs, and an array of other private transactions that needed a notary's certification to be legally valid. Merchants, clerics, and ordinary citizens produced their own characteristic documents, and the publishing industry in Spanish America also needed a steady and growing supply of paper, all of which was imported from Europe.

Other leisure activities extended much farther down the social scale than did reading and writing. As noted above, the drinking of alcoholic beverages in the Americas seems to have been largely separate from dining and can therefore be considered as a leisure activity that involved all social classes. Gambling of various sorts enjoyed great popularity in Europe and was carried to the Americas by the Carrera de Indias. Games played with decks of cards (*naipes*) imported from Spain were especially popular; Cortés's men carried playing cards with them in their first foray into Mexico. Throughout the colonial period, the latest popular card games in Europe spread rapidly to the Americas, and the Spanish government established a monopoly on the printing, sale, and export of playing cards. Thomas Gage was scandalized to see friars and well-born ladies indulging in gambling, and the pastime seems to have been extremely widespread at all social levels. As with other controlled or prohibited items, contraband or counterfeit playing cards provided a cheap alternative to the official decks. Wherever the cards originated, dishonest players could always find ways to cheat, marking the cards before a game, or using other means to fool unwary opponents.

Although warfare and other forms of armed violence were not precisely leisure pastimes, they represented a departure from the ordinary routines of working lives. Swords and sword-hilts, knives, pikes, pistols, muskets, harquebuses, and other weaponry, plus breastplates, helmets, and other protective gear were all exported from Europe to the Americas. When a sword finished its working life, it might be transformed into another sort of weapon or tool by people who lived in an area that produced little metal. Or it might be melted down and combined with other metals to produce new objects, including the metal letters (*caracteres de imprenta*) used in the printing industry.

TRADE GOODS FOR CLOTHING AND FURNISHINGS

Trade goods related to tastes in fashion and furnishings also played an important role in daily life on both sides of the Atlantic. For example, the fashion for extremely high boots and leather vests, jerkins, and other clothing during the Habsburg centuries presumably related to the ready availability of cheap hides from Spanish America. Along with items such as pearls, precious stones, and worked gold and silver that found their way into fashion and furnishings, America shipped raw materials such as dyestuffs, cotton, and exotic woods in addition to hides. European craftsmen prized tropical hardwoods from the Americas for use in the furniture industry, especially for the exquisite marquetry that became fashionable in the seventeenth century. Mexico and Colombia also held rich deposits of fossilized resin known as *copal*, the key ingredient in durable varnishes for furniture and fine paintings. *Copal* could also be burned as incense, which added to its value in European markets.

Trade items related to clothing illustrate the intricate relationships that characterized the Carrera de Indias. Among American dyestuffs, the most important was cochineal (*Coccus cacti*) from New Spain—tiny insects that fed on cactus plants. Painstakingly nurtured, collected, dried, and processed into a brilliant crimson dye, cochineal was highly prized in Mexico long before the Spaniards arrived. The finest sort of cochineal (*grana fina*) came from the female of the species, and its production became a major source of peasant credit and income. Although exports from the Indies are difficult to quantify, especially in the early decades, cochineal alone may have accounted for more than forty percent of the total value of exports by the late sixteenth century.

New Spain also exported huge quantities of the blue ink and dyestuff known as indigo (*tinta añil*). Europeans had produced blue dye for centuries from the plants known as woad (*Isatis tinctoria*) and dyers' knotweed (*Polygonum tinctorum*). The tropical indigo plants native to Asia (*Indigofera tinctoria*) and the Americas

(*indigofera suffructiosa*) yielded much more dye, however, and Spaniards established plantations of the latter variety in the humid parts of New Spain. As with cochineal, the production of dye from New World indigo provided income and profits for growers, small farmers, and merchants in America and a new source of dye for the textile industries of Europe. Unfortunately, the importation of Mexican indigo threatened jobs in the woad-producing areas of Europe, which led officials in France and parts of the Germanies to prohibit imports of Mexican indigo in the sixteenth century. Even so, indigo exports from Mexico nearly equaled those of cochineal in both weight and value in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.

The Americas also produced three types of dyewoods that became important trade items in the Carrera de Indias: brazilwood (*Caesalpinia echinata*), for which Portuguese Brazil was named; *palo de Campeche* (*Haematoxylum campechianum*), abundant in the Yucatán and traditionally shipped out of the port of Campeche; and *palo de brasil* (*Haematoxylum brasiletto*). The first two varieties of tree grew only in the tropics, but the third flourished in a wide variety of growing conditions, from hillsides in dry areas such as Sonora and Chihuahua to dry forests from Oaxaca to Colombia. The heartwood of these trees produced red tinctures that could be used for dyes and ink in European industries. Like cochineal and indigo, dyewoods from Spanish America posed a threat to traditional dye industries in Europe, and many countries prohibited their importation. Nonetheless, they found their way into the prohibited markets one way or another.

Trade goods shipped from Europe to America for religious purposes included fine cloth for vestments and religious habits as well as for altar coverings and wall-hangings, rosaries, incense, almsboxes (*bacinillas*), and other items used for services or festivals. Religious articles shipped from the Americas back to Spain included finely worked chalices, monstrances, reliquaries, lamps, and other objects of silver and gilded silver, produced for export by skilled craftsmen in Mexico and Peru. Many examples of their fine work can still be seen in the treasuries of churches throughout Spain and Spanish America. Items in worked silver (*plata labrada*) were also exported to Spain for use and decoration in private households. Presented to kings and emperors, or simply displayed in the homes of the European elite, objects of worked silver provided tangible evidence of the wealth and status of their owners and of Spanish America in general. Where silkworm cultivation took hold in the Americas, including parts of Guatemala, local artisans wove luxurious items of clothing and adornment for export to Spain, although the silk industry diminished once direct trade between New Spain and Asia developed with the Manila Galleon Trade in the late sixteenth century.

More ordinary household items exported from Spain to the Americas included carpets (*alfombras*), glassware (*vidrio*), soap (*jabón*), mirrors (*espejos; espejitos*),

and—somewhat surprisingly—a wide variety of bedding. Ordinary metals and ironwork in particular were also common European exports that were crucial to the economic development of Spanish America, although they seldom receive the attention they deserve. For example, Spanish railings and grills, plain or embellished, traveled across the Atlantic to adorn windows, stairways, gardens, altars, and other architectural forms throughout Spanish America. Local artisans soon learned to produce fine ironwork of their own, incorporating design elements from both sides of the Atlantic.

THE PASSION FOR FASHION

Consumers in Spanish America seem to have had an almost insatiable demand for fashion in its broadest sense. Clothing and adornment displayed an individual's wealth and taste and served to enhance his or her social status as well. In much of the Old World of Europe and Asia, so-called sumptuary laws regulated how individuals of differing social status could dress, and the norms of the Aztecs and Incas had been at least as carefully defined. In short, individuals were expected to dress and behave according to their station in life. In a colonial setting, however, the rigid traditions and customs that defined social status in Europe no longer prevailed.

Spaniards and Creoles in the Americas soon realized that they could claim a higher social status by their outward appearance, spending their money—even if they did not have much—to dress and adorn themselves. Colonial society loosened social strictures among Indigenous peoples as well, often as part of official policy. Indigenous leaders were permitted to dress in European fashion to demonstrate their status in the evolving colonial hierarchy. Likewise, Indigenous women who married Spaniards often adopted European fashions. In the early seventeenth century, Thomas Gage commented at length about the luxurious clothing worn in Mexico City.

> Both men and women are excessive in their apparel, using more silks than stuffs and cloth. Precious stones and pearls further much this their vain ostentation. A hat-band and rose made of diamonds in a gentleman's hat is common, and a hat-band of pearls is ordinary in a tradesman. Nay, a blackamoor or tawny young maid and slave will make hard shift, but she will be in fashion with her neck-chain and bracelets of pearls, and her ear-bobs of some considerable jewels.[16]

[16] Gage, *The English American… ,* p. 56.

Gage went on to discuss in great detail the clothing and adornment worn by mixed-race women of loose morals, criticizing not only their behavior but also their adoption of styles that were unsuitable to what he considered their lowly station in life.

Lima's citizens were also known for their lavish styles of dress and public display. Many relied in part on the skill of local weavers and other artisans to produce the goods they craved, if they could not afford to buy European products. Bernabé Cobo wrote in 1639,

> The grooming and resplendence of Limeños in the care and adornment of their persons is so great and commonplace that on a feast day one cannot tell by looking who anyone is. Everyone—nobles and those who are not—dress stylishly and richly in silk garments and all kinds of fancy clothing, and with no moderation at all in this part of the world because the Pragmatics [laws] on dress that were published in Spain have not arrived here. And to this end, incredible sums are spent on all kinds of silks, fabrics, brocades, delicate linens, and fine textiles.[17]

In addition to the fabrics mentioned by Cobo, shipments from Europe included ready-made clothing such as footwear; hats; feathers, lace, and ribbons; and the raw materials for cosmetics. The latest European notions about styles of dress, adornment, and behavior also traveled to America, where they were avidly copied by members of the colonial elite and whoever else could afford to be fashionable. Spanish clothing styles were highly influential in Europe during the period of Spain's greatest power under the Habsburg dynasty. In the late seventeenth century, however, France replaced Spain as the dominant power in Europe and as the source of new trends in fashion.

FASHIONS AND POLITICS

Whether consumers in Spanish America could acquire the fashions they craved depended in large measure on the political situation on both sides of the Atlantic. In normal circumstances, the route to New Spain brought merchandise to the port of Veracruz and then inland to its intended customers. The route to Peru was much more complicated. If merchants in Seville decided it was worthwhile to send merchandise across the ocean, the Tierra Firme fleet brought it first to Cartagena de Indias in Colombia and then to Portobello on the east coast of Panama for a commercial fair. However, for the fair to take place, merchants in Lima had to travel up the west coast of Peru and then across the Isthmus of Panama to Portobello. If

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[17] Bernabé Cobo, "Viceregal Lima in the Seventeenth Century," in *I saw a City Invincible: Urban Portraits of Latin America,* eds. Gilbert M. Joseph and Mark D. Szuchman (Wilmington, Del., 1996), pp. 67-68.

there was too much unsold merchandise and too little money in Lima, the merchants resisted traveling to Portobello. Even if the fair was held, that was not the end of the process. Any goods bought in Portobello had to be hauled back across the isthmus and then shipped or hauled overland to Lima and other population centers of the viceroyalty. Meanwhile, the money that had been paid for that merchandise in Portobello, along with tax revenues sent from the viceroy in Lima, sailed back to Cartagena and then to Havana before returning to Spain. In short, the complicated logistics associated with the Tierra Firme route made that trajectory especially vulnerable to the disruptions of war and the threat of pirate attack.

The political situation in the seventeenth century was rife with those disruptions. As noted in earlier chapters, Spain was a major participant in the Thirty Years War (1618–48), at the same time facing rebellion in the Netherlands, Portugal, and Catalonia and economic crisis at home. Although the Thirty Years' War ended in 1648, Spain's war with France continued. England was mired in its own crises of civil war and revolution, but the Protectorate of Oliver Cromwell captured Jamaica in 1655 and held it despite Spanish counterattacks. Thereafter, the route of the Tierra Firme fleet was under continual threats from English pirates based in Jamaica. Pirates of other nationalities also flourished in the Caribbean in the late seventeenth century, the most daring of whom rounded Cape Horn to attack Spanish ports and shipping on the Pacific coast.

The official threat from France was far more serious, however. Spain and France finally made peace in 1659, and the following year Felipe IV met with Louis XIV to formalize the marriage between his daughter María Teresa and the French king. After Felipe IV died in 1665, the throne of Spain was inherited by Carlos II, the sickly surviving son of Felipe's second marriage to his Habsburg niece. Almost immediately, Louis XIV made legal claims to the Spanish Netherlands based on his marriage to María Teresa and launched a war in 1667 to press those claims. Opposition from several European powers forced him to withdraw from most of the lands he had invaded, but Louis did not abandon his ambitious designs. Supported by able bureaucrats, military and legal experts, and his own visions of grandeur, Louis initiated another major war in 1672–78, which is known by various names in European history, as well as several minor conflicts, all in aid of extending France's borders and global reach. The last major conflict of the French king's reign alarmed the rest of Europe sufficiently to form a Grand Alliance against him. Known as the War of the League of Augsburg, or the Nine Years' War, among other names, the conflict lasted from 1688 to 1697 and involved areas as dispersed as North America and India as well as Europe. During that war, French forces under the Baron de Pointis, allied with pirates, captured the city of Cartagena de Indias in 1697,

extracted a ransom from the citizenry to do no further harm, and then burned the city anyway.

Figure 5.1 – The Baron de Pointis, with Cartagena burning in the background, 1687

Not surprisingly, the constant wars of the late seventeenth century interrupted the rhythm of trade between Spain and Spanish America, made worse by legal prohibitions against trading with enemy states whenever war broke out. As a result, the Viceroyalty of Peru was only sporadically supplied by official fleets in the late seventeenth century. Smuggling supplied some of the merchandise that consumers in the viceroyalty craved. In addition, the Spanish crown periodically granted general pardons or exemptions (*indultos*) from bans on French trade in wartime. Merchants who wanted to send French textiles and clothing to the Indies could purchase those

exemptions for a fee (*servicio pecuniario*) to the crown. They could then load clothing from France (*ropa de Francia*) onto ships in the official fleets without registering it or paying export taxes. In 1675, the fee amounted to 80,000 *pesos* (each *peso* = 8 *reales*); in 1684, 250,000 *pesos*; and in 1695, an impressive half million *pesos*. In each case, the merchants paid part of the fee in advance and the rest with profits from selling their goods in the Indies. That was true even in 1695, when merchants were well aware that the markets in America were already saturated with contraband clothing from France. In addition to the general pardons, the crown granted pardons to individual vessels and merchants, either before or after their violation of the legal prohibitions.

The royal pardons were a way for the crown to gain at least some benefit from a situation that it could not control. Moreover, colonial officials responsible for stopping contraband habitually tolerated it instead. The last official fleet to Tierra Firme in the seventeenth century left Spain in 1695. There would not be another until 1706. The net result of wartime disruptions to official trading fleets, royal exemptions for shipments from enemy powers, and the toleration of contraband by officials in Peru meant that the last several decades of the seventeenth century defined the heyday of contraband goods entering the viceroyalty.

CONTRABAND AND GUN-TOTING ANGELS

The artistic genre known as the *ángeles arcabuceros* or gun-toting angels emerged at the same time that contraband trade flourished in Peru. The strange and beautiful portraits of angels armed with firearms have attracted considerable attention from scholars focused on the histories of art and religion, either separately or in combination. To my knowledge, however, no one has examined the gun-toting angels in their broader context, political and economic as well as artistic and religious.

There is a sizeable bibliography dealing with the function of angels in various religious traditions. In general, they are believed to be powerful messengers from God, sometimes sent to protect or aid humankind, but at other times sent to punish humans for their transgressions. In the Judeo-Christian tradition, God sent an angel, sometimes called Jophiel, to expel Adam and Eve from the Garden of Eden. After their expulsion, Jophiel (or sometimes Uriel) guarded the gates of Paradise to prevent their return. Moving forward in the Christian tradition, the angel (sometimes archangel) named Gabriel announced to Mary that she would bear the son of God—a largely positive event—but when a multitude of angels announced that birth to a group of shepherds, they were initially fearful, assuming that the angels had been sent to punish them. And the seven Angels of the Apocalypse in the Christian Bible's

Book of Revelation were undoubtedly dangerous, foretold to bring chaos and destruction of horrifying proportions to a sinful humankind. The ambiguous and often-terrifying power of angels has been largely forgotten by present-day Christian believers, but that was not the case in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Armed and dangerous angels depicted in those centuries usually carry swords or spears. A typical depiction of the Archangel Michael, for example, shows him attacking Lucifer with a sword or spear.

Figure 5.2 – Sculpture of St. Michael attacking Lucifer with a sword.
Church of St. Michael, Almazán, Soria

In contrast, the *ángeles arcabuceros* carry firearms. Their weapons are known in Spanish as *arcabuces*, or in English as harquebuses. However, the angels are usually holding those weapons loosely, loading the barrel, or aiming at some unseen target in the air above them. Their poses are relaxed, and they have bland or even beatific looks on their androgenous faces. In other words, although they bear firearms, they appear to be anything but militant or threatening.

Figure 5.3 – Three typical *ángeles arcabuceros*

Letiel Dei

Eliel

Asiel/Uriel

Some scholars have suggested the names of known artists who may have painted one or more of the images. Most, however, are simply attributed to anonymous artists working in or near the city of Cuzco in present-day Peru. Cuzco attained its cultural maturity during the tenure of Bishop Manuel de Mollinedo y Angulo from 1673 to 1699. Born in Madrid and trained in Spain, the bishop devoted his enormous energy to deepening the connections between religiosity and culture in the Viceroyalty of Peru and served as both a source and a magnet for patronage of the arts. During his tenure, the Seminary of San Antonio Abad de Cuzco was a focus of Baroque musical training, and a recognized Cuzco school of painting flourished at the same time. Bishop Mollinedo had an impressive collection of European paintings, which he made available to local artists studying with European artists sent to Cuzco. The earliest depictions of angels armed with firearms supposedly appeared in the same general area. Over time, depictions of gun-toting angels would also appear in New Spain and Argentina, while retaining their essential features. The genre remained popular in religious and secular venues for centuries, and the sameness of the gun-toting angels over time and space helps to explain why their origins and the dates of individual paintings are difficult to determine.

Historians of religion who have dealt with the *ángeles arcabuceros* concentrate on their probable uses in evangelization. Although seven or more archangels often appeared in European religious art, after the Council of Trent (1545–63) only Michael, Gabriel, and Raphael seem to have continued in official veneration.

Figure 5.4 - Holy Trinity with Archangels [Jerome Wierix, c. 1586–1600]

RAPHAEL
VRIEL
GABRIEL
MICHAEL
SEALTIEL
IEHVDIEL
BARACHIEL
Gratia vobis et pax ab eo qui est, et qui erat, et qui venturus est, et a Septem Spiritibus qui in conspectu throni eius sunt. Apocal. 1.
In conspectu angelorum psallam tibi, adorabo ad templum sanctum tuum, et confitebor nomini tuo, Dne. Psal. 137.
Hieronymus Wierx fecit et excudit. Cum Gratia et Priuilegio. Piermans.

Nonetheless, in colonial Peru at least seven *ángeles arcabuceros* were frequently depicted from the late seventeenth century onward, and missionaries supposedly linked them with traditional deities from Incan and other South American belief systems. Because those deities were associated with thunder, earthquakes, and other frightening natural phenomena, Peruvian catechists and converts would have had little trouble imagining the power of armed angels either to protect or to punish, as God directed. Traditional arguments about the religious function of the *ángeles arcabuceros* make sense, but defining their full historical context requires attention

to the images themselves: the guns and how the angels handle them; the time frame and location of their earliest portraits; and their flamboyant costumes.

Regarding their weapons, there is some ambiguity regarding what to call long-barreled guns in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In general, harquebuses and muskets seem to have been differentiated by size and weight and whether they required a fork-rest or support to fire accurately. In documents I have encountered for various research projects, the Spanish word *arcabuz* (harquebus) referred to a smaller gun than a *mosquete* or musket, with the former weighing anywhere from eight to fifteen pounds, and the latter weighing some thirty pounds. *Arcabuces* were about forty to sixty inches long and fired a muzzle-loaded ball of 0.6 to 0.8 inches in diameter. Muskets were somewhat longer and fired a heavier ball, and at least one Spanish commander referred to muskets as 'double harquebuses.' Among soldiers sailing on Spanish galleons, musketeers (*mosqueteros*) were larger, stronger men than other soldiers, and they earned higher wages. Moreover, the only way a musketeer could fire his gun accurately required the use of some sturdy form of support or rest.

Figure 5.5 - Harquebus [Château de Foix Museum]

Figure 5.6 - Musket (*mosquete*), with bracket for firing support [Madrid: Museo Naval]

The *ángeles arcabuceros* do not use supports for their guns, even those with a fairly heavy stock. However, supports could be used with harquebuses as well, so their presence or absence by itself does not prove whether a gun was a musket or a harquebus. On the other hand, the traditional description of the angels as *arcabuceros* (harquebusiers), and the size of their guns suggest that their weapons are harquebuses rather than muskets.

Regarding the poses of the *ángeles arcabuceros,* many scholars have pointed out their similarities to illustrations in a 1607 Dutch military drill manual by Jakob de Gheyn, which was widely known and translated into several languages. Henry Hexham's English-language version, based on de Gheyn and first published in 1637, was also widely known. Both manuals focus on muskets, always with a support for firing, though the poses of the *ángeles arcabuceros* otherwise resemble illustrations in both de Gheyn and Hexham. For example, many angels hold their guns like the illustrations of marching postures numbers 1 through 4 in Hexham's manual.[18]

Figure 5.7 – Marching postures 1–4 of gunners from Hexham's manual

Similarly, the angel named Eliel in various depictions loads his gun in a pose similar to Hexham's illustrations of standing postures numbers 24 to 28.

[18] Henry Hexham, *The principles of the art militarie; practised in the warres of the United Netherlands. Represented by figure, the word of command, and demonstration* (London/Delph: Matthew Symmons, 1637).

Figure 5.8 – Eliel loading the gun

Figure 5.9 – Standing and loading postures 24–28 from Henry Hexham's manual



Even so, one might ask how many ways a gunner could efficiently carry or load a long-barreled gun in the seventeenth century.

The soldier shown preparing and firing his musket in Hexham's standing postures numbers 5 through 8 aims forward at a presumed enemy, which has no equivalent among the poses of the *ángeles arcabuceros.*

Figure 5.10 – Firing preparations 5–8 from Henry Hexham's manual



Instead, the angel usually named Asiel or Uriel aims the harquebus skyward, perhaps as part of a ceremonial volley or simply as a demonstration of the weapon's power.

Figure 5.11 – Asiel/Uriel aiming skyward

In short, although the poses and the ways that the *ángeles arcabuceros* handle their guns resemble the illustrations in well-known military drill manuals of the seventeenth century, that is not sufficient to prove that the *ángeles arcabuceros* were simply modeled on the drill manuals.

Regarding chronology and location, the church of Santa María de las Nieves in Calamarca, Bolivia, some thirty-seven miles south of La Paz, houses what are thought to be the earliest images of the *ángeles arcabuceros*. One well-documented study by the art historian Kelly Donahue-Wallace argues that those early images date from the 1660s to the 1680s, whereas Joseph Richel and Suzanne Stratton favor the early eighteenth century, seemingly based on the dates when a known artist flourished. The *ángeles arcabuceros* are not the only angels depicted in Santa María de las Nieves, however. Some wear lavish costumes resembling the *ángeles arcabuceros* in many respects, but they do not carry guns. Other angels depicted in the same church are quite different in style. They do not wear headgear, and their facial features and full-skirted dresses are clearly feminine adaptations of the garb of ancient Roman soldiers.

If we accept that the first depictions of the *ángeles arcabuceros* date from the late seventeenth or early eighteenth century, their location in the region where present-day Peru and Bolivia meet still needs to be explained. Some historians point out that European missionaries brought images of militant angels to that area to use in evangelization. However, European images of angels, though sometimes armed with swords, do not carry firearms. Instead of focusing on evangelization, I will argue that their location, as well as their first appearance, related to the clandestine trade in French clothing and textiles that flourished along the coastline from Lima south to Arica on the present-day border between Peru and Chile.

Figure 5.12 – Map of Peru with historic placenames

That region, which includes Lake Titicaca, is famous for huge, mysterious images carved deep into the arid land and thought to be from the Nazca civilization in the first millennium of the Common Era. One of the carvings, the so-called 'Candelabra of Paracas,' was carved into the hillside behind the port of Pisco. Whatever culture produced the image in ancient times presumably had no concept of a candelabra, but that is the name by which it is known in the present day.

Figure 5.13 – The 'candelabra of Paracas' near Pisco

Because the image is supposedly visible from twelve miles out to sea, even the most inexperienced ship's pilot could hardly have missed it. That made the port of Pisco a likely destination for foreign ships, especially ships carrying contraband goods. According to local legend, the port of Pisco was so appealing that the Spaniards may have considered it for their capital before deciding on Lima. Legend aside, Pisco's harbor could accommodate seventeenth-century ships, and it was easily accessible to the Incan system of roads that had connected all parts of their empire.

Figure 5.14 – System of roads in the Inca Empire



Southeast of Pisco lies Nazca, a crossroads on the Incan system, connected to Cuzco, Lake Titicaca, and La Paz. Just off the road inland from Pisco toward Ayacucho and Cuzco is the enormous Tambo Colorado, a complex of buildings used in

Incan times as a storage facility for goods that were paid as tribute. Hundreds of similar facilities existed all along the Incan system of roads, but the Tambo Colorado was one of the largest and is still remarkably well-preserved.

Figure 5.15 – Tambo Colorado

Jakob Schlüpmann's study of ships arriving in Lima's port of Callao in 1698–1699 found a notable number of vessels that had stopped in Pisco and Nazca—51 out of the 206 ships he noted. Pisco's location and good connections inland suggest that it would have been ideal for introducing contraband in the late seventeenth century. It was far enough from Lima to make official supervision difficult, yet accessible enough to provide merchandise to the capital and other urban centers. In fact, Pisco was notorious as a port for contraband, a trade that involved many of the merchants based in Lima, despite their public support for reviving the official fairs in Portobello. As Geoffrey Walker noted, "The volume of illicit trade at the port of Pisco south of Callao grew large enough to be dubbed the 'Pisco fair'!"[19] If various markets were temporarily saturated with merchandise, the Tambo Colorado complex could have been used for storing contraband goods until demand rebounded.

Contraband arriving at Pisco and other Peruvian ports in the late seventeenth century enriched the whole area near Lake Titicaca. The town of Pisco became so prosperous that Jesuit missionaries were able to begin building a magnificent church in 1689, which was famous for centuries for its impressive architecture and lavish internal decoration. Tragically, it was completely destroyed in a devastating earthquake in 2007 that killed nearly a third of the city's population.

[19] Geoffrey J. Walker, *Spanish Politics and Imperial Trade, 1700–1789* (Bloomington, Indiana, 1979), pp. 41–42.

Figure 5.16 - The Jesuit church San Clemente, Cathedral of Pisco (2002)



The French textiles and clothing that entered the region as contraband coincided in time and location with the first appearance of the *ángeles arcabuceros*. Their extravagant costumes also suggest a link to that contraband trade. All the angels are flamboyantly dressed in rich fabrics, with voluminous slashed sleeves over ruffled shirts; flared cassocks; collars and other embellishments of fine lace; enormous broad-brimmed hats with plumes; silk stockings; and fine shoes with elaborate bows. Their colorful wings match their outfits, and they are clearly not of this world.

Art historians have explained the appearance of the angels in various ways. The Peruvian art historian Ramón Mujica Pinilla, who has written the most extensive analysis of the gun-toting angels, emphasizes their military function as a heavenly squadron deployed to fight evildoers, but he devotes little attention to their costumes. Alexandra Walsham argues that the *ángeles arcabuceros* were patterned on Andean nobles and aristocrats. However, whereas historical paintings show Andean noblemen and women richly attired, their costumes have little in common with the garb of the *ángeles arcabuceros*. For example, a painting commemorating a famous wedding in 1718 between two Incan noble brides, whose grooms were related to the

founder of the Jesuit order, includes a group of noble Incan men and women in lavish traditional garb that is quite unlike the costumes of the *ángeles arcabuceros*.

Figure 5.17 – Incan nobles in formal dress

The Spanish historian Mario Ávila Vivar notes that depictions of angels from ancient times onward tended to show them dressed according to styles current when they were depicted. After the Council of Trent, however, European artists reverted to depicting angels dressed as Roman soldiers, with short tunics and sandals. Because Roman garb would have had little resonance for potential converts in colonial Peru, Ávila Vivar argues that the *ángeles arcabuceros* were shown as seventeenth-century courtiers, carrying the weapons of Spanish infantrymen. Arnoldo Gualino, an Argentinian art historian, holds a similar opinion, writing that the *ángeles arcabuceros* were dressed like seventeenth-century noblemen, with guns instead of the swords typical for militant angels. He summarizes the work of various authors in noting that the "lace, brocades, gold and silver threads, girdles, silk sashes, tunics, lace petticoats, armor, plumed hats, belts, buckles, buttons, and brooches were very

similar to European models."[20] However, Gualino's statement begs the question of when and where those models existed.

In the late seventeenth century, Spanish elite garb was relatively plain compared to the French, even on festive occasions. That disparity shows in the 1660 tapestry formalizing the marriage of Louis XIV to Princess María Teresa of Spain, with the French entourage on the left and the Spanish on the right. Although both groups are dressed for the occasion, the French costumes are visibly more elaborate than the Spanish.

Figure 5.18 – Tapestry formalizing the marriage
of Louis XIV and María Teresa



In Peru, the ordinary garb of elite Spanish men was more subdued, in part because of disruptions to the transatlantic trade caused by wars and piracy. Even in times with regular trade, luxury items were just that: luxuries. When contraband French textiles and clothing arrived in abundance during the late seventeenth century, they would have provided a sharp contrast to what the local population was used to seeing, even among the elite. French goods were more colorful, exotic, and

[20] http://arnoldogualino.blogspot.com/2014/02/angeles-arcabuceros-arte-del-virreinato.html. [my translation]

appealing than the somber, stodgy styles favored in Spain and Peru at the time, and if the French goods arrived as contraband they could be sold at lower prices than goods registered and taxed on the official fleets. French ships arriving at Pisco and other unofficial ports with contraband would presumably have included armed men to guard the valuable merchandise, and some of them may well have worn clothing similar to the goods they hoped to sell.

All of the evidence for the relationship between French contraband and the *ángeles arcabuceros* is inferential and speculative, but two prominent features of the costumes worn by the angels reinforce their probable French origins and the approximate date of 1680 for their first appearance. Wherever images of the *ángeles arcabuceros* are found, they wear wide-brimmed hats and large bows on their shoes, both styles that were considered typically French. Wide-brimmed hats were characteristic of elite men's fashion in France from the 1660s to the 1680s, and shoes with large bows, similar to the footwear on Louis XIV's entourage in the 1660 tapestry, were popular in France, but not in Spain, from the 1650s to the 1670s. The artists who painted the first *ángeles arcabuceros* presumably exaggerated the exotic features of their costumes to emphasize that the angels were far removed from ordinary mortals as messengers from a powerful God. Nonetheless, wide-brimmed hats and large bows on footware were typical features of the garb of elite Frenchmen from that same period. In the engraving of the Baron de Pointis burning Cartagena in 1687, shown earlier, he wears a different style of hat and no bows on his shoes, presumably because broad-brimmed hats and shoes with bows were no longer in fashion.

It is commonly accepted that the first portraits of the gun-toting angels were sponsored by missionaries who understood the value of stunning images to impress converts. That being the case, the merchants and contraband goods arriving at the unofficial ports south of Lima would have provided the artists and their sponsors with fantastic models of otherworldly, powerful beings. These observations, speculative and suggestive, rather than proven, nonetheless link political and economic developments with artistic expression and evangelization—topics that are usually considered separately. Viewed in that broad context, the artistic genre of the *ángeles arcabuceros* become less mysterious but no less stunning.

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From food, drink, textiles, clothing, and items for leisure pastimes, to the treasure, raw materials, and tools for building a global empire, the cargoes carried in the Carrera de Indias had great importance for the lives of millions of people on both sides of the Atlantic. Contraband cargoes also affected countless lives. Overall, the transatlantic trade linked Spain and the rest of Europe with the Americas and their

fabled wealth. According to a widely repeated story, for the official entry into Lima of the Duke of la Palata in 1681 to begin his term as viceroy, local merchants temporarily paved two streets leading to the Plaza Real with silver bars worth more than five million *pesos* as visible proof of the city's wealth. As long as the mines of Potosí continued to produce silver, and even after Peru lost importance compared with New Spain, Peru remained a symbol of almost inexhaustible wealth to many Europeans, and its residents remained famous for their luxurious tastes.

The legendary wealth of Peru came into question during the wars against French aggression at the end of the seventeenth century and then with the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–14), when a coalition of states tried to block the Bourbon succession in Spain. During that global conflict, although irregular fleets supplied a small but important fraction of the total needs of New Spain, official fleets arriving in Tierra Firme ceased after 1695. As a result, the markets of the viceroyalty of Peru were supplied largely by contraband. Two viceroys presided over Peru during the difficult years from the late seventeenth century to the end of the War of Succession. Their stories provide the focus of the next chapter.

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Chapter 6
FROM HABSBURG TO BOURBON: A GLOBAL UPHEAVAL

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The distance between Spain and America was a perennial obstacle to efficient government in Spanish America. For two centuries Habsburg monarchs struggled to maintain effective control of the vast territories that had been claimed in their name, and communication between Madrid and Peru was especially difficult. Moreover, in the viceroyalty of Peru a few dozen officials presided over hundreds of miles of exposed coastline and millions of square miles of territory. The bureaucratic structure in Madrid was hopelessly inadequate to rule those vast regions directly on a day-to-day basis. As a result, by necessity and also by choice, the Habsburg monarchs delegated active rule to the combined efforts of royal officials and local elites in the viceroyalty of Peru. Overall, the system worked, because everyone accepted that the monarch was the ultimate authority and that the viceroy was in control at the local level as the monarch's representative. In fact, although the viceroy held the reins of power, they were not attached to anything unless local elites provided the motive force. That arrangement faced a serious challenge during the wars from the end of the seventeenth century through the first decades of the eighteenth century.

The Nine-Years' War from 1688 to 1697 had negative consequences for Spain's transatlantic trade and the administration of the Spanish Empire in the Americas, as noted earlier. Moreover, in the viceroyalty of Peru, a devastating earthquake struck Lima in 1687, leveling large areas of the city and damaging some of its most impressive structures, including the cathedral. A detailed engraving of Lima in 1685 shows the city before the earthquake; the devastation would take decades to repair and absorbed much of the tax revenue generated by the viceroyalty as a whole.

Figure 6.1 - Lima in 1685

LIMA
Ciudad de los Reyes, Corte y Emporio del Imperio
del Peru, Cefiida, y fortificada con muros y baluar
tes, conforme la mas moderna arquitectura militar que
tienen de circunvalacion nueue millas
POR EL EXMO SENOR
D. Melchor de Nauarra y Rocafull, Cauallero de Alcantara
Duque de la Palata, Principe de Maran de los consejos de Es
tado y guerra de su Mag.d Virrey y Capitan general del Peru
tierra firme y Chile Año 1685
DELINEOLA Y FORTIFICOLA EL D.D. Ioan Ram
Capellan Real, Doctor en Sagrada Theologia, Cathe
dratico de mathematicas y Fortificacion en la Vniuersi
dad de Lima y Cosmographo mayor del Reyno del Peru
Dibuyolay Fortifico en perspectiua el P.F.B.to Nolasco Re.so de la Merced

MELCHOR PORTOCARRERO, III COUNT OF LA MONCLOVA[21]

The viceroy who would first grapple with the difficult rebuilding process was Don Melchor Portocarrero Rojas (also styled Portocarrero y Laso de la Vega). Born in Madrid in 1636, Don Melchor was the second son of the first Count of La Monclova. Although his family is often thought to have been Portuguese in origin, the first count's ancestor came from Asturias and fought in the medieval reconquest of Portugal from the Muslims. He took the name Portocarrero from a Portuguese town bestowed on him for his wartime services. His descendant, Don Melchor, spent time as a child in the household of Queen Isabel of Bourbon, the French princess who was

[21] This chapter contains excerpts from my book, *The Treasure of the* San José*: Death at Sea in the War of the Spanish Succession* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, May 2007). Copyright 2007 The Johns Hopkins University Press. All rights reserved. Excerpted here with permission of the Licensor through PLSClear.

the first wife of Spain's Felipe IV. Choosing a military career, Don Melchor fought with conspicuous bravery in many battles during the second half of the seventeenth century, serving in Sicily, Flanders, Catalonia, Portugal, and France and rising from infantry captain to lieutenant general of cavalry. He lost his right arm in the Battle of the Dunes at Dunkirk in June 1658. After that battle, he wore a prosthetic arm made of silver, earning him the nickname "brazo de plata" (silver arm) by which he was known informally for the rest of his life. Off the battlefield, he served on the king's Council of War, the council of the Indies, and as General Commissary of the Infantry and Cavalry of Spain. He also accompanied the royal bastard, Don Juan José of Austria, to Sicily, Catalonia, and Portugal on diplomatic missions. In 1673, he married Doña Antonia Jimenez de Urrea. For his military and diplomatic services, Portocarrero was named a gentleman (*caballero*) in the noble military order of Alcántara in 1681—a promotion to the middle ranks of the Spanish nobility. That same year, his wife gave birth to their daughter Josefa, whom we met in chapter 2.

Appointed viceroy of New Spain in April 1686, Don Melchor's tenure would be brief though marked by consistent efforts to forestall incursions into New Spain from other European states. As soon as he arrived in Veracruz, he dispatched two brigantines to find out whether the French had a presence on the Gulf of Mexico. In fact, René-Robert Cavelier, Sieur de La Salle, had established a primitive French fort and colony inland from Matagorda Bay in 1685, but it would last only four years, and the few survivors were killed by the local Karankawa tribe. Don Melchor took firm control of the northern province of Nueva Extremadura de Coahuila in New Spain and appointed a governor to oversee its development. He also built or reinforced other forts and colonial settlements in the region, establishing regular communication among them and dispatching soldiers to patrol the area. He also expelled English log-cutters who had arrived from Jamaica, attracted by the dyewoods near the Gulf of Campeche. He also ousted all foreign priests who did not have explicit licenses to preach in New Spain.

In the capital of Mexico City, problems related to water demanded much of his attention. The city often experienced severe flooding, and various viceroys had struggled to fund the construction of a drainage system. Before Portocarrero's arrival, the project had proceeded with excruciating slowness. To increase the pace, he assigned the local Franciscan friars to supervise the work, and the subterranean portions had been dug and faced in masonry within a few years. It would take two centuries more to complete the above-ground portions of the massive project, with frantic activity in wet years and little activity in dry years. Portocarrero also addressed the persistent challenge of providing drinking water to the capital, personally funding the start of a new aqueduct. Some four kilometers long, that

aqueduct would take more than a century to complete, with more than 900 stone arches supporting the channel that carried the water.

Portocarrero's energetic efforts in New Spain impressed the government in Madrid, and the outbreak of the new war of French aggression in 1688 persuaded the king and his ministers to transfer him to Peru. Portocarrero's official tenure in New Spain ended on 19 November 1688, though the documents for his appointment to Peru did not reach him until 15 March 1689, at which point he made plans to travel to his new posting. Portocarrero's tenure in New Spain had been so impressive that no one could be found to testify against him in the mandatory review (*residencia*) of his two years as viceroy. Many other historians have also considered him an exemplary viceroy, and his public works and military operations to defend the Viceroyalty of New Spain from enemies and interlopers were indeed exemplary.

Portocarrero took possession of the viceregal office in Lima in August 1689. The situation was hardly promising. In Spain, the ineffectual King Carlos II sat on the throne, while the economy was just emerging from the seventeenth-century crisis in production, trade, and tax revenue. In Peru, the earthquake of 1687 had left much of the capital in ruins, but Madrid was desperate for money to fund the new war against France. In short, the many problems afflicting Spain and Peru had made it very difficult to recruit a new viceroy. Though qualified candidates for viceregal office were expected to donate or loan sizeable sums to the crown before their appointment, the distinguished historian Lewis Hanke noted that Portocarrero had nothing to offer the crown "except his loyalty to the throne, his skills as a military man, and his probity as an administrator."[22] Hanke considered it almost a miracle when Portocarrero accepted the assignment. Portocarrero had spent much of his adult life fighting the French, so there is no doubt that he was anxious to aid the war effort. Nonetheless, when he arrived in Peru, the administration of his huge viceroyalty had to take precedence over sending tax revenue to Spain.

As noted in the previous chapter, smuggling and contraband trade into Peru, largely from France, increased exponentially in the last two decades of the seventeenth century, responding to unmet market demand. Despite the serious nature of the problem, Viceroy Portocarrero simply lacked the resources to devote much effort to suppressing contraband. He did, however, commission small warships to be built and manned to combat piracy on the Pacific coast, especially along the crucial route between Lima's port of Callao and the coast of Panama. The merchants in Peru relied on that route to attend the official fairs in Portobello. Without

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[22] Hanke, Lewis, ed. *Los virreyes españoles en América durante el gobierno de la Casa de Austria. Peru*, vol. 7. In BAE, vol. 286 (Madrid, 1980), p. 153; my translation.

assurances that the route was safe, the merchants in Lima were likely to stay home and drift into collusion with smugglers in the contraband trade.

When Don Melchor's older brother, Gaspar, died on 18 May 1693, he became the third Count of la Monclova, the title by which he is known to history.[23] Monclova earned respect in Peru, as in New spain, for his personal bravery, piety, probity, and evenhandedness. According to Hanke, he had no tolerance for those who openly tried to buy official favor and nothing but contempt for anyone who defied the royal will. On the other hand, Hanke acknowledged that Monclova "was neither a frenetic nor an aggressive administrator, which satisfied many."[24] In other words, part of his success in Peru seems to have resulted from his willingness to let influential merchants and other members of the Peruvian elite oversee themselves, trusting that his personal example would inspire them to behave properly. As long as the trade of Peru was tied closely to the Atlantic fleet system and the Portobello fairs, and as long as the eastern shores of the Pacific Ocean—the Mar del Sur—remained relatively free from pirates, there was little conflict of interest between the viceroy and the most powerful economic interests in Lima.

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[23] A manuscript letter dated 18 September 1689 from Juan Estéban de la Parra, the secretary Don Melchor appointed in Lima, refers to him as the "conde de la Monclova," a contradiction that remains a mystery. AHN, Diversos-Colecciones,27, N.55. It is possible that whoever later copied the letter into the collection where it now appears simply used the noble title that Don Melchor inherited in 1693.

[24] Lewis Hanke, ed. *Los virreyes españoles en América durante el gobierno de la Casa de Austria*. Peru, vol. 7. in Biblioteca de Autories Españoles (BAE), vol. 286 (Madrid, 1980), p. 154. ["… no fue un administrador frenético ni agresivo, lo que satisfizo a muchos."]

Figure 6.2 – Don Melchor Portocarrero, III Count of La Monclova

WAR AND SUCCESSION

As war continued in the last decade of the seventeenth century, it became increasingly clear that Carlos II of Spain could not produce an heir, despite two marriages. Taking advantage of the situation, dynasties in Europe with familial ties to the Spanish Habsburgs began to position themselves to claim Spain and its empire. They all had representatives at the court in Madrid and cultivated factions among members of the Spanish elite who hoped to benefit if their candidate prevailed. The major contenders were the elector prince of Bavaria, Joseph Ferdinand (still an infant); the Habsburg Archduke Karl, younger son of the Holy Roman Emperor; and the young Bourbon Duke of Anjou, Philippe, one of Louis XIV's grandsons. All had various dynastic claims in their favor, some more plausible than others.

In anticipation of the Spanish king's death, William III of England and the Netherlands drew up a secret treaty in 1698 for the dismemberment of Spain's empire in Europe and abroad to avoid a concentration of power in the hands of either Habsburgs or Bourbons. Louis XIV signed the treaty, despite his ambitions for his grandson, because decades of warfare had strained the French economy almost to the breaking point. The Habsburg emperor refused to sign, expecting that his family would inherit everything when Carlos II died, and news of the failed partition treaty inevitably reached the Spanish court. King Carlos, justifiably angry and offended, indicated his favor for the Habsburg contender as his heir, and his strident German queen and her faction worked to strengthen his resolve. As the century drew to a close, intrigues among the various factions continued to swirl around the court in Madrid and its moribund king. Even in his enfeebled condition, Carlos II knew what was at stake. He eventually recognized that the only way to preserve the empire that his forebears had created was to choose a successor who could defend it. As a result, in the last will and testament that Carlos II dictated on his deathbed, he named Philippe, the Bourbon Duke of Anjou, to succeed him. His dying hope was that the Spanish people would accept a French ruler and that Louis XIV would defend his grandson's accession. King Carlos died on the first of November 1700, but neither the acceptance of the Spanish people nor the aid of Louis XIV was assured at that point.

MANUEL DE OMS Y SENTMENAT, MARQUESS OF CASTELLDOSRIUS

The man who turned hope into reality was Carlos II's ambassador to France, the Marquess of Castelldosrius. The marquess descended from two distinguished families of Catalonia, the noble lineage of Oms that claimed to have served the crown since the time of Charlemagne, and that of Sentmenat, which had ancient roots in the Sabadell district of Barcelona. Over the course of the Middle Ages, both families had consolidated their positions by well-chosen marriages between Oms and Sentmenat and with various other prominent clans. The ancient lineages of Catalonia and the Balearic Islands had a very strong tradition of preserving and defending the integrity of their descent, including the practice of stringing together as many family names as possible to demonstrate their connections. When the combination of surnames became too complicated, a family might retain only the most distinguished, sometimes retaining an echo of the past by using the Latin *olim* (lit., before). The future Marquess of Castelldosrius was born on Christmas Day 1651 as Manuel de Oms de Santa Pau olim de Sentmenat y de Lanuza. In simplified form, his name is generally rendered as Manuel de Oms olim y Sentmenat.

Because his older brother had died in 1646, Manuel was the family's principal heir from the moment of his birth. When his father died in 1652, the one-year-old

inherited the family fortunes, much richer in honor and prestige than worldly wealth. The family's net income from holdings in land, credit paper, and other property barely surpassed 2,000 Catalonian *libras* a year, a minimal income to sustain the family's honor and traditions of service to the monarchy. Despite these modest resources, Don Manuel received an excellent education and developed a polished literary style replete with classical allusions. He was also prepared for a career appropriate to his station in life that could generate income as well as serving God and the king. The church was not an option, leaving the military as the best point of entry into royal service.

In 1673, Don Manuel married his cousin, Doña Juana de Oms y Cabrera, further consolidating the Oms lineage. The following year, during the second major war against Louis XIV's France, he was promoted to the rank of *maestre de campo*. As part of his duties, Don Manuel raised an infantry regiment and served with distinction in preparing Catalonia against the threat of a French invasion. From there he moved into positions of increasing authority, as military governor of the port of Tarragona in 1677–80 and viceroy and captain general of Mallorca in 1683–88. In 1689, Carlos II elevated him to the titled nobility as the Marquess of Dosrius, named for one of the family's properties in Catalonia, and appointed him to the Council of War in Madrid. In addition to fulfilling family traditions, the marquess had more than enough personal reasons to work hard in royal service. He and his wife had thirteen children, nine of whom lived to adulthood and had to be provided for in a manner befitting their distinguished lineage.

The Count of Oropesa, president of the Council of Castile and perhaps the richest nobleman in Catalonia, sent Dosrius to Portugal as a special envoy in 1691. On the surface, the Spanish mission to Portugal aimed to congratulate the king and queen on the birth of their son and heir, Prince João. The queen of Portugal was the sister of the new German queen of Spain, María Ana of Neuburg, so the mission had a dynastic dimension as well. With his cultured manners and diplomatic gifts, the Marquess of Dosrius carried out his duties in Lisbon with more than the required grace. He even wrote a theater piece, or *comedia*, in honor of the infant prince. His mission to Lisbon was far more than a courtesy call, however. Louis XIV had begun another land grab in 1688, and Spain had joined most of the rest of Europe in a Grand Alliance against him. Portugal remained neutral, so Dosrius could act as a well-placed spy for Spain in Lisbon, with the ultimate aim of enticing Portugal into the alliance against France. As the war dragged on, he remained in Lisbon, becoming a great favorite at the court. He even stood in for the king of Spain as godfather to one of the Portuguese princesses. In 1696, Carlos II officially appointed him ambassador to Portugal and amended his title to the Marquess of Castelldosrius, recognizing Don Manuel's plans to build a castle on his estates.

The promotion and title proved to be a financial burden, however. Spanish royal finances were in sad shape in the mid-1690s, after decades of economic distress, monetary upheaval, and seemingly endless warfare. The Spanish economy showed signs of recovery, but the government still found itself financially embarrassed on a regular basis. To carry out his ambassadorial duties, Castelldosrius had to empty his pockets and go deeply into debt besides, trusting that the crown would eventually reimburse him. The history of his personal finances, arranged through agents in Catalonia, was as complicated as the most intricate courtly dance, with loans arranged to pay off other loans and money shifted to where it was most needed in the short term.

At the court in Madrid, a small but influential group of Spaniards continued to favor the French candidate to succeed Carlos II, convinced that only France could defend the empire against partition. As they worked behind the scenes to neutralize the influence of the unpopular German queen and her faction, in 1698 the king appointed the Marquess of Castelldosrius as his ambassador to France. For a variety of reasons, France was probably the most difficult and important posting for a Spanish ambassador at the end of the seventeenth century, as well as one of the most expensive. At the best of times, diplomats generally had to supplement official funds when they served in such posts, so that they could entertain and make an impressive showing at the foreign court. Given Castelldosrius's meager estate, he was not the most likely choice for France, but his personal qualities and distinguished record nonetheless commended him to the king and his advisers. It took considerable effort for Castelldosrius to extricate himself from his creditors in Lisbon, until the Council of Finance in Madrid approved his expenses for eventual reimbursement. With that, and Castelldosrius's guarantees to his principal creditor that the money would be repaid, he finally left Portugal in 1699; his wife had died in January of that year. On the way overland to France he stopped briefly in Barcelona to attend to family business and was fêted by the Catalonian elite. The French court would receive him far less graciously.

Castelldosrius, who was then forty-eight years old, arrived in Versailles in the autumn of 1699, just as the court was leaving for Fontainebleau. King Louis refused to let him come along, presumably in retaliation for the King of Spain's delay in receiving Louis's minister, Henri d'Harcourt. In any case, Castelldosrius had his first audience with Louis only after the court returned to Versailles. The gossipy but generally trustworthy memoirs of the Duke of Saint-Simon described Castelldosrius as "a very poor Catalonian gentleman" whose appointment to France was a kind of

exile for him after the prestige and success he had enjoyed in Portugal."[25] Saint-Simon reported that Castelldosrius raised only two matters with Louis at their first meeting, both of which King Louis rejected. First, the new Spanish ambassador presented Carlos II's request that the Sorbonne revoke its condemnation of the books of the Spanish nun, María de Ágreda. As mentioned in an earlier chapter, Sister María had maintained a long correspondence with Felipe IV of Spain in which she often pointedly reminded him of his duties and his responsibilities to God and his people. Louis XIV presumably had little interest in refurbishing the reputation of a nun who presumed to advise kings. Second, Castelldosrius presented King Carlos's request that Louis establish the Immaculate Conception of the Holy Virgin as dogma throughout his realm. Given that the Catholic Church did not proclaim the Immaculate Conception as dogma until 1854, the request was not likely to appeal to the French king in 1699.

Writing sometime later about Castelldosrius, Saint-Simon noted with some surprise: "Who would have believed that this ambassador would have turned out as he did just fourteen months later, and that this very exile would have made the ambassador's fortunes complete?"[26] Saint-Simon was alluding to the dramatic sequence of events preceding and surrounding the death of Carlos II in November 1700. As all of Europe jockeyed for position in the Spanish imperial claiming race, Castelldosrius proved to be an ideal intermediary between Spain and France. Louis granted frequent audiences to the marquess in 1700, including one very long chat in which the two men met privately, without the French foreign minister, the Marquess de Torcy. Commenting on the extraordinary nature of that private meeting, Saint-Simon remarked that Castelldosrius would not disclose what was discussed, either at the time or later, but that he had emerged from the king's chamber looking very pleased.

In Madrid, the Habsburg and French factions continued lobbying for the Spanish inheritance right up to the king's final agony. The infant Bavarian candidate had died in 1699, so that the only contenders were the Habsburg archduke and the French Bourbon Duke of Anjou. In the end, as noted above, King Carlos made the necessary choice, though not necessarily with a full heart. His last will named Philippe, Duke of Anjou, the second grandson of Louis XIV, as his successor, acknowledging that only the Bourbons had the resources to hold the empire together against the pack of predators circling in the near distance. Louis himself could be

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[25] Saint-Simon, *Memoires du duc de Saint-Simon,* ed. Gonzague Truc, 7 vols. (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1956), 1:679. The memoirs of the Duke of Saint-Simon have been published in a confusing variety of editions, each with different pagination and completeness. This is one of the best complete editions.

[26] Saint-Simon, *Memoires,* 1 : 679.

viewed as the top dog in that pack, and Carlos knew it. Nonetheless, by stipulating in his will that Bourbon Spain and Bourbon France must remain separate and that the empire would be Spain's alone, he and his advisers hoped to make the best of the difficult situation.

When Carlos II finally died on the first of November, the Spanish court was immediately informed of his will, which came as a great shock to the Habsburg ambassador, and the news passed quickly to the French court at Fontainebleau, where it had an equally stunning effect. King Louis and his advisers spent days discussing whether to accept its terms, while Castelldosrius received the latest dispatches from Spain and assured Louis that the Spanish people were anxious to welcome his grandson as their new king. Secure in that knowledge, Louis agreed to accept Carlos II's will. The seventeen-year-old duke was not overjoyed with his new responsibilities, but he could hardly go against his grandfather's wishes.

The formal audience confirming these events took place at Versailles on the morning of 16 November. Louis invited Castelldosrius to his chamber as soon as he rose; his grandson had already entered through a private doorway. When Louis indicated his grandson as the new King of Spain, Castelldosrius fell to his knees and kissed the duke's hand in the Spanish fashion, thus becoming the first Spaniard to pay homage to his new king. He then made a graceful speech to the young man in Spanish. Louis responded to the speech himself, noting that his grandson did not yet understand Spanish.

Figure 6.3 - Louis XIV (center) declares his grandson King of Spain, while Castelldosrius kneels to his new sovereign (left foreground)

According to Saint-Simon, King Louis then said to Castelldosrius, "If he follows my counsel, you will be a great lord, and soon; he could not do better presently than to follow your advice." At that point, Castelldosrius responded in French with a remark that is often misquoted and misattributed: "What joy! There are no more Pyrenees and we are but one."[27] Despite the stipulations in Carlos II's will, much of

[27] Saint-Simon, *Memoires,* 1: 800 and note on p. 1206.

the rest of Europe decided that Philippe of Anjou's accession would lead to a Bourbon hegemony and soon declared war to prevent it.

GLOBAL WARFARE ERUPTS

In the Americas, the change of dynasty and the outbreak of war over the Bourbon succession meant that a new wave of English privateers and Spain's new French allies sailed into the Mar del Sur simultaneously. At the start of the war in 1701, three French ships arrived on the coast of Peru to defend against English attacks, carrying King Felipe's permission to enter ports to buy supplies. Viceroy Monclova clearly needed French help against the English, but at the same time he was supposed to prevent outsiders—including the French—from trading in the viceroyalty. With much anxiety and frequent consultations with the merchant consulate and other public authorities in Lima, Monclova allowed the French to sell enough merchandise in the ill-supplied markets of Peru to cover the costs of maintaining their ships and pursuing the English. That decision opened the floodgates. Despite Monclova's attempts to hold the tolerated illicit commerce (*comercio ilícito*) within strict limits, it is likely that most of the textiles and French clothing that arrived in Peru in the early years of the War of Succession was contraband.

The government in Madrid was well aware that official prohibitions against illicit trade were ineffective and that French merchandise was flooding into Peruvian markets, both with and without official permission. The merchants of Lima were also well aware of that reality. The coastlines were so extended, and royal officials so thinly spread that contraband was impossible to prevent. As a result, many members of the merchant community in Lima actively colluded with the French to bring illicit goods into the viceroyalty. Their behavior was understandable if hypocritical. As good businessmen, they were hedging their bets and diversifying their investments, working publicly to protect what remained of their monopoly and breaching it privately at the same time.

Back in Europe, the Marquess of Castelldosrius remained at the French court for several years after 1700, enjoying the favor of both Louis XIV in France and Felipe V in Spain. In a curious way, Louis XIV had shaped Castelldosrius's career from the beginning. By launching wars in the 1670s and 1680s, the French king had provided opportunities for the young Don Manuel de Oms to rise swiftly in Spanish military and diplomatic circles. Once he became a key player in the Bourbon succession in Spain, King Louis's favor, however self-interested, propelled the impecunious marquess into a position of influence and status that he could never have achieved on his own. Judging from his own remarks in the years that followed, Castelldosrius

developed a genuine and deep admiration for the French king. He also gloried in the sophisticated culture and refinement of the French court. Long before French fashions, entertainments, and literary affectations became the rage in Spain, Castelldosrius adopted them wholeheartedly at their source. And the intensely status-conscious French courtiers who had scorned him when he arrived seemed to grow genuinely fond of him. Saint-Simon himself wrote a surprisingly warm description of Castelldosrius that deserves to be quoted at length, because a few phrases are usually excerpted out of context and used to his detriment:

> The king, who always treated the Marquess of Casteldosrius with great distinction and much familiarity after the acceptance of the will, sent him much money at different times, as he was very needy without every speaking about it: he accepted [the gifts] with grace, because they came from the grandfather of his master. He was a very good, honest, and gallant man, whose head was never turned, nor was he ever lacking in this conjuncture to be so extraordinary and so brilliant, polite and considerate, and who made everyone love and esteem him.[28]

FELIPE V, MARÍA LUISA GABRIELA, AND THE WAR IN SPAIN

While Castelldosrius continued to serve in Paris, Felipe V traveled to Spain. The leaders of the anti-Bourbon coalition assumed that the young king would be a mere pawn of his grandfather and French interests in Spanish America. They were wrong about Felipe, but there is no doubt that Louis XIV and many French officials saw the Bourbon accession in Spain as a chance to increase French trade with Spanish America. The government's intendant in Nantes wrote a long memorandum to France's Contrôleur Général in March 1701, noting that the best way to increase French trade "would be to ensure that the people of [the Spanish] monarchy, as much in America as in Europe, should put aside their black clothing in order to wear our fashions and to dress themselves in the French style."[29] As Duke of Anjou, Philippe had dressed in the French style at his grandfather's court. However, in his official portrait by Hyacinthe Rigaud in 1701 as Felipe V of Spain, he wore the somber black costume of the Spanish elite, adorned with the Golden Fleece and other signs of distinction. His costume was presumably a sign of mourning for his precursor Carlos II, but it also represented a politically astute gesture to his new subjects.

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[28] Saint-Simon, *Memoires,* 1: 814.

[29] Boislisle, A.M. de, ed. *Correspondance des Contrôleurs Généraux des Finances avec les Intendants des Provinces*, 3 vols. (Paris 1883), Appendix – "Mémoire du sieur des Casaux du Hallay, député de Nantes, sur l'état du commerce en général," sent to the council on March 4, 1701," vol. 2, p. 499.

Figure 6.4 - Felipe V by H. Rigaud, 1701

From the onset of the War of Succession, Felipe V took an active role in defending his throne. Because he was young and inexperienced in Spanish politics, he had to decide whether to rely on officials that his grandfather had chosen, or to trust Spaniards of unclear loyalties. Above all, he knew that he had to earn the loyalty of the Spanish people. In this difficult task, he was aided immeasurably by his queen, María Luisa Gabriela of Savoy, who was also shaped at Louis XIV's court. Felipe V was seventeen years old when he accepted the Spanish crown at his grandfather's behest. María Luisa Gabriela was just thirteen when they were married in November 1701. A few months after their arrival in Spain, Felipe sailed from Barcelona for Italy to defend his crown, leaving María Luisa Gabriela as regent.

Louis XIV had provided several trusted figures to advise the teenaged monarchs, among them the self-styled Princess of Ursins as the queen's premier lady in waiting (*camarera mayor*). Ursins immersed herself in the intrigues that defined

court politics in Madrid, as leftover Habsburg bureaucrats vied for power against the new Bourbon appointees. Most historians portray Ursins as a sinister and powerful figure at the Spanish court, working to ensure that María Luisa Gabriela and, through her, Felipe V, acted in the interests of France. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that she was a staunch supporter of the young king and queen, as well as enjoying the confidence of Louis XIV and his second wife, Madame de Maintenon.

María Luisa Gabriela was extraordinarily young for the enormous responsibilities she had to bear; Ursins was almost sixty and served as a surrogate grandmother for the young queen. It is clear, however, that María Luisa Gabriela had a mind of her own and an acute political sense. She wrote regularly to Louis XIV in her own hand, treating him with the utmost respect but also with a familiarity born of her multiple connections to the French royal family. In the first few years of the war, with her husband absent most of the time, she presided over endless sessions of the governing council and appeared almost daily on a balcony of the royal palace, often reading letters to the crowds from her husband as he traveled with the army. As a result, she endeared herself to the citizens of Madrid, who nicknamed her "La Saboyana" and viewed her more as the loyal young wife of a soldier fighting for the integrity of Spain than as the queen. Moreover, she worked hard to rally support and funds for the Bourbon cause in Castile and helped to win the enthusiastic loyalty of many aristocratic families that were lukewarm at the start of Felipe V's reign. In fact, it is fair to say that early on she was much more effective than her husband in winning and retaining that loyalty.

CASTELLDOSRIUS AND THE WAR EFFORT IN PERU

Felipe V repaid the loyalty of the Marquess of Castelldosrius by naming him Viceroy of Peru in 1702 and a first-class grandee in 1703. Given the reputation of Peru as a land of immense riches, Saint-Simon assumed that the viceregal appointment would make Castelldosrius's fortune, and many scholars have repeated that notion without question. The appointment certainly marked the pinnacle of his career. Even so, it would be several years before he could take up his new post. Previous wars had meant that no official fleet sailed to Tierra Firme after 1695, and the War of Succession meant that Spain sent no fleet anywhere in the Indies between 1701 and 1706. Preparations began every year, only to be postponed for more opportune times. In the meantime, Castelldosrius continued to serve Felipe V as Spain's ambassador to France, though he was also technically a member of the Council of War in Madrid. When he finally received his orders to report to Cádiz and prepare for embarkation in 1704, he had to borrow 6,300 *pistoles* from French

merchants in the Compagnie de la Mer Pacifique (Pacific Ocean Company) before leaving Paris.

Castelldosrius presumably viewed his new post with distinctly mixed feelings. Despite all prognostications for his good fortune in Peru, taking up responsibility for the viceroyalty during a world war for the empire's survival can only have been a daunting prospect. Once he reached southern Spain, he found that the fleet had been postponed yet again, and he eventually had to bear the cost of supporting his entourage in Jerez de la Frontera for another two years. That was no small matter. The Council of War recommended that the crown pay for moving Castelldosrius and twelve members of his entourage to Peru, the same arrangement that had been made for Melchor Portocarrero, but the journey was nonetheless bound to cost Castelldosrius considerably more than the subsidy allotted. His personal household included two of his sons, a chaplain, forty-eight male servants and twelve female servants. His official entourage added twelve French gentlemen, two pages, two personal attendants (*ayudas de cámara*), five lackeys (*lacayos*), one surgeon, three musicians, two cooks, two cooks' helpers, and two pastry chefs. Judging from their surnames, twenty-seven of the thirty-one persons in the official category were non-Spaniards, and all but one of them was French, the lone exception being the Milanese, Roque Ceruti, music director for the palace orchestra in Lima.

The Council of the Indies complained about the numbers, and especially the presence of so many foreigners, but other viceroys had also traveled with large entourages, and the council ultimately gave its approval. By the time Castelldosrius finally left Cádiz in 1706, he owed creditors in Spain another 200,000 *pesos* (equivalent to 1.6 million *reales* or 145,454 *ducados*), in addition to debts he had accumulated in France. His Spanish debts alone were several times his future viceregal salary of about 60,000 *pesos* a year. Still, the fabled wealth of Peru had been making Spaniards' fortunes since the days of the Pizarro brothers, and it is reasonable to assume that Castelldosrius hoped to repair his ruined fortunes through fees charged for appointments to office, private investments, and other payments related to his official duties. Many of these sources of income would be considered corrupt in the present day, but they were an expected part of official life in early modern times. In addition to repairing his own depleted finances, Castelldosrius hoped that Peru would produce revenue that his king desperately needed for the ongoing war.

In early March of 1706, Castelldosrius finally sailed from Cádiz with the Tierra Firme Fleet under the command of Don José Fernández de Santillán, the Count of Casa Alegre. The voyage was anxiously monitored on both sides of the Atlantic, as well as in the Mar del Sur, but the nature of the anxiety varied from one interest group to another. The crown wanted the Portobello fairs revived and a regular flow

of trade and revenue reestablished to fund the viceroyalty and support the war. Ordinary consumers in Peru wanted a reliable source of merchandise. Vice-regal officials wanted their salaries paid and enough money in the public coffers to properly fulfill their duties. And merchants in Peru wanted to make a profit, whatever else happened. With English pirates in the vicinity and illicit commerce widespread in the Mar del Sur, the merchants of Lima had reason to doubt the value of the Portobello fair to their interests. Their willingness to make the long, dangerous journey from Peru to and from Portobello, or to entrust their money and merchandise to agents, depended on the attitude of the new holder of the viceregal office. Viceroys of Peru had to calibrate their exercise of authority very carefully and choose their battles more carefully still. If they alienated the local power structure, they would not have been able to govern at all. Castelldosrius knew this intellectually, but he would often forget to modify his behavior accordingly.

When the fleet reached Cartagena de Indias on April 27, 1706, Castelldosrius expected to continue his journey to Peru almost immediately. Instead, he spent nearly a year trying to arrange transport, first to Portobello, then to Panamá, and finally to Lima. In the meantime, he sent a steady stream of letters to Lima, urging the merchants to prepare to attend a fair at Portobello. The Audiencia of Lima had been running the government since September 1705, after Viceroy Monclova died in office. The members of the Audiencia lacked the moral authority to coerce the merchants to go to Portobello, even if they possessed the will to do so, which is doubtful. Castelldosrius realized immediately that the members of the Audiencia had been governing Peru less as united representatives of a monarchy and more as a quarrelsome oligarchy, with multiple voices rather than one.

On December 31, 1706, Castelldosrius wrote two letters from Panamá, one to the Audiencia of Lima and the other to the merchant consulate. He told the Audiencia that the fate of the monarchy depended upon their efforts and argued that their young king merited an offer, "not only of our fortunes, but also of our lives, as he had exposed his own life to danger [in battle] for the conservation and universal glory of the kingdom." King Felipe had charged him above all to prevent illicit commerce, and he urged the members of the Audiencia to do everything they could to stop it as well. Castelldosrios also noted that he had served,

> five years in the embassy of France, at the feet of the Most Christian king [Louis XIV], and he instructed me well to know how much it is against the royal mind to permit the excesses that some private individuals attempt, abandoning his grace and favor.

In his other letter, Castelldosrius assured the merchant community in Lima that he would deal truly and honestly with them. They would have a viceroy who, after his service to God, would devote his time,

> to nothing more than the service of [the king] his master, the public good, and his own conscience (*propio punto*), which he has known how to conserve in thirty-nine years of public service from one place to another; and who is not so imprudent as to offer to do things that he cannot accomplish, and therefore to expose your graces to disappointment with him later ....[30]

At about the same time, Castelldosrius borrowed money from a merchant in Panamá to pay off his remaining European debts, a reminder that a lack of funds continued to plague him. In addition to the many Frenchmen in his entourage, Castelldosrius had also recruited several Spaniards in Cartagena. Arriving with a portable administration was not unusual for a new viceroy; in fact it was traditional. A viceroy enjoyed broad powers of appointment as one of the major benefits of his post. He could reward loyal retainers, consolidate family influence, pay back favors, collect fees from new appointees, and enhance his own power and prestige, all without costing the crown any money. Moreover, arriving with a ready-made network of loyal subordinates meant that a new viceroy could install an administrative structure more quickly than we might assume. Castelldosrius and most of his entourage arrived in Lima in March 1707, and he immediately dispatched his new appointees to the main population centers of the viceroyalty. By the time he officially took possession of his office on 22 May, his administration had already settled in.

Royal finances in Peru were a shambles, in part because of the hiatus in the Portobello fairs. Castelldosrius found that the viceroyalty, far from being the cash-cow that Madrid and Paris imagined, had been running a deficit for years, with about 1.5 million *pesos* in annual income and 1.7 million *pesos* in annual expenses. Among many other items, the expenses included a cavalry regiment, the chaplains of the cathedral choir in Lima, and ongoing repairs for damages from the 1687 earthquake. With added wartime expenses and disruptions and no subsidies from the crown, by 1707 the viceroyalty had debts of over five and a half million *pesos* and only 600,000 *pesos* on hand, all of which Castelldosrius immediately spent on defense. Perhaps as a symbolic gesture to distance himself from French interests, his official portrait in 1707 show him clad in the all-black costume and flat collar (*golilla*) also worn by

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[30] Quotations are translated from the two letters in Manuel Moreyra y Paz Soldán, ed., *Tribunal del Consulado de Lima, Cuaderno de Juntas (1706–1720)*, vol. 1 (Lima, 1956), 1: 41–43.

Viceroy Monclova and Felipe V. Castelldosrius's facial features are depicted as quite stern, presumably reflecting his image in Peru when he took office.

Figure 6.5 – Manuel de Oms, Marquess of Castelldosrius,
as viceroy of Peru, 1707

Viceroy Castelldosrius soon realized that illicit commerce with French interlopers in the Mar del Sur was rampant and largely uncontrolled, and he blamed the situation on the merchants themselves. He learned that companies in Lima had actually been formed to invest in French contraband by "persons in authority, gentlemen, and others of all status and professions," in the words of Pedro de Ulaortua y Garazatua, a wealthy local merchant.[31] Castelldosrius understood that the lack of official fleets to Tierra Firme had encouraged their behavior and that the port of Pisco was central to the contraband trade. Pisco's gain was Lima's loss. As the French engineer, Amedée François Frézier, would write in 1712,

[31] Memo to the crown, January 1708, by Pedro de Ulaortua y Garazatua, quoted in Nuria Sala i Vila, "Una Corona bien vale un Virreinato: el marqués de Castelldosrius, primer Virrey Borbónico del Perú (1707-1710)", in Alfredo Moreno Cebrián, and N. Sala i Vila, *El "premio" de ser virrey. Los intereses públicos/ privados del gobierno virreinal en el Perú de Felipe V,* Col. Biblioteca de Historia de América: 33 (Madrid: C.S.I.C., 2004), p. 41.

> It is true that Lima is in some fashion the depository of the treasures of Peru, of which it is the capital. A few years ago, it was estimated that more than six million *écus* were spent there; one must reduce that estimate greatly today, since the trade of the French has brought merchandise from Europe at low prices, and the transactions carried out in Arica, Ylo, and Pisco have diverted money that used to go to Lima, so that the town at present is poor in comparison to what it had been before.[32]

There were enough merchants in Lima involved in French contraband to outrage their new viceroy. If they expected him to turn a blind eye to their activities, they were badly mistaken. Instead, with breathtaking speed, considering the distances and surface area involved and the fact that he was a complete newcomer to Peru, Castelldosrius devised a plan to make the contraband trade unprofitable. In the words of the historian, Geoffrey Walker,

> A de facto trading company run by the viceroy's associates absorbed control of existing groups involved in illicit commerce. In exchange for paying a tax to the viceroy's company—reputedly worth 25 percent of the total volume in some places—the merchants could continue doing business as they had in the past few years. ... The viceroy's company issued receipts for the tax, which allowed the merchants and their goods free passage. If they refused to pay, they saw their goods confiscated as contraband, with the denouncer claiming a share as legal compensation. Either way, Castelldosrius and his network benefited. The whole system was set in place and functioning toward the end of 1707. At the very least, it speaks well of Castelldosrius's organizational skills.[33]

Walker interpreted the plan as proof of the viceroy's corruption, but taxing contraband followed the precedent of the indults mentioned in the previous chapter and benefited the crown as well as Castelldosrius and his network of appointed officials. Jolted out of their lethargy by this turn of events, the merchants soon added real conviction to their habitual calls for the suppression of illicit commerce.

The dismal state of finances in the viceroyalty induced Castelldosrius to risk alienating other members of the local elite as well. In the fall of 1707, he used every possible expedient to collect a respectable pile of money to send to Madrid for the war effort. His sources—all duly recorded—included the salaries from vacant offices, unclaimed legacies, income from ancient *encomiendas*, coerced donations from anyone with money and pretensions to royal favor, and half a year's salary from the *corregidores* in the viceroyalty. In a few months, he had gathered 1,379,310 *pesos* to send to the crown—an astonishing accomplishment at a time when the viceroyalty

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[32] Amedée François Frézier, *Relation du Voyage de la mer du Sud au côtes du Chili et du Pérou, et de Brésil, fait pendant les années 1712, 1713, et 1714* (Paris, 1716), p. 196.

[33] Walker, *Spanish Politics and Imperial Trade*, pp. 41–42.

had a deficit of five and a half million *pesos* and virtually no cash on hand. That was more than his precursor Monclova had sent to Madrid in sixteen years.

The benefits of Castelldosrius's zeal in a few short months were extraordinary, but so were the costs. He had alienated an impressive assortment of powerful citizens in Peru: merchants involved in illicit commerce; officials whom his appointees had replaced; several members of the Audiencia; everyone forced to contribute to the extraordinary levy; and even viceroy Monclova's widow, who was being pressed to explain the sources of her husband's very large estate. On the road to Lima, Castelldosrius ordered an embargo of 1,000,000 *pesos* from Monclova's estate, as insurance pending the outcome of the *residencia* for his years in office in Peru. Monclova's widow and her son contested the embargo most vigorously. Like other individuals whom Castelldosrius offended in various ways, they had well-connected family and friends, enmeshed in social and political networks of long standing in Peru.

THE WAR OF SUCCESSION GRINDS ON

By 1706, the war had been going on for five years, with many changes in loyalty, depending on which side had an advantage at any given time. Portugal and Savoy, reluctant early adherents to the Bourbon cause, later joined forces with the Austrian Habsburgs, England, and the Dutch Republic in opposition to the Bourbons. The Archduke Karl Habsburg received a major boost when Catalonia shifted to the Habsburg side in 1704. As a result, Castelldosrius's estates in Catalonia were confiscated, further reducing his resources before he sailed for Peru. The leaders of the anti-Bourbon coalition—primarily England and the Dutch Republic—focused their support on helping the Habsburg pretender to reach Madrid. It was up to him to stay there and consolidate his support in Spain as a whole.

The anti-Bourbon allies marched eastward from Portugal and captured Madrid in late June of 1706, though King Felipe, along with his queen and their court, had fled the capital before the allies arrived. In their absence, María Ana of Neuburg, the German aunt of Archduke Karl and dowager Queen of Spain, took it upon herself to sign a capitulation with the invading forces from her residence in Toledo. At that point, observing the growing strength of the Habsburg cause, Louis XIV proposed terms to end the war, sacrificing his grandson's throne along with the Spanish Empire in America. The anti-Bourbon allies rejected his terms, however, and the war continued.

The allied occupation of Madrid in 1706 lasted only two months due to the hostility of the population, and King Felipe re-entered the capital in triumph in August. Against the advice of some of his advisers, the king took revenge against any

nobles who had supported the Habsburg pretender and against Catalonia in general, regardless of the individual actions of its citizens. As a result, over the next few years Archduke Karl solidified his support in Catalonia and elsewhere in the Crown of Aragón. Meanwhile, the citizenry of Castile and a sizeable portion of the Castilian nobility continued to support King Felipe V and Queen María Luisa Gabriela. The birth of an heir in August of 1707, named Luis in honor of Louis XIV, secured the Bourbon succession in Spain, but only if Felipe could win the war, which was by no means assured.

HOPE AND DISASTER IN PERU

In the first years of the war, treasure fleets arriving from New Spain allowed Felipe V to pay his grandfather for continued French aid. Peru had not been able to contribute much to the war effort, and Viceroy Castelldosrius's primary task was to restore the flow of tax revenue, which meant above all reviving the Portobello fairs. While Castelldosrius supervised the extraordinary tax levy in 1707, he also persuaded the merchants of Lima to attend or send representatives to the Portobello fair and to pay for the escort fleet that would carry them as far as Panama. They left from the port of Callao on December 19, 1707, sailed to the west coast of Panama, and then trekked across the Isthmus of Panama to Portobello. After they arrived, the first major Portobello fair in more than a decade took place in April and May of 1708.

In exchange for the merchants' agreement to participate in the Portobello fair, Castelldosrius issued orders barring illicit trade and expelling French interlopers from the viceroyalty. That was easier said than done, however. When the French ship *L'Aimable* arrived in Callao to fetch silver to repay Louis XIV's aid to Spain, Castelldosrius told Captain Michel Chabert that his treasury was empty, but he eventually put together a package of loans that produced another 300,000 *pesos* to send to France. Unfortunately, at the same time other French ships continued to smuggle merchandise into ports down the coast. Did Castelldosrius permit the contraband trade to occur—and even profit from it, as his enemies claimed—or was he simply incapable of stopping it? Whatever the truth of the matter, as long as contraband goods continued to arrive in Peru, those goods would undercut the prices of the registered merchandise bought at the Portobello fair, and the merchants were sure to blame Castelldosrius for their losses.

Worse was yet to come. The Tierra Firme fleet that had arrived in Cartagena de Indias in 1706 with Viceroy Castelldosrius eventually escorted the merchant vessels to Portobello for the long-delayed fair. When the fair ended in late May of 1708, fourteen merchant ships and their escort, including the galleons *San José* and *San Joaquín*, left Portobello to return to Cartagena de Indias on route to Spain.

Under the command of the Count of Casa Alegre, the small fleet carried tax revenues vital to Felipe V's war effort and private funds from merchants and others. Casa Alegre was well aware that a squadron of four armed English warships had been patrolling the route from Portobello to Cartagena for several months, hoping to intercept the ships returning from the fair. Nonetheless, he trusted that the ships under his protection could reach Cartagena safely. He was wrong. In the late afternoon of June 8th, the English squadron overtook the small Spanish fleet. Casa Alegre ordered the unarmed merchant ships to continue to Cartagena, while the seven Spanish ships that carried sufficient artillery turned to face the English.

The battle lasted for several hours in the fading light. At about 7:30 in the evening, fire erupted on the *San José*, Casa Alegre's flagship, which seems to have caused the powder magazine to explode. The ship sank in a few minutes, drowning nearly all of the individuals aboard—some 600 in all—including Captain General Casa Alegre. The second galleon in the chain of command, *San Joaquín*, had drifted away from the battle site before the *San José* sank, having sustained too much damage to be maneuverable. The English captured the third ship in the chain of command, and the Spaniards deliberately grounded and burned another ship that had participated in the fight, while the rest reached Cartagena safely. After undergoing emergency repairs at sea, the *San Joaquín* reached Cartagena the next day, its commander having outwitted the captains of the two English warships pursuing it.

Before the Spanish fleet left Portobello, nearly all of the funds and other valuables belonging to the crown and consigned by private individuals were divided equally between the two principal ships in the fleet, following standard practice. The commander of the English squadron, Commodore Charles Wager, had hoped to capture both principal ships. With the *San José* sunk and the *San Joaquín* safe in Cartagena, however, he could only profit from the contents of the third ship, which was nonetheless a handsome prize. The loss of the *San José* was an unrelieved disaster for the Spanish crown and the private individuals who had valuables on board. Moreover, because of the ongoing war, the *San Joaquín* would not return to Europe until 1712, by which time most of the funds it carried had been spent on repairs and maintenance in Cartagena.

The merchants who had attended the Portobello fair experienced further losses on the way back to Lima. Their complicated return journey retraced the route across the Isthmus of Panama, after which they loaded the goods they had bought at the fair and the rest of their funds on ships bound for Lima's port of Callao. Even before they left Panama, however, English privateers under Thomas Colb captured seven of the fourteen laden sloops (*balandras*) and more than half the merchandise. Storms forced the other ships to unload in the port of Paita, and the goods they carried had to be

transported overland to Lima at additional expense. By the time the merchants and their goods arrived in the capital, the continuing contraband trade had saturated the local markets with cheaper goods, undercutting demand for the merchandise they carried.

ACCUSATIONS AGAINST VICEROY CASTELLDOSRIUS

Not surprisingly, the merchants blamed Castelldosrius for the whole series of disasters associated with the Portobello fair. Their fury translated into accusations that he had encouraged and profited from the illicit commerce, rather than stamping it out as he had promised. A long list of additional accusations questioned his loyalty to the crown, his piety, his honesty, his attention to duty, and his commitment to the well-being of citizens in the viceroyalty—all matters that Madrid took quite seriously. Denunciations of the viceroy flowed from several other directions as well in the months after the Portobello fair, generated by the various interest groups that he had offended during his brief tenure.

The damning charges against Castelldosrius were sent to Europe with Captain Chabert and *L'Aimable* in the late summer of 1708. The viceroy was well aware of his enemies' activities, which provides further proof of the efficiency of his administrative network. Along with the funds he had gathered for the crown, he sent several sealed boxes of documents on *L'Aimable* to his daughter Catalina in Madrid, where she served as a lady-in-waiting to Queen María Luisa Gabriela, hoping that the documents would exonerate him.

In February of 1709, Castelldosrius also sent an explanation of the plot against him to his son Antonio, entrusting his letter to a cleric on his way to Mexico. His sense of helplessness, isolation, and disillusion permeates the letter. In vigorous and unguarded language, Castelldosrius warned his son against several Spaniards who had become tools of the French smugglers, and he railed against the calumny and ingratitude of those who had benefited from his patronage and then betrayed him. He also told his son that Captain Chabert had turned against him as well. Most disheartening, he had come to doubt the commitment of his royal patrons to the best interests of Peru. Because he had only forty soldiers to patrol hundreds of miles of coastline, Castelldosrius argued that the illicit trade could only be stopped at its source,

> ... and thus the blame lies with he who permits and tolerates it and not with this viceroy, who cannot prevent it; more than recognizing that, if those who are able to

> impede the traffic from Europe do not do so, it is a sign that the thing that is desired is the same as the thing that is censured.[34]

In the midst of his troubles, the viceroy continued to participate in the active cultural life he sponsored in Lima. There is a general consensus that Castelldosrius was a man of sophisticated tastes, a lover of fine food and music, and an accomplished guitarist. The concerts, literary discussion groups, and other activities he sponsored gained him supporters among the cultured sectors of the Peruvian elite. He also indulged his taste for French fashion, soon exchanging plain black for the more colorful wardrobe he had adopted in France.

Figure 6.6 – Viceroy Castelldosrius in French garb, ca. 1709

The same Tierra Firme Fleet that had brought Castelldosrius to America in 1706 carried dozens of different kinds of cloth made all over western Europe. Because of wartime restrictions, the cargo had been divided into licit and illicit items, the latter produced in enemy countries such as the Netherlands and England but which could be shipped after the shipper paid a fine to acquire an exemption from the

[34] Quoted in Alfredo Sáenz-Rico Urbina, "Las acusaciones contra el virrey del Perú, marqués de Castelldosrius, y sus 'Noticias reservadas' (Febrero 1709)," *Boletín Americanista* 28 (1978), p. 125.

restrictions, as noted earlier. The cargo in 1706 included fine woolen cloth made in Holland from Spanish merino wool; double camel-hair cloth 'of Smyrna,' (perhaps referring to a type of cloth rather than its origin); satin with a woven gold floral design; various types of printed cottons from France; durable woolen cloth called *sempiternas*; fine woolen twills called *anascotes* from Leiden and England that were used for religious habits; seven different types of linen; cloth of gold and silver; rough burlap; and a range of other cloth made from a variety of fibers. In addition, the cargo included cotton thread in various colors and items such as small loops (*presillas*) to secure buttons, plus other fasteners.

Some ready-made articles of clothing were also shipped on the 1706 Tierra Firme Fleet, including fine woolen stockings for men, women, and children; silk stockings; various sorts of linen underwear; handkerchiefs; and woven belts and sashes. All of these items were accessories, rather than garments. The only true garments on the list were loose coats called *chamarretas*, with sleeves and open fronts—a French style very popular at the time. An astonishing quantity of headgear also arrived on the fleet: some 70,000 ordinary hats of various sorts, plus a few hundred hats made of felted beaver hair or vicuña fiber. For the latter, fleece from the prized Peruvian vicuñas, related to llamas, was exported to Spain and then returned to Peru in the form of luxury hats. The 1706 fleet had also carried two large boxes of feathers for hats, suggestive of the plumed headgear worn by the gun-toting angels described in the previous chapter. Judging from the luxurious merchandise carried on the 1706 Tierra Firme Fleet and similar goods arriving as contraband, Peruvians were already beginning to adopt French fashions. Although local merchants decried the competition that those fashions represented and blamed Castelldosrius for failing to prevent their arrival, many of those same merchants were active participants in the contraband trade.

When Captain Chabert and *L'Aimable* reached Spain, the charges against Castelldosrius began to move through the bureaucracy unchallenged, because Chabert delayed releasing the boxes of exonerating evidence that Castelldosrius had entrusted to him. Seven months after *L'Aimable* arrived, Castelldosrius's daughter Catalina complained that she still had not received the boxes sent to her. As a result, the Council of the Indies had little to weigh against the damning list of accusations when they began to consider the matter in April of 1709. Hoping to forestall a decision that was likely to damage her father, Doña Catalina filed a petition with the Council of the Indies in the fall of 1709 requesting a full investigation of the charges against him. She evidently failed to persuade the members of the council, and the case moved forward.

Their deliberations coincided with a worsening situation for the Bourbon cause. A shortage of funds, an economic crisis brought on by bad weather and poor

harvests, and allied military gains persuaded Louis XIV to withdraw material support for his grandson in 1709, much to the dismay of the young king and queen and the Princess of Ursins. Moreover, that same year the pope recognized the Habsburg pretender as the legitimate King of Spain. In April of 1710 the Council of the Indies recommended removing Castelldosrius from office, forcing Felipe V to accept the bitter reality that the first Spaniard to salute him as king had betrayed his trust. Before leaving Madrid for an assault against the Habsburg pretender's armies in the spring of 1710, the king signed papers appointing a new viceroy for Peru. Although no one in Madrid knew it yet, Castelldosrius was already beyond their jurisdiction. He died in Lima on April 24, 1710, mercifully unaware of his disgrace.

THE ALLIED CAPTURE OF MADRID IN 1710[35]

In mid-June, the Bourbon army lost a series of bloody skirmishes at Almenara in Aragon. Rebounding, on 20 August the 30,000 troops of the allied armies shattered the Bourbon army of about 19,000 men at the Battle of Zaragoza. In an ironic twist of fate, Castelldosrius's son, Antonio, died at Zaragoza fighting for Felipe V. With the capital once again open to enemy occupation, the king retreated to Madrid and on 7 September decided to move the royal family and the whole administrative apparatus of the monarchy to Valladolid, though he permitted anyone to remain in Madrid who wished to do so. An enormous exodus took place. Within a few days, some 30,000 people left Madrid. Although that number seems astonishing, it comes from an official count taken in Valladolid to gauge the number of refugees and their potential effect on limited local resources.

Archduke Karl traveled toward Madrid after the victory at Zaragoza, escorted by the Austrian army of Guido Starhemberg and the British army of James Stanhope, plus Portuguese and Dutch contingents. As soon as they entered Castile, however, they encountered the same hostility they had faced four years earlier. The Sardinian nobleman, Don Vicente Bacallar y Sanna (1669–1726), Marquess of San Felipe, wrote extensively on the events of the war in Spain. According to his commentary, as the anti-Bourbon allies marched toward Madrid, the population "abandoned their towns, drained the water supplies, and burned forage and provisions, even those they needed for their own sustenance."[36]

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[35] Portions of the following discussion first appeared in my article, "The Allied Occupation of Madrid in 1710: A Turning Point in the War of the Spanish Succession," *Bulletin for Spanish and Portuguese Historical Studies*: Vol. 35: Issue 1, Article 2, 2010, excerpted here by permission.

[36] Vicente Bacallar y Sanna, *Comentarios de la guerra de España e historia de su rey Felipe V, El Animoso*, ed. Carlos Seco Serrano (Madrid: Atlas, 1957), p. 205. All material related to the 1710 occupation of Madrid appears on pp. 205–18 of this edition, which is available online.

Nearing Madrid, the allied armies marched ahead, while the archduke took up residence in the requisitioned country house of the Count of Aguilar, one of King Felipe's military commanders. Entering the capital, Stanhope's British contingent sacked the sanctuary of Nuestra Señora de Atocha, which turned out to be a serious blunder. Traditionally, victorious Spanish armies offered banners to the image of Our Lady of Atocha as they reached Madrid from the southeast, and King Felipe had done the same when he reentered the capital in 1706. The desecration of the revered sanctuary of Atocha by the British hardened attitudes against the invading allied force. Presumably to divert attention from the bad behavior of his allies, Archduke Karl repeated his earlier promises to confirm all the honors, offices, properties, and other marks of distinction that elite families had enjoyed under the Habsburgs, in exchange for their loyalty. His blandishments had some effect, but mainly among those who already supported him.

On 28 September, the archduke, styling himself Carlos III of Spain, heard mass in the church of Our Lady of Atocha and then continued toward the royal palace in what was planned as his triumphal entry. Instead of cheering throngs, however, he saw virtually empty streets, with shops closed and buildings turning a blind eye to the street, bolted and shuttered. The capital was not deserted, but it might as well have been. With a much-reduced population and very little in the way of government structure, the remaining citizens of Madrid resisted the second occupation of the capital, just as they had resisted the first. Disheartened by encountering a court without people, Archduke Karl never reached the royal palace, instead turning back out of town to the country house of the Count of Aguilar. He invited loyal members of the Spanish elite to pay their respects to him there, but few distinguished individuals appeared and they were held in contempt, not only by supporters of King Felipe but also by generals Starhemberg and Stanhope and the archduke himself. Although the archduke created an administration with those who claimed to support him, he knew that he had failed to win over the citizens of the capital and could only hold it through harsh measures. By that time, France was back in the war, and the Duke of Vendôme had assumed practical command of the Bourbon army in Spain, which put additional pressure on the allied forces in Madrid.

As mentioned in an earlier chapter, on 12 October 1710, General Starhemberg attempted to remove sources of political intrigue from Madrid by ordering all resident noblewomen to relocate to Toledo, which was under the control of General Stanhope and his British troops. Although the women had only four days to obey the order, most seem to have done so, especially the partisans of the Archduke Karl, taking up residence in monasteries in Toledo. Those who ignored the order took care to stay out of sight, either at home or in monasteries in Madrid. Predictably, the noblemen with King Felipe in Valladolid were outraged by the forced relocation and virtual house

arrest of their family members. On 29 October, the Duke of Vendôme sent a letter to General Starhemberg to protest their treatment. Starhemberg responded curtly that his orders were designed to protect the ladies in question, adding the insulting suggestion that the noblemen supporting King Felipe were also being held against their wills.

WAITING FOR PORTUGUESE REINFORCEMENTS

The allied forces occupying Madrid were waiting for a Portuguese army to join them from the west before trying to conquer the rest of Castile. It was Vendôme's task to prevent that from happening. With seasoned French troops arriving in Navarre under the Duke of Noailles, Vendôme could plan his strategy. Old, fat, slovenly, and indolent, Vendôme could nonetheless rise to greatness when the situation demanded. Rather than trying to dislodge the occupying armies from Madrid, he and the king left Valladolid on 3 October, leading a forced march to the west in order to block the bridges that the Portuguese army needed to reach Madrid. At the same time, Queen María Luisa Gabriela and the infant Prince of Asturias, along with most of the court nobility and the government tribunals, traveled from Valladolid to Victoria in Navarre.

The bridge over the Tagus River at Almaraz was the crucial choke point for the Portuguese army. Without that bridge, built in 1537, there was no way to march a large army and its equipment into Castile. The Spanish army, shattered at the Battle of Zaragoza in late August, had regrouped in less than two months. By late October, the army may have numbered some 22,000 men. Under Vendôme and King Felipe, the troops settled in to defend the bridge, supplied with food by local townspeople and villagers, despite their own privations in a lean year. Smaller contingents guarded the bridges at Alcántara and Puente del Arzobispo. As a result, the Portuguese army could not advance. In Madrid and Toledo, Starhemberg and Stanhope waited in vain for their arrival, unable to find out what was causing the delay and facing ever shorter rations as time wore on.

A key element in their predicament was the continued harassment by two cavalry contingents operating near Madrid, one led by field marshal (*mariscal de campo*) Don Feliciano de Bracamonte, and the other led by Don José Vallejo. Vicente Bacallar calls them "men of the utmost valor, expertise, and fidelity [to Felipe V], and, against the enemy army, they could count on as many spies as there were residents in the towns and villages in the vicinity."[37] They blocked the various mountain passes into the capital from the north, attacked enemy soldiers who

[37] Bacallar, *Comentarios*, p. 207.

ventured away from their camps, captured convoys of food commandeered from the countryside, and intercepted communications to and from Madrid. Aided in all these endeavors by the local citizenry, they effectively isolated the armies occupying Madrid and Toledo. In short, the opposition to the allied invasion was nothing short of guerrilla warfare, nearly a century before such actions are thought to have begun during the Napoleonic invasion of Spain. At the same time, King Felipe showed his determination to defend Spain against foreign invasion, which gave a powerful boost to his popularity.

The occupying armies quickly fell into bad habits, with tacit encouragement from their leaders. Both Bacallar and an anonymous eyewitness in Madrid[38] chronicled the occupying soldiers' debauchery, looting, drunkenness, sacrilege, and desecration of buildings, holy images, and sacramental objects revered by the local Roman Catholic population. Both authors blamed German, English, and Dutch 'heretics' for most of the damage, and Bacallar took pains to note that Archduke Karl would never have permitted insults to the religion that he shared with Spaniards. Nonetheless, soldiers from all the occupying forces participated. The result was to drive the local population ever deeper into opposition to the Habsburg pretender. The residents balked as much as they dared in providing food, fuel, and other supplies demanded from them. They knew the invaders could not last long.

Archduke Karl had no illusions about his situation. A 'kissing of hands' arranged for his twenty-fifth birthday on the first of October turned into an embarrassing demonstration of how little support he enjoyed in Madrid. Vallejo intercepted a letter from the archduke to his wife in Barcelona, complaining that the citizens of Madrid did not support him; only three men of distinction had joined his side, and they had neither money nor authority. It became clear that he could not remain in Madrid without the occupying armies. Vallejo intercepted another letter, this time from Archduke Karl's wife in Barcelona, with the bad news that an attempt to conquer the city of Valencia in his name had failed. According to Bacallar, before Vendôme and the king left Valladolid for Almaraz, "Don Jerónimo de Solís brought these letters to King Felipe ..., who ordered them read in public, along with his expressions of gratitude to the Castilian people."[39]

Starhemberg and Stanhope eventually learned why the Portuguese had not arrived. With winter approaching, they called a council of war to decide what to do. The occupying armies could not stay in Madrid. By the first week of November, they

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[38] [Anon.], *"Relación diaria de todo lo succedido en Madrid, desde el dia 20 de Agosto, hasta el dia 3 de diciembre de este año de 1710. en que S.M. entró en su Corte,"* in *Papeles curiosos en prosa y verso de los años de 1710 y 1711 (BN, Ms. 10.907),* fols. 15–29.

[39] Bacallar, *Comentarios*, pp. 206–207.

had used up all the grain commandeered from the city's storehouses, monasteries, mills, and private homes. Every day brought fresh outrages as the soldiers foraged for food. The decision was made to move the occupying forces to Toledo on the pretext of establishing the archduke's government there, but actually as a prelude to retreating into Aragón. On 9 November, all the new appointees of the archduke's government were ordered to go to Toledo, since the troops would not remain in Madrid to protect them, and they would be "exposed to the insults of children."[40] On 11 November, on the march at Ciempozuelos, Archduke Karl rescinded the decree that had exiled the noblewomen to Toledo, repeating that the decree had been for their protection, and freeing them to return to Madrid or to go wherever they chose.

The occupying armies stopped only briefly in Toledo before heading toward Aragón, though Starhemberg made a show of having trenches dug, as if preparing for a long defense of the city. When his forces left Toledo on 23 November, the citizens immediately closed the gates and proclaimed for Felipe V from the ramparts, within earshot of the departing troops. The troops just kept going. By then, relations between the two principal commanders were so strained that the various contingents marched far apart from one another, and Starhemberg was the only officer that everyone would obey. As Bacallar described the retreat, the Portuguese and Palatines marched in the vanguard, the Germans and Dutch in the center, and the English in the rear guard, with the Catalonian cavalry guarding the flanks of the center. Some of the soldiers went off on their own to rob nearby villages or steal cattle. In a continuation of the guerrilla war, Bacallar noted that many of the allied soldiers who left their units, "did not return and became victims of the hatred of the peasants, who armed themselves in defense."[41] The allied commanders did not expect the Bourbon forces to pursue them. That proved to be a fatal mistake.

Immediately upon hearing that the occupying armies had left Madrid for Toledo, King Felipe and Vendôme marched the army from Almaraz. Their Portuguese adversaries simply turned around and went into winter quarters. The Bourbon army, supposedly numbering some 25,000 men by then, was close to Toledo when word came that Starhemberg was instead retreating toward Aragón. With fresh troops eager to avenge the defeat at Zaragoza, the king and Vendôme moved the army in pursuit. After cavalry contingents made sure that Madrid was secure, King Felipe and Vendôme entered the capital on 3 December, stopping first at the sanctuary of the Virgen of Atocha, and then proceeding by coach toward the royal palace. As Bacallar described the scene, "the multitude of the people who had come out to see him, bless him, and acclaim him, [meant] that the coach could scarcely make any headway along

[40] "Relación diaria," in *Papeles curiosos,* fols. 26v-27r.
[41] Bacallar, *Comentarios,* p. 212.

the road, which, although the distance was not more than half a league, took many hours for them to arrive at the palace. The streets and fountains were adorned with the most exquisite decorations, and that night fireworks and illuminations followed, and [the people displayed] such universal joy that presaged the most favorable events."[42]

Vendôme rejoined his contingent of the Bourbon army on 6 December. In the meantime, the cavalry units of Bracamonte and Vallejo harassed Stanhope's rear guard, while the Bourbon army marched to overtake them. Stanhope ordered his troops to spend the night in the town of Brihuega, so as to cross the Tagus River the next morning. During the night, Vendôme sent part of his army to cut Stanhope off from Starhemberg and defend the river. After a brief skirmish on the morning of 7 December, Stanhope realized he was trapped. He sent word to Starhemberg, then far ahead, and spent the rest of the day in a heroic effort to trench, mine, and otherwise fortify Brihuega against the approaching Bourbon forces. King Felipe and his army had left Madrid at dawn on the seventh. He arrived at Brihuega with the vanguard at midday on the eighth, turning heavy artillery on the town walls but failing to open a sufficient breach to mount a full assault. The rest of his army arrived on the morning of the ninth, and they knew that they had to attack before Starhemberg returned.

Despite Stanhope's best efforts, the Battle of Brihuega on 8–9 December was a crushing defeat for the British. Stanhope finally surrendered after dark on the ninth, along with a reported 4,800 British soldiers and two other generals. The prisoners were sent in various directions into the interior of Castile under armed escorts, with orders to keep marching all night and the next day without stopping. Bacallar noted that Stanhope's troops had committed many thefts and acts of sacrilege in Toledo, whose patroness was Saint Leocadia. The British had been defeated on 9 December, her saint's day. "Though heretics will laugh at that," Bacallar added, "the fact is certain: Providence does not include coincidence, nor does divine justice forget."[43] Stanhope would remain in Spain for two years as a prisoner of war.

In the short term, worse was yet to come for the allies. After General Starhemberg turned his troops around to aid Stanhope, they kept marching until 10 December, unaware of the definitive defeat at Brihuega. Vendôme prepared to receive them on an exposed hill near Villaviciosa de Tajuña. Starhemberg had 17,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry. Vendôme and the Spaniards had 10,000 infantry, many of them new recruits, and 9,000 cavalry, including the units of Bracamonte and Vallejo. When Starhemberg arrived, he bombarded the Spanish position with heavy

[42] Bacallar, *Comentarios,* p. 212–13.
[43] Bacallar, *Comentarios,* p. 215.

artillery but did not attack, having learned of Stanhope's defeat. Vendôme guessed that Starhemberg planned to wait until the eleventh and then withdraw to Aragón, so he ordered an immediate attack. The subsequent Battle of Villaviciosa was very costly in terms of human life, and some military analysts call it indecisive. Many of the Spanish infantry units fled as the fighting intensified, but the furious assaults of the cavalry and the persistence of a few key infantry units kept Starhemberg's infantry at bay. At nightfall, Starhemberg withdrew to the woods, where the Spanish cavalry could not function effectively, and held a council of war. According to Bacallar, many of Starhemberg's officers wanted to surrender, but Starhemberg decided to see what the morning would bring. King Felipe spent the night in his carriage on the battlefield, surrounded by the dead and wounded.

On the morning of the eleventh, Starhemberg could see only the opposing cavalry units and decided to withdraw with his remaining troops toward Aragón, traveling through wooded areas wherever possible. Though the Spanish cavalry units wanted to block the route into Aragón and resume the battle, Vendôme judged that too risky. Instead, José de Vallejo's cavalry unit captured the artillery and baggage trains of the allied armies as they retreated. According to Bacallar, no more than 6,000 men remained with Starhemberg after the Battle of Villaviciosa. Though Starhemberg would claim victory and blame Stanhope for any losses, it is clear that the battles of Brihuega and Villaviciosa were disastrous for the anti-Bourbon allies.

News of the Bourbon victories quickly traveled to the rest of Europe. Britain's Queen Anne and her advisers always had limited objectives in the war and had made clear early on that they only contributed men and funds to seat Archduke Karl on the throne of Spain; it was up to him, backed by his other allies, to remain there. That is why British commanders insisted on occupying Madrid in 1706 and 1710, against the judgment of other allied leaders. That approach failed both times. Although the War of Succession lasted until 1714, after the disasters connected with the occupation of Madrid in 1710 the British and the Dutch would not commit troops to support the Habsburg pretender's claims. They lost interest in his pretensions altogether in 1711, when he became the top candidate for the imperial crown.

Ironically, Archduke Karl's transition from self-styled king of Spain to heir-apparent to the Holy Roman Empire only strengthened the adherence of his true loyalists, among them the widowed Countess of Oropesa. Her brother, the Duke of Uceda, had served as King Felipe's diplomatic plenipotentiary in Italy in 1710, while still disguising his preference for the Habsburg pretender. When Uceda finally declared his true loyalty, he gave Archduke Karl all the official documents he had amassed from his years in King Felipe's service.

POSTHUMOUS VICTORY FOR CASTELLDOSRIUS

As the war continued, Castelldosrius's daughter Catalina championed the family's honor after the deaths of her father and eldest brother. The standard investigation (*residencia*) of Castelldosrius's term in office became more complicated because of the charges and countercharges surrounding his brief tenure. The investigation in Peru and lasted for several years, during which time it became clear that Castelldosrius had many supporters in the viceroyalty as well as enemies. The official outcome (*sentencia*) of the investigation, dated in Lima on 24 October 1716, exonerated him on all charges. The Audiencia of Lima duly certified and registered the result on 3 November 1717, and on 21 June 1720, seventy-one fair-sized packets of paperwork in five large bundles reached the desk of the royal attorney (*fiscal*) of the Council of the Indies in Madrid.[44] The government reviewed and confirmed the sentence a year and a half later on 14 February 1722, with full exoneration and praise for Castelldosrius's service as viceroy. By then, of course, he had been dead for nearly twelve years.

Castelldosrius's son Félix, his principal heir after the death of Antonio at Zaragoza, had remained in Lima during the investigation. With the shadow of disgrace finally lifted from the family, he settled his father's debts and left Peru with what remained of his inheritance. The inventory made after Castelldosrius's death listed possessions with a total value close to 29,000 *pesos*, including jewels given him by the kings of Portugal and France, scientific instruments, over five hundred books, many paintings, four bundles of musical scores, and six Black slaves. To put the monetary figures in perspective, Castelldosrius's annual salary as viceroy had been about 60,000 *pesos* a year. The annual income from his estates in Catalonia was about 2,500 *pesos*, though the estates had been confiscated in 1704 when Catalonia joined the Habsburg cause. Compared to the 14,000,000 *pesos* that the Count of Monclova reputedly left at his death, Castelldosrius's estate was very small indeed, though much standard historiography continues to label him as corrupt.

Time, distance, and delayed communications at first had favored the case against him. With France so recently the enemy of Spain, French interlopers at the center of illicit commerce in Peru, a French Bourbon on the throne of Spain, and Castelldosrius's 'Frenchified' tastes, the Council of the Indies may have been predisposed to believe the charges against him. He had lived most of his professional life outside Spain, and his natural base of support in Catalonia was tainted once Catalonia declared for the Habsburg pretender. In addition, both French and Spanish advisers to Felipe V were trying to re-organize the government and learn how to work

[44] AGI, Escribanía, legs. 548 A, 548 B, 549 A, 549 B, y 549 C.

with one another, all while fighting a war. Castelldosrius surely had a few allies among them, but they may have been too distracted to do him any good. Despite these disadvantages, he was able to counter the charges against him from beyond the grave, thanks to the administrative network he had established in Peru, which helped to document his case, and to family members in both Peru and Spain, who argued it to a successful conclusion.

Castelldosrius also prevailed because the imperial system, set up by the Habsburgs and adopted by the Bourbons, aimed to get at the truth of matters and to hold officials accountable for their actions. Investigations proceeded despite the unsettled atmosphere of warfare or invasion, despite the death of the officials being investigated, and even when there was no realistic prospect of collecting fines from their estates. His enemies presumably relied on the expanse of ocean between Lima and Madrid to aid their case. In the end, however, they learned that no matter how much distance lay between them and the Bourbon administration in Madrid, the royal government was determined to assert its control over Peru.

In a curious way, the same problems that plagued Spanish bureaucrats in the transition from Habsburg to Bourbon rule continue to confuse the historical reputation of the Marquess of Castelldosrius. The sheer volume of paperwork involved and the disarray in the archives during the War of Succession make it very difficult to consult the full record. Those who repeat the charges against Castelldosrius as if they were proven make selective use of the documents in that record, though often inadvertently. Those who take the trouble to examine the full record find ample reason to agree with the Council of the Indies that Castelldosrius was a good and honest servant of the crown, whichever dynasty happened to be in power.

AFTERMATH OF THE TRANSITION FROM HABSBURG TO BOURBON

Although Castelldosrius did not live to see it, the advanced European fashions that he helped to introduce to Peru soon took hold. Within a few years of his death, French styles would become common among the Peruvian elite. An excellent example is the huge mural showing the entry of the Viceroy Archbishop Morcillo into Potosí in 1716, painted by Melchor Pérez Holguín in 1718. The mural covers one long wall in a room dedicated to its display in the Museo de América in Madrid. Nearly everyone in the procession is dressed in French styles, including men of African and/or Indigenous heritage.[45]

[45] Interested readers can study the mural on the website of the Museo de América: https://www.cultura.gob.es/museodeamerica/en/coleccion/america-virreinal/potos-.html

In addition to French fashion, Castelldosrius had acquired a taste for Italian musical styles during his five years at Louis XIV's court, and he brought the Milanese composer and conductor Roque Ceruti to Lima in his entourage. As music director in the viceregal palace, Ceruti introduced Italian musical forms to one of the farthest outposts of Spain's American empire, where he would remain for the rest of his long life. He died in Lima in 1760, and twenty-eight of his compositions remain in Peruvian archives.

When the dust cleared at the end of the war in 1714, there was a Bourbon on both the French and Spanish thrones, but Louis XIV was near the end of his life and lacked the resources to continue his ambitious and aggressive foreign policies. In Spain and Spanish America, his grandson Felipe V still had to consolidate his rule and strengthen royal authority in the Bourbon style. However, although he continued to maintain close diplomatic relations with France, he would resist major French inroads into Spanish America. Born into France's ruling dynasty, Felipe V had settled into his role as the King of Spain and would reign longer than any other king in Spanish history.

SUGGESTIONS FOR ADDITIONAL READING IN ENGLISH

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Chapter 7
A SEABORNE EMPIRE: SHIPS AND SAILORS

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Although Spain is not usually included among Europe's maritime empires, Spanish exploration, trade, colonization, and defense could not have been sustained without sea power. During the Habsburg period, communication by sea maintained a semblance of exclusive control over the territories claimed by Spain around the world. During the first century of Bourbon rule, Spain's European rivals gained in economic and maritime strength, capturing a goodly proportion of the transatlantic trade to Spanish America. Even so, Spanish territories in the Americas reached their greatest extent during the eighteenth century, and maritime exploration, communication, and defense played a key role in that expansion. Earlier chapters have introduced some of the most prominent individuals in Spanish maritime history. This chapter will focus on the fleets that fulfilled commercial and military needs and the sailors who served on Spanish ships under difficult and often dangerous conditions at sea.

A GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM

The ships depicted on early modern maps remind us that Spain's global presence depended on the availability of vessels that could withstand conditions on the high seas. A variety of ships had been developed over the course of the late Middle Ages in Europe, so that by the late fifteenth century, Columbus was able to make his historic 1492 voyage in three small but sturdy ships of types that had proven their worth in the Mediterranean and the eastern Atlantic. As exploration continued and Spanish seafarers came to know more about sailing conditions around the world, shipwrights adapted their designs to create vessels for diverse local conditions as well as deep-ocean sailing. Some were built and outfitted in Spain. Others were launched from shipyards far from Iberia, such as the 200-*tonelada* galleon *San Salvador* that Juan Rodríguez Cabrillo built on the west coast of Guatemala in 1539 and sailed into San Diego Bay, California, in 1542.

Already in the 1520s, it was clear that voyages into the vast Pacific Ocean were better launched from the west coast of the Americas rather than from Spain. Besides avoiding the perils of the long voyage from Iberia through the Strait of Magellan, the route from the Americas to Asia benefited from the prevailing clockwise winds and currents in the southern Pacific Ocean. The problem was to find an eastward route

from Asia back to the Americas, avoiding the part of the world designated for Portuguese seafaring in the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494. As mentioned in a previous chapter, after several failed attempts to find that eastward route, Andrés de Urdaneta demonstrated that ships had to sail far to the north from Asia to pick up the winds and currents that would take them across the north Pacific and then south to New Spain. After Urdaneta's epic voyage in 1565, regular trade quickly developed between New Spain and Asia, known as the Manila Galleon Trade.

At the same time, Spain's Atlantic trade was approaching its peak. The House of Trade in Seville supervised and regulated private commerce and the vessels and crews that carried it and made sure that taxes on trade were collected and turned over to the crown. The merchants themselves had authority over commercial disputes in the first instance, working through their Consulado in Seville. Although merchants preferred to arrange their own transport as well, an organized system of convoys was the best way to protect shipping across the Atlantic. In 1526, King Carlos I ordered merchant vessels to travel in convoys, and in 1536 and 1543 the crown issued detailed ordinances about the ships, officers, and sailing orders for the merchant fleets. Generally speaking, between 1543 and 1554, one fleet each year sailed for the Indies, as Spaniards called the Americas, dividing into two parts in the Caribbean. One part sailed on to New Spain and the other to Tierra Firme. A single warship with each convoy provided additional protection for the armed merchant ships.

The intensified struggle between Spain and France toward the mid-sixteenth century called for even more protection, and stiff penalties awaited ships that failed to travel in convoys. Not only were all the merchant ships to be armed, but the crown planned to provide each convoy with an escort of four heavily armed warships (*naos de armada*), funded by a tax (the *avería*) on the merchandise shipped. With these changes, Spain's transatlantic fleet system settled into a pattern that would last for more than a century.

Conditions of wind and weather at both ends of the run helped to shape the timetable of the Atlantic convoys. The dangers of winter sailing in the Atlantic were well known to Spanish seafarers by the mid-sixteenth century, and the dangerous Caribbean hurricane season in late summer and fall was even worse. Moreover, the steamy climate in many Caribbean ports created an unhealthful atmosphere both for human beings and for ships.

To avoid these hazards, organizers of the Indies fleets tried to follow a rational and predictable timetable. From 1555 on, the ideal was two annual convoys, one to New Spain and the other to Tierra Firme, which accounted for most of the authorized trade with Spanish America. An official schedule, developed by the crown in 1561–64 in consultation with the Council of the Indies and the House of Trade, called for the New Spain fleet to leave Spain in April and the Tierra Firme fleet to leave in August.

The real schedules often differed, although they retained an internal logic and rhythm that responded to the prevailing wind and weather conditions and the logistics of supplying the large fleets with men, provisions, and equipment. The New Spain fleet tended to leave Cádiz by about July 1, following the prevailing currents southwest to the Canaries, then sailing west across the Atlantic to the Caribbean. On average, the fleet arrived at the outer Caribbean islands sometime in August and the Mexican coast sometime in September. This exposed the ships and men to summer storms but avoided the worst of the pestilential summers on the Mexican coast. The bulk of the fleet could winter over fairly safely in Veracruz, doing business in the temperate winter and spring. For a safe return home, the fleet left Veracruz sometime in May or early June for Havana. After staying there for several weeks, the fleet departed for Spain.

The Tierra Firme Fleet followed its own timetable, leaving Spain from March to May, wintering over in Cartagena de Indias and returning to Spain the following summer after the trade fair in Portobello. On the return to Spain, both fleets aimed to get through the Bahama Channel before August. As the naval hero Don Fadrique de Toledo noted in 1630, "to delay departure for Spain beyond August was to tempt God."[46] Usually, the New Spain Fleet arrived in Seville around the first of October, followed by the Tierra Firme Fleet about a month later. The two fleets returned together only fourteen times during the reign of Felipe II in the late sixteenth century, although combined fleets became the norm in the seventeenth century for the added protection they provided. As one pair of fleets prepared to leave the Americas, another pair prepared to leave Spain. With luck, they would both sail the Atlantic and the Caribbean during the most favorable seasons.

Counting both fleets, close to one hundred ships carried merchandise across the Atlantic between Spain and the Americas by the 1520s, as an earlier chapter mentioned. By the late sixteenth century, a yearly average of 150 to 200 ships participated in the Indies trade each year, and their average size had also doubled, leading to a fourfold increase in carrying capacity. Other shipping may have required some eight to ten times the carrying capacity of the transatlantic trade, according to some estimates, although the same vessels might be used at various times for trade, fishing, military needs, privateering, or even free-lance piracy. For military needs, the Spanish crown owned few ships during peacetime, primarily for communication, escort duty, and defense. To increase their number during wartime, the crown relied on embargoed and leased private vessels. Regardless of the purpose of a given voyage, Spanish shipping as a whole drew its crews from the same population of mariners.

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[46] Archivo General de Simancas (AGS), Guerra Antigua, leg. 3154, letter of June 5, 1630.

MEN AND BOYS FOR THE SHIPS[47]

Recruiting sailors posed a problem for all seafaring nations during the age of sail, and the problem was particularly acute in Spain. In addition to periodic warfare in Europe, the government had to maintain contact with possessions in North Africa and the Kingdom of Naples and Sicily, as well as with overseas territories in the Americas after 1492 and in the Philippines after 1565. All of Spain's seaborne commitments required about 35,000 to 40,000 men by the late sixteenth century, according to various estimates

The number of crew members on a given ship varied, depending on the type of ship, who owned it, and the purpose of the voyage. The numbers are often described in terms of manning ratios or ranges—that is, the number of crew members for a given number of *toneladas*. Sixteenth-century manning ratios on Spanish ships fell in a range of one man for every five to ten *toneladas*. In the late sixteenth century, vessels engaged in trade required one crewman for every 8–10 *toneladas*, and vessels on military voyages required one crewman for every 6–7 *toneladas*. In times of war and danger from pirates, however, merchant vessels often carried more crew members as well as armament.

To find crews for Spain's diverse maritime needs, we might assume that a population living on or near a coastline would develop a seafaring tradition, but that was not always the case. One reason is that agricultural productivity was so low in the early modern centuries that the vast majority of the population had to work the land to survive. Even in coastal areas with a strong seafaring tradition, the percentage of the population earning a living from the land was nearly always much larger than the seafaring population. For example, Spain has extensive coastlines on the Bay of Biscay, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Atlantic Ocean. Nonetheless, mariners comprised less than one percent of the population of the coastal provinces, most of them in the port towns, and an even smaller percentage of the total Spanish population, according to figures from the mid-eighteenth century. For coastal residents who did go to sea, family tradition surely played a powerful role. Many boys

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[47] The discussion of the recruitment of crews draws on several of my previous publications: "The Labour Market for Sailors in Spain, 1570–1870," in *"Those Emblems of Hell"? European Sailors and the Maritime Labour Market, 1570–1870,* eds. Paul van Royen, Jaap Bruijn and Jan Lucassen (St. John's, Newfoundland: Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1997): 329–348; "Naval Recruitment and Basque Resistance in Early Modern Times," *ITSAS Memoria. Revista de Estudios Marítimos del País Vasco,* No. 5, pp. 173–185 (San Sebastián, Spain, 2006); and "Why Did Anyone Go to Sea? Structures of Maritime Enlistment from Family Traditions to Violent Coercion." In *A World at Sea. Maritime Practices and Global History*, eds. Lauren Benton and Nathan Perl Rosenthal (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2020), pp. 17–36.

could not have imagined another way to make a living and gladly followed their fathers, uncles, and brothers to sea. Others may have been persuaded to go to sea by their families, although they had no real affinity for the seafaring life.

For the majority of men and boys who went to sea, economic incentives both positive and negative were also an important part of the decision to become a sailor. Such incentives covered a wide range of situations. During the heyday of Spain's transatlantic trade in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the promise of regular wages on a merchant ship was a powerful incentive to sign up, especially for younger sons with little chance to inherit a family farm. Moreover, the lure of the Indies undoubtedly enticed many men to sign on for a round-trip voyage and then to jump ship after crossing the ocean, in search of a better life. If positive economic incentives pulled some men toward the sea, poverty surely pushed others in that direction, though we cannot assume that poverty accounted for the recruitment of most common sailors. Moreover, it is not clear if maritime enlistment was always a good economic choice for a poor man. There may have been other opportunities for employment that would keep him closer to home and family, and a life at sea would not necessarily bring an end to his poverty. Depending on time and place, the relative importance of various economic incentives for enlisting—both positive and negative—would undoubtedly vary. Recruiting crews for commercial and fishing voyages relied on geography, personal inclination, and the promise of regular wages, aided by a long tradition of seafaring on Spain's extensive coastlines. Nonetheless, before a man or youth decided to enlist, he had to consider whether his economic prospects would be better, worse, or about the same whether he went to sea or stayed on land.

Recruiting crews for military voyages relied on a variety of strategies by the government. With the population of Spain growing rapidly through most of the sixteenth century, much of the demand for sailors on military voyages could be met with Spaniards. Popular ideas often assume that gangs of thugs—known as press gangs in England—scoured taverns, rooming houses, and brothels near the waterfront and dragged hapless or unconscious sailors to ships waiting in the harbor. Such ideas are usually associated with the eighteenth century and later, all to meet the challenge of crewing ships during rapid economic growth and nearly constant warfare. Although coercive and often violent recruitment methods were common in many maritime states, Spain favored voluntary recruitment whenever possible.

In wartime, however, there were often too few volunteers to fill the government's needs, which made other methods necessary. Forced levies were considered too costly in both money and goodwill to be used in any but the most desperate circumstances. Instead, economic incentives offered to crews on sailing ships and free men serving on galleys were higher in wartime than in peacetime. For a given voyage, recruits might be offered as much as six months' wages in advance

when they signed up, depending on their experience and the needs of the moment. That was a powerful incentive for a poor man with a family to feed. Wartime quotas assigned in Madrid were filled by royal and local officials in the coastal districts, and those officials relied on enticements, persuasion, negotiation, and co-optation to recruit crews for a particular voyage. Local officials might drag their feet when asked to fulfill the quotas in their districts, but they generally complied out of self-interest. Willing participation in recruitment efforts could earn favors from the crown and enhance an individual's status among the local citizens. Distinguished maritime officers, such as those discussed in earlier chapters, often participated in recruiting crews, especially in their home regions. In addition, noblemen such as the successive dukes of Medina Sidonia in southwestern Spain regularly recruited crews for military voyages, often using their own funds to pay the men advance wages and promising to look after their families in their absence.

One example of the realities of recruitment for military voyages relates to the Armada of the Strait dispatched in 1581 to fortify the Strait of Magellan and drive pirates and interlopers from Brazil. Francis Drake's peacetime raids in the Americas in the late 1570s and Felipe II's claim to the vacant throne of Portugal in 1580 provided the context. The armada was designed to prevent other opportunists from following Drake's example and to demonstrate the king's resolve to defend Portuguese Brazil against interlopers. The commander of the armada, Diego Flores de Valdés, was a nobleman from Asturias on Spain's northwest coast and a member of a distinguished seafaring clan. The head of the clan, Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, had ousted the French from La Florida in 1565 as the capstone event in a long career at sea. Flores had served with distinction in that campaign, and an array of men related by blood or marriage to the Menéndez clan enlisted to sail with Flores in 1581. The disproportionate number of Asturians in the armada and their family relations are not apparent from their names alone, but the career trajectories of individual men, as well as their marriages and other documented interactions, make their connections to the Menéndez clan unmistakable. Family tradition was undoubtedly a major factor in their enlistment.

Ordinary sailors who were not connected to the Menéndez clan found the expedition much less appealing. Although the destination of the armada was not made public, everyone in southwestern Spain seemed to know that it was going to the Strait of Magellan. The terrors of sailing in the South Atlantic were well known in the maritime community. Moreover, because of Drake's raids and rumors of other interlopers being sent from England and France, the armada would almost certainly encounter enemies. Ordinary sailors, even those from seafaring families, were difficult to recruit under those circumstances. The crown offered higher monthly wages to entice men to enlist. Even so, recruiters found it impossible to sign up

enough volunteers in time, because the merchant fleets to New Spain and Tierra Firme were being prepared at the same time. In filling out crews for the twenty-three ships of the Armada of the Strait during the summer of 1581, some 280 of the 2,408 men and boys in the armada were forcibly reassigned from the returning Indies fleets and held in a local jail until the armada sailed—a rare occurrence in Spanish maritime history.

Although the government retained the principle of voluntary recruitment, men were often coerced into re-enlisting when the crown owed them money. In the late sixteenth century, royal finances were stretched to the limit. This often meant that the sailors, soldiers, and officers serving on royal ships were not paid in a timely fashion, and sometimes they were not compensated at all during the voyage, apart from their rations. Returning sailors often had to petition the House of Trade in Seville or the government in Madrid to collect their back pay, and many of them lacked the resources to do so effectively. The eight hundred men who returned with the Armada of the Strait in 1584 faced that situation. Their rations ceased the day they arrived back in Spain and were dismissed from service, and most of them had not been paid for the duration of the three-year voyage. In September of 1584, the president of the House of Trade wrote that groups of angry sailors were roaming the streets of Seville, demanding to be paid. In response, Felipe II ordered his officials to offer the men re-enlistment, so that they could collect rations while they waited to collect the monies owed them. Under those circumstances, men who re-enlisted were economically coerced, although the choice was theirs to make. Those who did not re-enlist—and that was the majority of the returnees—were not necessarily worse off, however. They presumably would be paid eventually, and in the meantime they were free to pursue other opportunities. In 1584, there were many opportunities for experienced sailors in the transatlantic fleets. Moreover, rebellion in the Netherlands and other military actions in Europe provided many opportunities for soldiers as well.

Naval officers faced more complicated choices when the crown suggested they reenlist. Those with ambitions to advance in royal service often found it advantageous to do so if the crown owed them money. Like the sailors and soldiers, the officers who had served in the Armada of the Strait petitioned for their unpaid wages, but the government had little cash on hand. It was not immediately clear when they might be paid, and there was a long line of suppliants ahead of them. In 1586, at least a dozen officers from the Armada of the Strait signed up to serve in the Indies fleets in exchange for part of the monies owed them and the promise to receive the balance in the near future. Though economic coercion played a role in their decision to re-enlist, they had evidently decided that they were better off re-enlisting than continuing to wait for reimbursement. In the meantime, they furthered their careers in royal service by re-enlisting.

Manning Spain's galley squadrons posed special problems. In the late medieval centuries, the Mediterranean galley fleets of various states were crewed by free men, some enlisting for economic reasons, and others serving as citizen conscripts in times of need. During the sixteenth century, galley oarsmen included more unfree labor, and Spain's galley squadrons followed that trend. By the late sixteenth century, as mentioned in an earlier chapter, virtually all of the oarsmen on Spanish galleys in the Mediterranean were forced laborers of one sort or another: enemies captured in battle; purchased slaves (*esclavos*, generally Muslims); or convicted criminals (*forzados*). A few free oarsmen, often from Sardinia or Sicily, might also sign on. Known as *buenas boyas* in Spanish (a corruption of the Italian for 'good will'), they received wages as well as better rations than the unfree oarsmen, who received nothing for their labor except food and clothing and were legally considered slaves of the crown. Moreover, they were held at their posts by force, generally chained to the benches on which they rowed while the vessel was at sea. On shore, carefully supervised by soldiers, they washed their clothes and performed various assigned duties. All of the unfree oarsmen served on the galleys with clear legal justification: captured in a 'just war;' purchased as slaves; or convicted of civil or (rarely) religious crimes. Convicted criminals on Spanish galleys served for a fixed term. Even the men convicted "for life" or "in perpetuity" were released after serving ten years if they were still alive. The slaves may truly have served for life, or until they were replaced as being unfit to continue.

Active warfare between Spain and the Ottoman Empire diminished after the Battle of Lepanto in 1571, in which galleys played a significant role, but the Spanish crown still maintained several galley squadrons in the Mediterranean. In fact, the number of Spanish galleys reached a peak in about 1575, with some 150 vessels and upwards of 21,000 men. Recruitment was not an issue for the unfree oarsmen, who had no choice in the matter. However, the sailors and soldiers on the galleys were free men (*gente de cabo*), as were the small number of voluntary recruits. All the free men on board were recruited through the same combination of geographic, familial, and economic incentives that characterized recruitment for sailing ships.

Effective galley captains were difficult to recruit and retain, because they had to be able to command both free and unfree labor, keep order on board, and encourage the best performance from all hands. After Lepanto, the government decided that more noblemen should be encouraged to serve as galley captains, because they were raised from birth to be leaders and were thought to be naturally suited for command.[48] By all accounts, some Spanish noblemen served the crown on the galleys

[48] The following discussion draws on my essay on "Spanish Noblemen as Galley Captains: A Problematical Social History," pp. 9–18 in *Strategy and the Sea: Essays in Honour of John B. Hattendorf*, eds. N.A.M. Rodger, J. Ross

willingly and with distinction, certainly until Lepanto. Thereafter, however, many of them seem to have decided that the disadvantages of service on the galleys far outweighed the benefits. The bitter reflections on galley service by Don García de Toledo, discussed in an earlier chapter, was presumably not unique.

To encourage more noblemen to serve in the galleys, the Spanish government decided to use economic inducements. In a series of debates in the Galley Committee of the Council of War in 1584, Felipe II's councilors proposed a significant increase in the base pay of galley captains, both noble and non-noble. They reasoned that this would attract more noblemen to serve and eliminate the need to pay large supplements to galley captains for exemplary service. The incentives were not entirely positive, however. Noblemen who did not serve the crown in some desired capacity—or send their sons to do so—could not expect rewards from the reigning monarch. Retaining royal favor was crucial for the prospects of a nobleman's family and even his entire lineage. If the monarch withheld that favor, it could have a negative impact, from the chances of good marriages for the young females in the family to the career ambitions of the males.

The Spanish crown's strategy to attract more nobles to the galleys seems to have been successful, judging from the number of noblemen serving on the galleys as free wage earners in the mid-to-late seventeenth century. Of the 373 men whose records are legible in the galley records, 142 (38 percent) were noblemen, designated by the honorific "Don" before their names and other indications of high status. Forty-seven of those 142 noblemen served as galley captains, some 59 percent of the captains listed from 1649 to 1681. It is noteworthy that a 30-year-old nobleman from one of the most illustrious families in Spain—the ducal house of Medina Sidonia—served on the galleys for a year in the late seventeenth century. The unexpected death of his older brother forced him to return home and assume the ducal title, or he might have made a career on the galleys. Other noble lineages also staked their claims to continued royal favor by serving on the galleys, though it is not clear whether all of the individuals undertook that service willingly.

Noblemen serving as galley captains received no higher compensation than their non-noble counterparts in their initial posting, and exemplary service still earned bonuses for captains of whatever social status. In England, noble naval officers usually disdained the non-noble officers. That attitude presumably existed in Spain to some extent as well. However, the government's decision to attract and retain competent galley captains by positive economic incentives cut across the divide

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Dancy, Benjamin Darnell, and Evan Wilson (Woodbridge, Suffolk, UK: Boydell & Brewer, 2016), presented here in revised form with permission from the publisher.

between nobles and non-nobles and may have encouraged better acceptance of non-noble captains by their noble counterparts.

THE STRUGGLE TO REGISTER MARINERS[49]

For military voyages on sailing ships, levies and the local administration of recruitment in times of need worked fairly well, but the process was never popular. In addition, the unpredictable number of available mariners presented a continuing problem, particularly in areas with the most experienced sailors, such as the Basque regions of Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya. Even as government officials relied on volunteers and occasional levies, they discussed ways to identify and keep track of the maritime population to facilitate long-range planning. One method discussed in the late sixteenth century was a registry of sailors and marine artisans, but there was never time for any serious plan to mature. Then in 1605, during a rare interval when Spain was making peace with its European neighbors, King Felipe III ordered the Basque province of Guipúzcoa to register and count all local mariners fit for service and to write to the crown twice a year to update the count. To make registration more appealing, the king decreed that only registered mariners would have the right to fish or otherwise make a living from the sea and that registered mariners would be allowed to pursue commercial and fishing voyages unless the king needed their services.

Instead of compliance, however, a squall of objections to the decree began almost immediately and showed no signs of abating. Local officials produced a series of long memoranda objecting to the decree on numerous grounds, arguing that it violated the legal exemptions and privileges that Guipúzcoa had enjoyed from the crown since time immemorial. They noted that local men had always served the crown and would continue to do so, but through honor, duty, and tradition, not by decree. Mandatory registration, they predicted, would drive the entire population out of fishing and seafaring in general. Local officials never refused to obey the royal decree; instead, they repeatedly and implacably offered reasons why it was impossible to carry it out. In other words, they practiced respectful non-compliance—a revered Spanish tradition. Even when the crown reissued the order in 1607, local officials did not relent. Instead, the king officially rescinded the decree in December of 1607, while emphasizing the crown's fundamental power to issue decrees and expect them to be obeyed. Thus began the long and contentious history of Spain's *matrícula de mar*

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[49] I discuss the history of the maritime registry in "'The Life Blood of the Navy': Recruiting Sailors in Eighteenth Century Spain," *The Mariner's Mirror* 87, No. 4 (November 2001), 420–445. Copyright *The Mariner's Mirror*, 2001. Excerpted here with permission of the Licensor through PLSclear;

(marine registry). It would take more than 130 years of intermittent efforts before the registry was effectively established, and another sixty years before it was brought under military rather than civilian control.

After the embarrassing failure of 1605–07, the government of Felipe III made no further attempt to register mariners, and the lull in European warfare made the whole idea less urgent. Spain and France had made peace in 1598, Spain and England had ended hostilities in 1604, and a twelve-year truce with rebels in the Netherlands would be negotiated in 1609. Those unusual circumstances reduced the immediate need for sailors on military vessels at the same time that the volume of trade between Spain and its American colonies approached a peak, providing a powerful magnet for Spanish sailors and an increased flow of tax revenue for the crown.

The situation changed under Felipe IV in the 1620s, as territorial and religious rivalries drew virtually all of Europe into the destructive cycle of mayhem known as the Thirty Years' War (1618–48). Hostilities began in the Germanies, followed by the renewed rebellion of the Netherlands when the truce expired in 1621. For the next several decades, the Spanish Habsburgs would engage in global warfare to defend dynasty, empire, and faith in alliance with the Habsburgs of Austria and various other Roman Catholic states.

To organize royal naval forces for the war, particularly in the Atlantic, the crown ordered the establishment of a marine registry for all of Spain on 31 October 1625. The registry had two parts, one for men who registered voluntarily (*matrícula particular*), and one for all others who earned a living from seafaring (*matrícula general*). Those who registered voluntarily would not be required to serve on royal ships any more frequently than they had served in the past. They would be required to notify whoever kept the registry when they were going to be absent from home, but they did not need permission to leave—an important change from the 1605 decree.

Voluntary registrants were promised an attractive list of privileges and exemptions. Foremost, they would be shielded from arrest for debt in most circumstances, and their property could not be seized. They would also be permitted to bear arms anywhere in the kingdom and enjoy exemption from the billeting of soldiers and government officials. The king also promised that voluntary registrants would receive preferential treatment over other mariners on all vessels in which they served, private merchant ships as well as royal vessels, with the House of Trade ensuring compliance. Engaging parental pressure on the decision to register, a father with four sons who registered and served on royal ships would be exempt from personal taxes during their service. His exemption would continue even if two of the sons died, as long as the other two continued to serve the crown—small compensation for the loss of two sons, but nonetheless generous in context.

The decree assigned the Royal Court of Appeals (Chancillería) in Valladolid responsibility for sending out commissioners and notaries to create the registries in the northern districts, following detailed instructions regarding the information that the registries should include. Despite the government's careful planning, creating the registry overwhelmed the Chancillería, given its other duties and the general resistance that greeted the commissioners. Very few mariners volunteered to register, perhaps because they had little confidence that they would receive the privileges, exemptions, and assurances promised, perhaps because of a general reluctance to compromise their freedom as seafarers. Non-compliance was especially prevalent in Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa, where local officials who traditionally recruited sailors for the crown threatened to suspend their efforts in the face of the new decree. Though the crown urged royal officials in the north to enforce the decree with mildness and respect for local traditions, it did no good. The 1625 decree, like its precursor in 1605, failed completely in Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya, although the king did not rescind it. His government simply recognized that resistance to any form of mandatory service was so strong among mariners and local officials in the Basque region that it would take extraordinary efforts to overcome.

As the war continued, voluntary enlistments and periodic levies had to suffice to recruit men for the navy, as in times past. In 1632 Martín de Valenzaguí, the king's purveyor (proveedor) for the navy on the north coast, had responsibility for conducting a levy of sailors for the two most important ships in a royal fleet. When King Felipe IV asked local officials in Guipúzcoa to help Valenzaguí, his letter tacitly acknowledged their power to affect the outcome of the recruitment effort. Addressing his request to the "noble gentlemen of the very noble and very loyal province of Guipúzcoa," he promised to pay the sailors an advance of six months' wages for enlisting and assured the officials that ships' officers would treat the men well in the royal armada. In 1634, Spain's Atlantic Fleet alone included thirty-three warships (about 15,000 *toneladas*), and the need for ships increased two years later when France entered the war against Spain. The years 1639–40 added urgency to naval recruitment, as Spain prepared fleets to send against the French and the Dutch simultaneously. Because the Indies trade had greatly diminished, service on royal ships may have held more appeal for sailors than in times when trade prospered.

The range of recruitment methods changed little during the wars of the late seventeenth century, as France's Louis XIV tried to gain additional territory in Europe and to create a French empire in the Americas, mostly at the expense of Spain. When it was necessary for Spain to lease foreign vessels during the continuous wars, government agents also recruited foreign crews, in particular from

Roman Catholic areas such as Ragusa (modern Dubrovnik), Malta, Genoa, and Naples, as they had done in prior times.

At the start of the eighteenth century, the supply of Spanish mariners seems to have met demand one way or another. As discussed in earlier chapters, when Carlos II, the last of the Spanish Habsburgs, died without an heir in 1700, he named one of Louis XIV's grandsons as his successor. The subsequent war against the accession of Felipe V found the newly allied Bourbon states of Spain and France at war with most of the rest of Europe. The Spanish government had only about twenty ships in its Atlantic fleet during the war and trade had nearly ceased, freeing mariners for naval service. When the war ended with Felipe V secure on the Spanish throne, his government was already beginning a thorough overhaul of Spain's seaborne forces, which the government combined into a national navy in 1714. José Patiño served as the Intendent General of the newly established navy and brought his considerable energy and focus to the task of organizing it. One of his main priorities echoed the century-long goal of those before him: to make naval recruitment more predictable, equitable, and efficient.

Once again, a national maritime registry figured prominently in the government's plans. As those plans took shape, Gerónimo de Uztáriz wrote an important treatise in 1717 called *Theórica y práctica de comercio y de marina (Theory and Practice of Commerce and the Navy*). Among his recommendations, Uztáriz urged the crown to bring the navy up to a strength of fifty large warships (*navíos*) and twenty smaller warships (*fragatas*), with a total of 3,660 guns and 23,150 men. To prepare the men for naval duty in wartime, he urged the government to encourage commerce and fishing in peacetime and to create a maritime registry of available men, pointing to France as an ideal model. It is not clear how much Uztáriz knew about the French system or if knew that Spanish Habsburg governments had tried and failed several times to create such a registry based largely on voluntary cooperation.

The French system was more mandatory than voluntary. In 1668, at the start of Louis XIV's wars, the king and his minister, Jean-Baptiste Colbert, aimed to make the supply of sailors more predictable by instituting a mandatory system of registration for mariners. Once registered, each man was assigned to one of four classes. Those in the first class would immediately serve a year in the navy. Those in the second class were held in reserve for the following year, during which they collected half-pay and were required to remain near at hand. Those in the other two classes could sign on for local or extended voyages until their turn came to be on reserve or active service. The government held that the new system satisfied the Frenchman's natural instinct for liberty and equality by replacing the brutal and arbitrary methods of the press gang by a rational and equitable process to select conscripts. The government also made the pill easier to swallow by providing benefits

for sailors and their families. Nonetheless, registration and eventual service were mandatory. Men who failed to appear when called for duty, or who deserted, could be condemned to death or to life as oarsmen in France's Mediterranean galley fleet. Because galleys had come to rely almost exclusively on unfree labor in France as elsewhere, galley oarsmen remained apart from the new system. Sailors in some of the poorer parts of France signed up gladly, enticed by the promise of wages and benefits. Others staged violent riots in futile attempts to avoid compliance. After a rocky start, the French system became well entrenched by the early eighteenth century, generating a wealth of documentation and playing a key role in the French labor market for sailors. Even so, officials sometimes had to apply force to provide sufficient crews in wartime.

With the French system as his model, and the Bourbon dynasty acknowledged in Spain, Uztáriz presented his ideas as a new approach to an old problem. He had a powerful ally in Don Antonio de Gaztañeta, perhaps the most distinguished Basque naval commander of his day, a man who had enjoyed the confidence of the last Habsburg king and his Bourbon successor and was second in command of the newly formed Spanish navy. Gaztañeta was willing to bring his prestige and his Basque ancestry to bear in support of establishing a maritime registry in Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa. In a document dated in the town of Motrico on 23 November 1717, he issued an order for local officials to create a marine registry, with detailed rules about how to proceed. Despite his efforts, however, the decree was met with non-compliance, although it technically remained in effect.

By the 1720s, Spain's commercial and military needs both increased, and the government of Felipe V was determined to conduct a survey of the maritime population. At the end of the War of Succession, the king had been forced to give up considerable territory in exchange for remaining on the throne, and he and his second wife, Isabel Farnese, launched a campaign to regain some of the lost Italian lands. Naval forces would be crucial for that effort, and in 1726 the government renewed the plan to survey and register Spain's maritime population. As in 1625, the government distinguished between those who registered voluntarily and those who did not, with privileges and exemptions accorded only to the voluntary registrants. The survey was conducted in many coastal districts, though not easily nor without protest. Moreover, despite government assurances that registration did not mean immediate service, very few mariners signed up voluntarily. In Catalonia, for example, 897 mariners registered voluntarily, but another 3,059 mariners were listed outside the voluntary registry. Although José Patiño and his subordinates worked diligently to make the effort a success, the same degree of reluctance marked the survey in other districts. Even more disappointing, some of the men who

registered voluntarily simply disappeared thereafter, and others deserted from active service at the first opportunity.

In Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa, the situation was also difficult but somewhat more encouraging to the government than in the past. When a call went out for volunteers to crew the ship *Santa Rosa* early in 1727, with each man paid three *reales* per day from the time he signed up, local officials devised a unique response. Instead of acting as individuals, they acted collectively as the personification of Guipúzcoa. Writing to the town of Deva, Guipúzcoa noted that it made better sense for mariners to sign up voluntarily for that voyage and reap the benefits than to be recruited by quotas without those benefits. In other circumstances, however, Guipúzcoa argued against royal decrees that it judged to be incompatible with time-honored traditions and local control. That became quite clear regarding the creation of a general registry of mariners. In a detailed communication that emphasized the traditional exemptions and privileges of the province, Guipúzcoa agreed that local officials would provide the crown with the information required for the registry, but on its own terms and in its own way, not as the royal decree had outlined. Given the continuing need for experienced Basque sailors on military vessels, the government had no choice but to accept that arrangement, and Guipúzcoa produced the list in 1728.

The crown needed as many experienced sailors as it could find. In 1731, Spain had some forty large warships but not enough crewmen to sail them all. To man those ships and others projected for the future, as well as ships for the reviving transatlantic trade, a maritime registry was even more important. Given a choice between serving on private vessels engaged in trade or fishing and serving in the navy, sailors would presumably choose service on private vessels where they could hope for less danger and better pay. Until and unless the government could devise a system of registration and incentives that could guarantee sufficient crews for the navy, marine officials had to rely on traditional levies administered locally. Moreover, officials in Madrid realized that the mandated listing conducted in the Basque region in 1728 had not facilitated levies thereafter and had probably made them more difficult. The implication was clear: forced registration of seafarers in the Basque region was counterproductive because it induced local officials to balk at assisting government commissioners when the time came to recruit or levy sailors.

The campaign to register the maritime community in the country as a whole began in earnest in the 1730s, following another failed effort to register mariners in the Basque region in 1734. Ironically, in that same year, the government was able to recruit sailors for the Spanish navy from several regions of northern and southern Italy, as well as Malta, Ireland, and even England. Given the willingness of foreigners to serve, it must have been galling to the government not to be able to recruit Basque sailors without an enormous expenditure of time and effort. Nonetheless, the

government had not given up on the establishment of a general marine registry, and registries had been compiled in many coastal areas in Spain, based on the royal decree of 1726. The government issued an updated version of that decree on 9 February 1737, which once again ordered local officials to establish a marine registry of all the sailors and shipwrights in their districts. Although the government remained committed to the ideal of voluntary registration, the men directing the effort realized that no purely voluntary system could work. Consequently, the 1737 decree established a system that, while technically still voluntary, in fact left the men little choice. Virtually all maritime activities, including ocean-fishing and commerce, became the exclusive preserve of those willing to register and thereby agreeing to serve the crown when the need arose. The language of the decree urged registered sailors and fishermen to lodge complaints against any non-registrant who encroached on their exclusive privileges, a provision that empowered as well as coopted them into the system.

To administer the revitalized registration drive, King Felipe V created an Admiralty (Almirantazgo) in March of 1737, headed by his son, Prince Felipe. The notion of an overall marine authority owed something to contemporary English practice, but it also had antecedents in the Almirantazgos that had coordinated and supervised naval forces in Castile and Aragón in medieval times and in limited versions thereafter. In its eighteenth-century incarnation, the Almirantazgo marked the culmination of ten years' work on naval reorganization by José Patiño, who simultaneously ran the ministries of Marine, Indies, Finance, War, and State from 1726 until his death in 1736. Although the Almirantazgo lasted only from 1737 to 1748, the registration of men for naval service had come to stay.

Like its prototypes in 1625 and 1726, the 1737 decree formed the registrants into a separate and distinct guild with honors, exemptions, and privileges. As in the past, the king also invited foreign mariners of the Catholic faith to register and offered them the same benefits as Spaniards. The 1737 decree required only that they settle in Spain with their families (or marry Spaniards), and that they remain on the marine registry to enjoy its benefits. By using religion rather than nationality as a criterion for service, the crown could draw from a large potential pool of foreign mariners and still hope for some degree of cultural loyalty to Spain. Although the decree explicitly aimed to support navigation and commerce in general, military objectives were clearly the most important.

Royal officials provided local authorities with a detailed list of the personnel that the government considered necessary to support Spain's peacetime fleet of sixty warships, including officers, sailors, shipwrights, chaplains, medical specialists, and bureaucrats. All the men who registered received the same benefits in exchange for their willingness to serve, notably exemption from army levies and the billeting of

troops. Moreover, any civil or criminal case involving a registrant fell under the jurisdiction of Almirantazgo courts, where an experienced mariner might expect more favorable treatment. Registered mariners who were called to serve in the navy were promised the customary enlistment bonus to sustain their families while they were at sea. When they returned to port, they were promised whatever licenses and passports they needed to get home and a continuation of their wages until they arrived (assuming a direct route). They also had the right to lodge along the way at fixed rates. Though members of the nobility would receive special schooling as naval officers, under the 1737 decree they would not have a monopoly on the honors and rewards granted for serving the crown at sea.

Official policy demanded that registered mariners called to serve on royal vessels be treated well, because they were considered volunteers. In July of 1738 the king ordered naval commanders and bureaucrats to see that mariners were "treated with sweetness and good form, and that they issue the strictest orders to captains and senior officers to very particularly fulfill their duties in seeing that ships' officers lay aside the rigor with which they customarily treat mariners."[50] It would be naïve to think that official policies were always followed, even by officials, but they nonetheless accorded the men more respect than we might assume. Spanish sailors did not shrink from complaining when they were mistreated, and they had the king's own words to encourage them.

Men who deserted after they had signed up and accepted the enlistment bonus presented a challenge to the system that could not go unanswered. By offering a reward to citizens who denounced deserters, the government created a broad network of informants to locate them, but it was more difficult to decide how to punish them, given the ongoing shortage of mariners. In practice, some deserters were assigned to serve in the presidios of North Africa or on galleys in the Mediterranean. Those who had been temporarily absent without leave might be taken back and fined, or simply penalized by the wages lost while they were gone. More serious miscreants might be ordered to serve the king without pay for a specified time. The common denominator is that the punishment for desertion generally involved labor or money, not physical abuse or incarceration.

One of the most interesting provisions of the 1737 decree concerned mariners no longer fit for service. If they had been injured at sea, they had the right to a disability pension (*sueldo de invalidos*), or a lump sum equal to eighteen months' wages to help establish them in another line of work. Registered mariners over age sixty were exempt from being called to serve on royal ships while retaining all the

[50] AGS, Secretaría de Marina, leg. 277.

privileges of registration. Finally, anyone who remained on the registry for thirty years without desertion, regardless of age, could retire and retain his privileges.

Moving from the paper decree to the reality of a marine registry proved challenging, but the resolve of several extraordinary individuals tipped the scales in the government's favor. Prince Felipe, the new Admiral, lent prestige, but the bureaucratic genius driving the effort was the secretary of the Almirantazgo, Don Cenón de Somodevilla, Marquess of La Ensenada. Then in his mid-thirties, Ensenada had spent his early career in the naval bureaucracy shaped by José Patiño and would become one of the most effective royal bureaucrats in the whole of the eighteenth century.

To facilitate the creation and maintenance of the registries, Spain's extensive coastline was divided into three administrative districts. The Department of Ferrol, named for a key port in the northwest region of Galicia, included the northwestern and northern coasts on the Atlantic Ocean and the Bay of Biscay, more than 150 ports in all. Don Bernardino Freyre served as the chief naval official (Intendent) of that department. The Department of Cartagena included the Mediterranean coast from the French border to Cartagena in the southeast, headquarters of the Intendent Don Alexo Gutiérrez de Rubalcava. And the Department of Cádiz included Spain's southern Mediterranean coast and the Atlantic coast of Andalusia west of Gibraltar, with Don Francisco de Varas serving as the Intendent.

Each of the three departments contained units of varying sizes, based on traditional administrative districts. Some local officials used printed forms to register each man; others wrote the documents by hand, giving each sailor a copy of his registration so that he could claim exemption from army levies and the other privileges offered by the 1737 decree. A young man named Bernardo Garzía soon had occasion to test the system. He signed up for the marine registry in July of 1738 in Gijón, Asturias, when he was a nineteen-year-old bachelor. He seems to have married shortly thereafter and entered active naval service on the royal ship *Princesa*. It is tempting to think that the advanced wages he received when he signed up helped him and his bride to establish their household. In any case, when the *Princesa* disarmed for the winter, he received permission to go home—only to be swept up in an army levy. Garzía successfully used his matriculation papers to extricate himself from the army.

As the registration proceeded, Ensenada kept in close touch with the Intendents and set deadlines for their reports. In turn, they supervised local officials and reported to Madrid, both in letters and in the form of large spreadsheets, some of them elaborately decorated, with the tallies for their districts neatly arrayed in rows and columns. Some of those spreadsheets contained extraordinary detail, as Ensenada had asked, reporting on the highly specialized craftsmen, as well as the

gunners, sailors, apprentices, and pages who lived in each town. In a few towns, officials counted pilots and other officers separately, but most were content to report only the more inclusive categories of mariners. Taken together, the registries compiled from 1737 to late 1739 provided the first comprehensive survey of Spain's maritime population.

In the department of Ferrol, along the rugged Atlantic coastline of Galicia, officials registered nearly 8,000 mariners and shipwrights in 121 ports by late October of 1739. Over 88 percent of the ports and 92 percent of the men pertained to the area that stretched from Ferrol west and south to the border with Portugal; the remainder pertained to the area north and east of Ferrol. The number of registrants was not as straightforward as it seems, however. The coastline of Galicia is penetrated by long fingers of the sea known as *rías,* which are similar to the *fjords* of Norway. In such an environment, many men who were essentially farmers had to use small boats simply to get around or to haul the sand that they used as fertilizer. They also relied on coastal fishing to provide for their families and to supplement their income. The fact that many Galician farmers registered as mariners may simply testify to their desperation not to be excluded from fishing, an activity prohibited to non-registrants. Or, they may have registered to provide security against the chronic uncertainties of farming in the cold, wet north. Similar ambiguities surfaced everywhere in Spain. Officials had to distinguish true ocean sailors and shipwrights from the broader population of men who knew a little about boats and coastal waters but nothing about ocean sailing. Officials also had to decide how, if at all, to count men who were aged or disabled but who nonetheless wanted to register.

East of Galicia, officials registered nearly 2,000 mariners in Asturias and over 1,200 in the area known as "The Mountains" (Las Montañas), whose largest city was Santander. At the far eastern end of the Ferrol district, officials in the Basque provinces of Vizcaya (with its capital at Bilbao), and Guipúzcoa (with its capital at San Sebastián) resisted registration as they had done in the past, arguing that it would violate their traditional privileges. Officials in Guipúzcoa sent waves of protests to Madrid, authored by Guipúzcoa. Local officials in Vizcaya also mounted a vigorous resistance to registration but eventually produced a conservative tally of 2,038 mariners and 113 shipwrights. Don Manuel Olarte, the official who sent the tally to Madrid, estimated that there were really about 270 shipwrights: 150 carpenters and 120 caulkers. As in Galicia, many Vizcayans who farmed or exercised an artisanal craft also knew how to handle small boats, and some had experience in ocean sailing as well. Despite their maritime skills, they could legitimately claim to be counted in the non-maritime population. Although there was no official count for Guipúzcoa, a levy in 1739 suggested that the province held approximately 1,500 mariners and shipwrights. The steadfast opposition from Basque officials soon

persuaded the king to exempt both Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya from the general marine registry. In return, local officials agreed to oversee registries kept by local mariners' guilds and to produce naval recruits when the crown requested them, a reminder that local attitudes determined the fate of many government initiatives.

In all, the Department of Ferrol registered nearly 15,000 mariners by the end of 1739. At the time of the registration drive, the total population of the northern coastal region stood at nearly 1.8 million. If we assume that registered shipwrights, officers, gunners, sailors, and those unfit for service counted as heads of households, they and their families would have made up about 1.6 percent of the total regional population. Apprentices and pages presumably would still have been part of their parents' households. In coastal towns alone, mariners and their families would presumably have accounted for a higher proportion of the population.

The Department of Cartagena on the Mediterranean Sea included Catalonia, Mallorca, Valencia, and Murcia. By the end of 1739, local officials throughout the department had registered more than 14,000 mariners. Fifty-two percent of them lived in Catalonia, whose resurgent economy seems to have drawn people to the area around Barcelona in particular. The vast majority (74 percent) of the Catalonian mariners lived in ports from the French border to Barcelona; the rest lived between Barcelona and Cartagena. In the attempt to create a marine registry in 1726, only 6 percent of the 3,000 men who signed up in Catalonia had experience using square and lateen sails on the open ocean. The other 94 percent had sailed only in the Mediterranean. There is no reason to think those proportions had changed by 1739. Officials registered nearly 2,900 mariners in ports on the islands of Mallorca and Ibiza, and just over 2,000 in the district of Valencia. In Murcia, which included the city of Cartagena, nearly 1,900 men joined the registry. The Department of Cartagena as a whole held about 1.8 million inhabitants in 1739, which means that the adult registrants and their families made up about 2.3 percent of the total coastal population.

The Department of Cádiz included both Mediterranean and Atlantic ports, separated by the Strait of Gibraltar. The Málaga district accounted for all the ports on the Mediterranean side, which together registered more than 2,300 men. Some 55 percent of them lived in the port city of Málaga. The four districts west of Gibraltar had been at the center of Spain's Atlantic fishing and commerce since the fifteenth century and continued their links to maritime enterprise in the eighteenth century. The five ports in the tiny Tarifa district near Gibraltar registered fewer than five hundred mariners. The Cádiz district, official hub of Spanish trade with America since 1717, registered more than 4,000. The Seville district had been the official headquarters of the American trade until Cádiz replaced it, though Seville itself lay far inland. Officials registered nearly 1,600 mariners in the district as a whole, which

included the city of Seville and a handful of small towns downstream along the Guadalquivir River. The district defined as the County of Niebla included ports from the estuaries of the Tinto and Odiel rivers to the estuary of the Guadiana River at the Portuguese border. The crews for Columbus's first transatlantic voyage had come from this small area, where more than 1,800 men in nine ports signed up for the marine registry in 1739. In the department of Cádiz as a whole, more than 10,300 mariners registered in 1739, in a total regional population of about 1.6 million. The mature men among them, with their families, would have made up about 1.3 percent of the regional population.

In the first few years following the 1737 decree, officials registered mariners in about three hundred ports in Spain as a whole, a truly Herculean effort. Over half of the ports lay along the convoluted coastline in the department of Ferrol. Another 32 percent of the ports lay in the department of Cartagena, and the remaining 16 percent lay in the department of Cádiz. In all, local officials registered more than 39,000 men and boys connected to the maritime world, the vast majority of them sailors. An estimated 3,500 additional individuals lived in the Basque provinces of Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya, which were not part of the national registry. Together, adult mariners and shipwrights, with their families, made up about 1.7 percent of the Spanish population who lived in coastal provinces, and about 1 percent of the population overall.

The most striking differences among registered mariners had to do with the relative numbers in each job category. Shipwrights made up only 2–3 percent of the registrants in Ferrol and Cartagena, but a full 10 percent in Cádiz, presumably reflecting the greater number of shipwrights for the American trade. Harder to explain was the disparity in the number of gunners: 11 percent of the registrants in Ferrol, 13 percent in Cartagena, and only 3 percent in Cádiz. Sailors, apprentices, and pages accounted for 85 percent of the registrants overall, but with notable differences in the proportions in each group from one department to the next. Sailors made up 37 percent of the registrants in Ferrol, half in Cartagena, and 29 percent in Cádiz. By contrast, apprentices accounted for 41 percent of the registrants in Ferrol, 30 percent in Cartagena, and 51 percent in Cádiz. Perhaps, younger men more readily found alternative employment in the east than in the north and south and were less likely to enroll as mariners. Or, because mariners from the east rarely served on the Indies fleets, younger men in the Cartagena department may have been less attracted to naval service than they were elsewhere.

Negative factors may also have influenced the decision to register. Mature men in the east may have been driven by poverty to sign up in higher proportions, given the varied economic and demographic conditions in the region as a whole. The economic growth that characterized Catalonia in the 1730s may not have extended

much beyond Barcelona, making men with families anxious for the benefits that marine registration offered. Moreover, there is no question that some new recruits in the east came from backgrounds of extreme poverty. The intendent Don Alexo Gutiérrez de Rubalcava reported in July of 1738 that many of the men he had recruited around Cartagena were so poor that they were not used to consuming meat or wine and became ill when first provided with shipboard rations. He reported that he was keeping them on land and serving them fresh meat instead of salted varieties before adding them to ships' crews. Farther south, the arid region between Cartagena and Almería held few people and even fewer economic opportunities, which might have made registration for naval service especially appealing.

In all three departments, men registered who were too old to be useful to the navy but who nonetheless wished to enjoy the privileges and exemptions of registration. For example, Benito Rayoy was a married native of the port of La Coruña in Galicia and a member of the local mariners' guild (*gremio del mar*). At the time of registration, he was about seventy years old and had the gray hair to prove it. His case, and many others like it, forced officials to decide whether to enroll only those fit for service, or to err on the side of compassion and allow the registration process to become a *de facto* application for retirement or disability benefits. Overall, they followed the compassionate course. Men who had in effect already retired, like Benito Rayoy, or men who had been declared invalids, could receive benefits from the government as long as they remained registered in the matriculation books (*libros de matrícula*). A typical sailor who had served the crown was eligible for a pension of one-third his normal salary. In one atypical case, officials recommended a pension at half salary for an eighteen-year-old apprentice. An officer's carelessness had caused him to be hit by an anchor, breaking his collar bone and most of his ribs and rendering him unfit to serve.

The most careful record-keepers listed unfit registrants in a separate category labeled retired (*gente jubilada*), unfit (*inábil*), or useless (*inútil*). Less punctilious officials simply lumped them together with the other registrants. Because men who were unfit to serve because of age or infirmity presumably died at higher rates than their fit colleagues, it is difficult to interpret fluctuations in the number of registrants from one report to the next. Of all the registrants, about 84 percent were fit for service and 16 percent were unfit for one reason or another, but the proportions varied considerably from one department to the next. Ferrol fell close to the average, with 83 percent fit and 17 percent unfit. The comparable figures in Cartagena were 79 percent fit and 21 percent unfit, and in Cádiz, 92 percent fit and 8 percent unfit. It is tempting to conclude from these figures that the registered mariners were simply younger in the department of Cádiz than elsewhere, a speculation supported by the high proportion of apprentices among the registrants. If the Cádiz registrants were indeed

younger, their willingness to sign up might be explained by the lure of the Indies or the scarcity of alternative employment, among other possibilities.

One thing is certain. The registration effort from 1737 to the end of 1739 provided the government for the first time with a global assessment of Spain's maritime population and established the norms for a predictable system of naval recruitment. Just as the registration effort gathered momentum, however, war broke out with England in 1739. Presumably, it would have been easier to register men for indeterminate future service rather than for immediate sea duty. Once war began, the registration effort took on all the characteristics of a wartime levy, and desertions increased. Men from Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya tended to desert in higher numbers than their counterparts elsewhere in the north, but desertion rates were also high elsewhere. In Cádiz, 30.4 percent of the 1,320 men recruited in 1740 deserted within four months while waiting for the fleet to sail. The Marquess of La Ensenada blamed the desertions on an ill-advised combination of severity and laxity. The severity involved mistreatment; the laxity involved giving out too many permissions for shore leave to men of questionable loyalty and allowing sailors to shift from one ship to another, which made them difficult to track. To remedy all three problems, Ensenada ordered local commanders to see that the men received the best possible treatment, that only the most dependable sailors receive shore leave, and that men remain on the ships where they were originally assigned.

The war between Spain and England merged into the generalized War of the Austrian Succession from 1740 to 1748, and Ensenada sailed to Italy with Prince Felipe in 1742 to oversee the interests of the Spanish Bourbons there. In their absence, the registration of mariners and other vital aspects of naval reform slowed to a crawl. José de Campillo, another talented bureaucrat, took over the portfolios of Finance, War, and Marine. He shared his precursors' zeal for naval reform, but the strains of war greatly limited what he could accomplish and may have driven him to an early grave in April of 1743. Ensenada was immediately recalled from Italy and reached Spain in May, but he had to devote nearly all his time and energy thereafter to the continuing war.

From 1740 to 1748 Spain suffered defeats in battle and other disasters that nullified many of the maritime reforms instituted since 1715. Ensenada nonetheless continued to argue that the navy held the key to Spain's revival as a great power. As he wrote to the king in 1747, Spain was more dependent on its maritime forces than other nations because it was on a peninsula and also had to defend extensive territories overseas. In short, the strength of the navy was essential for the strength of the nation and its collection of territories around the globe. One of the key elements in maintaining the navy, as always, was guaranteeing the supply of sailors, and figures from 1748 suggest that the number of registered mariners stood at about

36,000 as the war wound down. Before 1750 the navy probably had 125 large warships and an equal number of smaller vessels, which would have required close to 35,000 crewmen. The need for merchant mariners would raise the total to about 40,000.

From 1748 to 1752 Ensenada launched a renewed program of naval reform and ship construction, with a commitment bordering on obsession. The moribund Almirantazgo was dissolved, and in its place Ensenada crafted a comprehensive set of Naval Ordinances (1748) and revised rules for the marine registry (1751). He remained convinced that Spain should prepare to challenge England at sea, though the new king, Fernando VI, seemed determined to avoid ambitious foreign policy initiatives. Officials restructured the three naval departments, defining nine major divisions in each department and regrouping ports into roughly comparable units or sub-delegations, moving away from jurisdictions defined by custom and historical precedent and toward more rational and scientific principles. Local officials still played key roles in administering the marine registry at the lowest levels, but the 1751 ordinances left no doubt that the head of the navy and his ranked subordinates occupied the top rungs on the bureaucratic ladder.

The new ordinances clarified and modified several points. For example, boys between the ages of nine and fourteen were included in the registry largely to provide a context to learn seafaring skills; at fourteen they could shift onto the regular rolls as apprentices. The king later ruled that even vagabond boys who had been rounded up and sentenced to work in the arsenals could register when they had completed their sentence, without the stigma of vagabondage on their records. The provisions with the most contentious consequences dealt with how—and how often—men could be called into royal service. The king ordered local officials in each town to divide all the registrants into four cohorts balanced in numbers and characteristics. In the ordinary rotation, men selected from each cohort by lot would serve the crown once every four years. During wartime and similar emergencies, entire cohorts could be called up early, though no man or cohort was supposed to serve again until all the other registrants had taken a turn. The 1751 rules also reduced the time a man had to be eligible to serve before retirement: from thirty years of eligibility to eighteen in the regular rotation and to twenty-four years for extraordinary lotteries.

Many men periodically served in the navy who were not registered mariners and therefore did not enjoy the privileges and exemptions of the guild. The sailors from Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa fell into that group. So did the so-called vagabond mariners who chose not to register but who enlisted on royal ships in times of extraordinary need. The 1751 rules provided that any man who had served on royal ships for fifteen years, whether or not he was registered and assuming that he had never deserted or

committed a serious crime, could claim veteran status and enjoy the privileges and exemptions of registered mariners, plus a pension.

The 1751 rules and the administrative apparatus they defined lasted for the rest of the century, leading many historians to designate 1751 as the start of Spain's marine registry. Nonetheless, the essential elements of the system were already in place in 1737. With the clarifications and detailed instructions provided in 1751, Spain's marine registry aimed to be fair, equitable, and beneficial to both the state and the maritime community. From the beginning, however, simultaneous demands for manpower from the navy and the fishing and merchant fleets strained the system. Moreover, exemptions for the Basque provinces and the presence of vagabond and foreign mariners on royal ships often offended registered mariners, as did the crown's periodic inability to pay the men on time.

At the end of the eighteenth century, the Spanish system of marine registration and recruitment collapsed under the strains of war, and it has generally been dismissed as a failed experiment at best or a pernicious example of government coercion at worst. It is worth remembering, however, that all European naval powers faced the problem of recruiting sufficient crews to man their ships. Some countries faced with that dilemma came to rely heavily on press gangs and forced recruitment. In Spain, by contrast, the government retained the principle of voluntary enlistment while restricting all maritime occupations to men willing to register for periodic service in the navy. Established in 1737, and administered by a combination of local and central authority, the marine registry functioned well for nearly six decades, providing predictability for the maritime community and an increasing flow of mariners for the navy, which is what it was designed to do. If financial exigencies had not prevented the government from fulfilling its economic obligations to the registered mariners, the system would arguably have been more successful. Even so, because it was technically based on the principles of voluntary recruitment and local administration, Spain's marine registry provides a useful comparison with systems elsewhere that relied on press gangs and other coercive measures.

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The global extent of Spanish territories during the Habsburg centuries required a robust presence at sea to ensure communication, administration, and defense, in addition to maintaining and defending regular trading networks. The number of ships sailing under Spanish flags, and the men and boys needed to sail them, rose and fell over time, depending on circumstances, but the need for ships and crews was continual. To know the number of mariners available for military needs, the Habsburg dynasty in Spain tried repeatedly to create a marine registry,

starting with discussions in the late sixteenth century and continuing sporadically thereafter. The French government during the reign of Louis XIV created such a registry, in which mariners were required to participate or face harsh penalties. The Spanish government hoped to base its registry on voluntary inscription, but repeated attempts to induce mariners to register failed, especially in important maritime regions such as the Basque provinces of Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa. A Spanish registry was finally established under the Bourbons, but the principle of voluntary registration was largely abandoned. Although registrants were promised numerous benefits, they had little choice but to participate, because all occupations dealing with the sea were restricted to registrants. Moreover, Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa remained apart from the system, because that was the only way the government could ensure a willing supply of mariners from that crucial region.

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